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ABSTRACT 
Water quality problems associated with agricultural nonpoint-source pollution remain 
significant in the majority of US watersheds. In this dissertation, I present a theoretical model of 
water quality that captures the main characteristics of agricultural pollution (the unobservability 
and the interactions between the field-level emissions, the imperfect knowledge of the abatement 
costs), propose and empirically estimate a simplified proxy model for the complex process that 
characterizes the fate and the transport of agricultural pollutants, and apply this model in a 
variety of empirical studies to evaluate alternative policy programs designed to improve water 
quality. Under a linear approximation of the abatement function, more flexible policies like the 
performance standard or trading program may outperform a command-and-control program in 
terms of abatement costs, but they may also result in the non-attainment of the abatement goal. 
However, the incentive-based policies can overcome, partially or totally, the issue of cost 
asymmetries, since the regulator does not need to know the farm-level abatement costs. 
I propose and estimate an approach for linearizing the abatement function using a system 
of point coefficients that measure the impact of an abatement action on the overall abatement 
level. The point coefficients are estimated for nitrogen and phosphorus with consideration that 
the two pollutants have separate abatement functions.  
The empirical assessments of the proposed policies for two agricultural watersheds in 
Iowa show an overall good performance of the incentives based programs: the deviations from 
the abatement goals are not significant and sizable cost savings relative to the command-and-
control programs are realized. A robustness analysis shows that the results are consistent across 
different: (a) pollutants (nitrogen and phosphorus), (b) sets of point coefficients (field-specific 
level, subbasin-specific, or watershed-specific), and (c) the distribution of historical weather. The 
xvii 
 
point approximation procedure is extended to two pollutant markets, where each market uses a 
separate set of point coefficients. Given that the same abatement actions that have the potential to 
increase the amount of carbon sequestration in soil, the point-based trading program is extended 
to allow trading participants to enter a market for carbon, including selling the carbon offsets 
associated with the abatement actions.
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The year 2012 has marked four decades since the main US regulatory act for improving 
water quality was enacted. In spite of the numerous nascent programs that followed, water 
quality pollution from agricultural activity remain a significant problem, particularly in 
watersheds dominated by row crop production1. 
The goal of my dissertation is to propose and evaluate policies that address agricultural 
nonpoint sources. Specifically, my objectives are to: 
1. Present a theoretical model of water quality that captures the main characteristics of the 
pollution within an agricultural watershed.  
2. Propose and empirically estimate a simplified proxy model for the complex process that 
characterizes the fate and transport of agricultural pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorus 
across the watershed. 
3. Apply this model in a variety of empirical studies to evaluate alternative policy programs 
designed to improve water quality. 
In the second chapter, I provide a literature review of the economics of nonpoint source 
pollution associated with agricultural activity. First, I introduce the nonpoint source 
characteristics and review the different policies approaches discussed in the literature on water 
quality trading involving single or multiple pollutants. Next, I explore the literature that links the 
                                                 
1 “A watershed is the area of land where all of the water that is under it or drains off of it goes 
into the same place”.  Watersheds come in all sizes and shapes. In the continental US, there are 
more than 2, 100 watersheds. http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/whatis.cfm.  
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nonpoint source programs and the programs for carbon offsets. Finally, I provide a brief 
description of the simulation models and optimization tools used in my empirical analysis. 
In the third chapter, I propose a simple model of pollution related to agricultural activity 
that captures three types of fundamental characteristics of agricultural nonpoint sources: 
imperfect information on the abatement costs of individual farms, difficulties in observing 
pollution or abatement activities at the farm level, and difficulties in measuring the emissions 
leaving the field. Specifically, I consider a watershed where agriculture is the main source of 
pollution. The regulator or an environmental authority decides to reduce the total level of 
pollution by requiring each field to adopt a specific set of conservation practices or abatement 
actions.  
I begin by assuming that the regulator and the farmers have the same cost information, 
perfect information on the emissions leaving the field and on the water quality production 
function as well. Next, I relax the assumption that the regulator has perfect cost information, 
while keeping the other assumptions constant. In the third case, I assume that for the ease of 
implementation of an incentive-based policy, the water quality production function is 
approximated as a linear combinations of known field level emission reductions. For the last case 
which represents the focus of my dissertation, I propose a method for efficiently identifying a 
system of points to approximate both the edge-of-field reductions and the impact on the total 
ambient level of pollution associated with the abatement actions implemented at the field scale.  
In the fourth chapter, I empirically evaluate three different abatement action based 
policies for improving the water quality where the policies are implemented using the system of 
point coefficients proposed and estimated in Chapter 2. Next, using a detailed biophysical 
watershed based water quality model in conjunction with a range of estimates for the abatement 
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costs, I demonstrate the efficiency tradeoffs implied by the use of a point based system by 
comparing its outcomes to the least cost allocation of conservation practices. 
To establish and identify a baseline of comparison, I first identify the least cost solution 
under the unrealistic assumptions that the amount of emissions leaving a source can be 
measurable and observable under alternative conservation practices, and that the full fate and 
transport of these emissions (i.e., the water quality production function) is fully specified and 
known. Next, I address the design and performance of three practice-based policy approaches, 
ranging from the command-and-control approach mandating practices, to the more flexible 
performance standard approach where farmers are free to select the optimal mix of on-farm 
abatement or conservation practices, to a fully flexible approach where credits or points for 
conservation practices are freely tradable. Under a points-based trading system farmers are 
required to undertake abatement actions that accrue a sufficient number of points per field or per 
acre basis. If, by undertaking a conservation practice they generate more points than their 
minimum requirement, they can sell the extra credits to other farmers in the watershed who do 
not meet their requirements (Kling, 2011). I evaluate the performance of the three policy 
approaches first by considering that the regulator and the farmers have the same cost 
information, and next by considering that the regulator does not know the field-level abatement 
costs, but does not know the distribution of these costs and uses the moments of this costs 
distribution (i.e.; mean) to find the least cost allocation of the abatement actions in the watershed. 
Finding the best solution is not trivial because the underlying water quality production 
function is highly non-linear and non-separable. To overcome this difficulty, I use evolutionary 
algorithms to approximate the solutions. To solve for the trading outcome of the point-based 
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trading system, I use the mixed integer algorithms that incorporate the discrete nature of the 
choices (conservation practices) and the continuous nature of the trading system. 
The proposed point-based trading system has the potential to be implemented for the case 
of a single pollutant (e.g., nitrogen or phosphorus) or multiple pollutants (e.g., nitrogen and 
phosphorus). I compare the efficiency of the three practice-based approaches assuming first that 
the policy approaches are designed only for one of the two pollutants, and next by considering 
the case where both pollutants are simultaneously targeted. I empirically evaluate the 
performance of the above approaches using watershed-based water quality model calibrated for 
two typical Midwestern watersheds. 
Water quality and improved soil are necessary qualities of healthy watersheds, which 
provide local ecosystem services such as improved fishing and wildlife habitat. At the same time, 
soil carbon sequestration is a global ecosystem service and plays an important role in reducing 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). In the fifth chapter, I analyze the impact of a carbon offset market on 
the efficiency of an already established water quality program. My analysis departs from 
previous research by considering the participation in a carbon offset market, a global 
environmental good, as a co-benefit of a water quality trading program with local effects. This 
chapter highlights the changes in the total cost of achieving an ambient level for water quality 
when farmers are allowed to participate in two parallel markets: a water quality trading program, 
and a carbon market where they can sell carbon offsets associated with their abatement actions. 
The water quality trading program is a local trading program (i.e., at the watershed or state 
level), while the carbon market is a wider market (i.e., nationwide) with no specific cap 
requirements at farm level. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The Federal Water Pollution Act—the main US main regulatory framework for water 
pollution control—has been in use for four decades (Shortle and Horan 2013). The act, also 
known as the Clean Water Act, emerged as a consequence of the rising concerns related to the 
water quality in the late 1960s. The legislation places stringent regulations on industrial and 
municipal polluters (i.e., point sources), but does not specify any regulations for agricultural 
polluters (i.e., nonpoint sources). In spite of the numerous efforts in reducing water pollution, 
water quality remains a significant problem, as underlined by several studies conducted by the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), such as the National Summary of Assessed Water 
Report and the National Rivers and Streams Assessment 2008–2009. 
The latest National Summary of Assessed Water Report assessed 28% of rivers and 
streams, and 43% of the lakes in the United States. Of the assessed rivers and streams, 53% were 
found to be impaired; and of the assessed lakes, 82% were found to be impaired for their 
designated uses. The report designates agriculture as being the leading source of river and stream 
impairments, the third largest source for lake and pond impairments, and the fifth largest 
contributor of wetland impairments. 
The National Rivers and Streams Assessment 2008–2009 (NRSA) is the first statistically 
based survey on water quality of all rivers and streams. The survey reports that 55% of the 
nation’s river and stream miles do not support aquatic life because of the high content of 
phosphorus and nitrogen, with 23% being in fair condition, and 21% being in good condition. 
Overall, the study found that the nation’s river and streams are under “significant stress.” The 
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study also stated “[r]educing nutrient pollution and improving habitat will significantly improve 
the biological health of the rivers and streams and support important uses as swimming and 
fishing.” The study also suggested that in spite of the fact that many actions have been taken 
towards improving water quality, “…we need to address the many sources of pollution—
including runoff from urban areas, agricultural practices, and wastewater—in order to ensure 
healthier water for future generations.” 
Both studies pointed out the significance of water pollution commonly produced by 
agricultural pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorus, and restate the fact that achieving the 
desired standards of water quality cannot be done through controlling the point source only 
(Ribaudo 2009). Emphasizing the contributing role of agriculture to water pollution, Ribaudo et 
al. (2008) noted that the complete elimination of nitrogen point sources across the United States 
would reduce the total nitrogen emissions by only 10%. This fact is not surprising, given that 
71% of the US crop land (more than 300 million acres) is located in watersheds where at least 
one of the most common surface water pollutants is above the accepted levels for aquatic 
activities (Ribaudo 2009).  
As water quality issues became a stringent problem with social and environmental 
implications, they started receiving attention from the environmental economists. In the next 
section, I present a short review of the economics of water quality focusing on the relevant issues 
stemming from the agricultural activity. 
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2.2. The Economics of Nonpoint Source 
Traditionally, urban and industrial polluters are identified as point sources, while 
agricultural polluters are identified as nonpoint sources. Over time, the industrialized countries 
have shifted their attention from water pollution created by point sources towards the water 
pollution created by agricultural runoff (Olmstead 2010). 
As defined by EPA, point sources are “any discernible, confined, and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete 
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate 
collection system, or vessel or other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.” Thus, point sources can be identified and their emissions can be properly measured 
at a relatively low cost. It is assumed that there are no stochastic elements or errors in emissions 
measurement. This makes the polluters easily to be identified and thus made accountable for 
their emissions. Examples of point sources are industrial facilities and sewage treatment plants—
they emit pollutants from a fixed and identifiable point such as a pipe or outfall.  
Nonpoint sources result from “…precipitation, land runoff, infiltration, drainage, 
seepage, hydrologic modification, or atmospheric depositions. As runoff from rainfall or 
snowmelt moves, it picks up and transports natural pollutants and pollutants resulting from 
human activity, ultimately depositing them into rivers, lakes, wetlands, coastal waters, and 
groundwater.” (EPA 2003). As the definition suggests, nonpoint source pollution or runoff is 
stochastic in nature because: (a) it is a weather driven process, and (b) it involves a complex 
transportation process from the production’s site to the location where the ambient pollution can 
be measured. Nonpoint sources do not discharge at particular receptors, their emissions or 
loadings being diffuse. Thus, nonpoint source emissions’ diffuse nature makes the loadings more 
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difficult and more costly to measure. Nonpoint sources can be identified as emissions coming 
from mobile sources, leaching, and runoff from farm fields. There is uncertainty about the 
contribution of each polluter to the total amount of pollution.  
Agriculture is the primary contributor of runoff creating nonpoint source pollution and 
the main cause of water pollution in the United States (EPA 2007). Three main forms of 
agricultural nonpoint sources have been identified: sediments, nutrients such as nitrogen and 
phosphorus, and pesticides. 
To sum up, point and nonpoint emissions differ in the following: (a) point loadings are 
deterministic while the nonpoint ones are stochastic; (b) the effectiveness of control efforts is 
certain for point sources but uncertain for nonpoint sources; and (c) loadings from point sources 
can be measured directly, whereas nonpoint sources loadings can be estimated (Malik et al. 
1993). 
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 emerged as a 
consequence of the rising concerns related to the water quality in the late 1960s.2 The Act 
establishes the National Pollution Discharged Elimination System Permit (NPDES), requiring 
each point source to comply with quantitative effluent limits established for each pollutant. To 
date, the point source compliance with these standards has been successful, but there is evidence 
that the gains from controlling them are constantly diminishing (Olmstead 2010). In spite of the 
increasing evidence regarding nonpoint sources as the main contributors to water pollution, the 
Clean Water Act does not directly address them. There are two sections within the Act that 
provide recommendations for nonpoint sources: section 319 of the 1987 Clean Water Act, and 
                                                 
2 The fire on the Cuyahoga River, Ohio, in 1969 was the worst fire since the mid-1800s (Fisher 
and Olmstead 2013) 
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section 303 (d) also known as Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL). Section 319 provides the 
legal framework for funding voluntary or monitoring programs, while the TMDL section 
requires each state to establish pollution budgets for each water body that does not meet the 
ambient water quality standards for designated uses (i.e., recreational public and industrial water 
supply use). 
2.3. Policies for Mitigating the Nonpoint-source Pollution  
While the regulatory framework does not allow for direct enforceable caps on the 
agricultural nonpoint sources, environmental and agricultural economists have been studying the 
design of efficient programs to address nonpoint sources water pollution from agriculture for 
decades. Over time, different policy options have been proposed to mitigate the nonpoint source 
pollution. These policies can be characterized as voluntary programs, command-and-control 
programs, and economic instruments such as input and ambient taxes and tradable permit 
systems.  
The voluntary programs can be characterized as: (a) voluntary self-regulating actions 
undertaken by the polluters; (b) negotiated contracts between environmental regulators and 
polluters where the participation is determined by both parties; and (c) voluntary government 
programs where a federal or state authority establishes eligibility and the rewards criteria (B.M. 
Dowd et al. 2008). 
Command-and-control programs have been successfully used to regulate point sources, 
but since there is a lack of a regulatory framework, there have been few attempts for regulating 
nonpoint sources. Command-and-control programs for nonpoint source can be implemented by 
requiring farmers to adopt different measures to reduce the emissions, such as the 
implementation of conservation or best management practices. Imposing performance standards 
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by which the polluters must comply is another way to impose a command-and-control policy 
(B.M. Dowd et al. 2008). 
Price instruments such as input and ambient taxes have also been pointed out as possible 
policy instruments for nonpoint sources. An input tax can be imposed on a farm input such as the 
use of chemical fertilizers. It has been shown that input taxes, set at the point where they equal 
the abatement costs are an efficient way to achieve environmental standards (Shortle and Horan 
2001). Griffin and Bromley (1982) showed, using an input-based model for nonpoint sources, 
that taxing the inputs that increase pollution and subsidizing the inputs that decrease it replicates 
the tax on pollution. Shortle et al. (1998) showed that a targeted tax, where polluters who 
contribute more are taxed more heavily, is more cost effective than a uniform tax.  
Effluent taxes for points sources are a common way for controlling water pollution being 
implemented in several countries (Olmestead 2010).Segerson (1988) was the first to advocate 
ambient or subsidies taxes for nonpoint source. An ambient-based tax scheme is based on the 
group performance rather than an individual one. It penalizes the polluters when the ambient 
pollution level goes beyond a given level and rewards them when the ambient pollution level is 
lower than the standard. Shortle and Horan (2001) pointed out that an ambient tax might not be 
efficient in the case of nonpoint source, since the emissions are influenced by the weather and 
stochastic elements, and it could not recognize the actions taken by the farmers located 
downstream the watershed.  
Additionally, Vanden-Fisher and Olmstead (2013) and Shortle (2013) are two of the most 
recent surveys that provide a comprehensive review of the policy instruments for water quality 
pollution with particular focus on nonpoint source pollution. Besides assessing the current status 
of the water quality programs in the US and worldwide, the surveys provide useful insights about 
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lessons learned so far as well about the research needed for improving the efficiency of the 
policy. 
Market-based instruments, such as trading programs, have been regarded as successful 
instruments for a broad range of environmental problems such as air pollution control, habitat 
protection and resource compensation. Based on the historical achievements of the Acid Rain 
Program, which used tradable permits for sulfur dioxide emissions, market-based instruments 
have been proposed to address water pollution control, as they can create a more cost effective 
approach for achieving the environmental goals. Next, I provide a short review of the evolution 
of permit-based trading systems—how they evolved, and how they relate to the water quality. 
2.4. Overview of Trading Systems to for Pollution Externalities 
The idea of using market mechanisms to correct economic externalities goes back to Coase 
(1960). A few years later, Dales (1968) applied the idea of market mechanism to the water 
pollution problem. Montgomery (1972) was the first to provide the theoretical foundations of a 
trading market based on pollution permits.  
An ambient pollution system (Montgomery 1972) assumes that permits are issued for 
each receptor. There is a market for each receptor, and a polluter needs to have a portfolio of 
permits to cover all receptors. If a polluter changes his behavior, he needs to find a trading 
partner for each receptor. Trading ratios are determined by an exogenous transfer coefficient 
matrix. Transaction costs are high because there is a market for each receptor point. In addition, 
Krupnick et al. (1983) showed that in order to have an equivalence between the least-cost and 
market solutions, the initial allocation of permits must make the pollution constraint binding at 
all receptor points, otherwise the solutions diverge if the actual water quality is higher than the 
environmental standard (i.e., the water quality standard is not binding). Only when the 
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environmental constraints are binding at all receptor points are all trade possibilities exhausted. 
Hung and Shaw (2005) showed that it is unusual to make all standards binding, which means that 
the most cost effective way is not always achieved. 
Krupnick et al. (1983) proposed a solution to fix this inconvenience: a permit offset 
system. In this framework polluters are free to trade as long as environmental standards are not 
violated at any receptor point. If this is the case, then the trade takes place with trading ratio 
given by the ratio of the two sources’ transfer coefficients, thus the trading ratios are determined 
endogenously. Polluters are required to have permits just for the receptor points where quality 
will be impaired as a result of an increase in emissions, thus transaction costs are lower than in 
an ambient permit system. Other caveats associated with this system are free riders and high 
transaction costs. 
An exchange rate trading system was proposed as an alternative to endogenous trading 
ratios. Trading ratios are set up exogenously as being equal to the ratios’ of the polluters 
marginal abatement cost in the least-cost solution. The burden of the cost is transferred to the 
environmental authority that needs information about polluters’ marginal costs. There is the risk 
that some initial environmental constraints will be violated after the trade takes place. 
Most research to date has been focused on modeling trading systems that included either 
only point source or both point and nonpoint sources (Montgomery 1972; Krupnik et al. 1983; 
Shortle and Abler 1997; Huang and Show 2005).Trading systems between point and nonpoint 
sources are based on the fact that, in general, the abatement costs for nonpoint sources is lower 
than the abatement costs for point sources. There are two main questions related to these trading 
systems: what to trade, and the ratio at which one can trade. Regarding what to trade, two 
designs have been proposed. In the first design, increments in point sources emissions are traded 
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for reductions in nonpoint-sources estimated loadings; this system has been regarded as a 
trading-emissions-for-loadings system. In the second design—a trading-emissions-for-inputs 
system—point sources emission permits are traded for nonpoint-source (NPS) permits, which in 
turn restrict the use of polluting inputs (i.e., fertilizer), or influence the adoption of a 
conservation practice (Horan et al. 2002). Since the point and nonpoint sources might have 
different contributions to total pollution, a trading ratio must be determined in order to achieve 
water quality goals.  
The trading ratio reflects the rate at which nonpoint-source emission reductions are traded 
for point-source emission increases. Because estimated loadings are imperfect substitutes for 
nonpoint-sources emissions, the ratio should be different than one. Existing literature provides 
little guidance, but suggests that factors such as the relative marginal contributions of point and 
nonpoint sources, the degree of environmental risk impacts, correlations between environmental 
and cost relationships, and the overall level of heterogeneity associated with point and nonpoint 
sources influence the magnitude of the optimal trading ratio (Horan et al. 2002). An optimal ratio 
should encourage more control for the source whose emission generates the most risk and is 
most costly to be controlled.  
The trading ratio can be equal to, greater than, or less than one. A ratio equal to one 
implies indifference at the margin between the sources of control. Ratios less than one imply a 
low abatement cost of nonpoint control relative to point sources control, and thus preference for 
nonpoint-sources reductions, and the opposite is true for a ratio greater than one (Shortle and 
Abler 2005). 
Horan and Shortle (2005) explained why the observed trading ratio should be greater than 
one, and not less than one as theory predicts. By setting up a model for point and nonpoint 
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pollution trading, they found that the ratio is higher because the number of point permits is 
decided by a federal authority, whereas the state authority has to determine the number of 
nonpoint sources permits and trading ratios in such a way as to achieve environmental goals. 
Their results assume away the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness in the reductions of 
nonpoint-source emissions, instead accounting only for uncertainty related to weather and other 
environmental drivers. 
Hung and Shaw (2005) proposed a system for trading pollution discharge permits in a 
river area. Their model proposed an exogenous trading ratio. Dividing the river into many zones, 
and accounting for the unidirectional characteristic of river flow, the trading ratio defines the 
amount by which a polluter can increase emissions if he buys t permits from a polluter situated in 
another zone. Their model is cost effective in achieving environmental goals, and given the 
assumptions that are made, it can get rid of issues like transaction costs and hotspots. One major 
critique to this model is the fact that it considers just point source emissions. The trading ratio 
system model proposed by Huang and Shaw (2005) brought significant improvements regarding 
transaction costs, least-cost effectiveness, and free rider or hotspot issues to previous existing 
trading systems such as the ambient permit system, the permit offset system, or the exchange 
ratio system; however, it does not incorporate uncertainty. Uncertainty is strongly related to 
nonpoint pollution sources and nonpoint aspects of the loadings are being ignored in this model. 
Incorporating nonpoint sources would change the model fundamentally, because the trading ratio 
has to be defined in term of trading point sources permits with nonpoint permits. The trading 
ratio should reflect the relative expected marginal damage impacts from each source and the 
relative uncertainty created by each source (Horan 2005). 
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An extension to the above models that incorporates a zonal approach and nonpoint source 
was brought by Lankoskyet et al. (2008). They derived an optimal point-nonpoint effluent 
trading ratio that considered heterogeneity of the emissions and heterogeneity of the 
environmental impacts of those emissions. They showed that spatial heterogeneity can 
significantly affect the political attractiveness of effluent trading. 
In the context of the point-nonpoint trade, the EPA recommendations are limited to offset 
programs rather than to cap-and-trade programs. Under an offset program, only the polluters 
facing regulations (i.e., point sources) have incentive to purchase offsets or reductions. Under a 
cap-and-trade system, a maximum emission for a particular pollutant is decided and distributed 
across polluters in the watershed as permits or polluting rights; however, in order to create 
incentives for the nonpoint source then they should face similar regulations as the point sources.  
2.5. Trading Systems for Nonpoint Source Pollution 
Several types of permit trading systems for nonpoint-source discharges have been 
proposed: an ambient permit system, a zonal permit system, and a pollution offset system. 
Morgan et al. (2000) proposed a marketable permit trading scheme to manage the nitrate 
pollution of groundwater supplies for rural communities with intensive agricultural activity with 
the level of nitrates monitored at the level of drinking water. The authors used a soil and 
groundwater transportation model to predict the nitrate leaching rates from a particular crop area. 
According to their model, the contribution of each farm is weighted by a delivery coefficient 
determined exogenously. The permit trading system is defined as an ambient permit system, with 
the permits being denominated in terms of nitrate emissions measured at a receptor point (e.g., a 
well). 
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Their proposed ambient permit system integrates three models: a production model, a soil 
model, and a groundwater model. The production model defines the profits as a function of yield, 
with yields being defined as a function of fertilizer, agricultural practices, and crop rotations. 
Next, the abatement costs are defined as the difference in profits before any regulation is 
imposed and the profits after the regulations are adopted. The farm minimizes its abatement 
costs, where the costs are defined as the sum of the loss of profits and the expenditure on 
permits. The soil model estimates the water and the nitrogen emissions associated with each 
practice, and the groundwater model simulates the nitrate’s fate to the water through 
groundwater.  
In addition to estimating the delivery coefficients, the marginal abatement costs, and the 
initial permit allocation, the authors also underlined the importance of the baseline and the 
timing. The authors simulated the trading outcomes over the span of several years and assumed 
that the permit price is determined in a repeated auction. Farmers make the trading decision by 
comparing the equilibrium price with the marginal abatement cost. The abatement cost is higher 
for the farms whose emissions have the greatest impact on the water quality measured at a 
specific well. Their model is one of the first papers that showed how using different tools (i.e., a 
soil and a groundwater model) can be used to transform the nonpoint-source problem into point 
source, and how point source policies can be applied to the nonpoint. 
Ermoliev et al. (2000) discussed the trading mechanisms in pollution permit markets. 
Their normative findings showed that, in the case of an ambient permit system with a single 
receptor, the market cost minimization solution is also the least-cost solution regardless of the 
transaction type: bilateral or sequential. In the case of multiple receptors, the convergence of the 
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solutions is assured if the transactions are sequential and multilateral, and hence a source 
supplying permits needs at least two trading partners. 
Lock and Kerr (2007), in a background paper, analyzed the decisions that need to be 
made for setting up a nutrient trading system, such as identifying a target, allocating the 
allowances, and setting up a monitoring system. According to them, the water quality goal needs 
to take into account both cost benefit analysis and political aspects. Next, a nutrient trading 
system should be made available only to the nonpoint sources. Furthermore, the trading cap 
needs to be expressed in units that can be easily allocated across the polluting sources. They also 
emphasize the importance of mapping the nutrient losses to the allowances needed.  
In a follow-up paper, Kerr et al. (2007) introduced a permit trading system for nonpoint 
sources for a watershed that drains in a lake (a single receptor point). Zonal permits are created 
to account for the time it takes emissions leaving the field to reach the lake. Hence, zones are 
distinguished by years, rather than distance, and the permits depend on the year in which the 
emissions reach the lake. In their setting there is a market for each type of permit, where the 
permit type is given each year. The trading cap (the maximum acceptable emissions in a given 
year) associated with a market determines the total number of permits of a given type. Hence, 
permits across different markets can be traded at a ratio of one to one. 
Prabodanie et al. (2009) proposed a nitrate-emissions-based pollution offset trading 
system applicable to a small-scale watershed. They used a leaching loss model to estimate the 
nitrate emissions from different land uses and the size of the permit required at field level, a 
transport model to estimate the a matrix of delivery coefficients, and a linear programing model 
that used the information based on the demand and supply of permits to determine the optimal 
trades. The size of a nitrate permit is equal to the estimated nitrate emissions from a land-use 
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option at field level, where the land-use options are defined as a combination of factors such as 
type of crop or stock, timing, method and rate of fertilizer applications, and other land 
management practices. The authors used a nitrate transport model to estimate a matrix of 
delivery coefficients. They simulated the impact of field emissions at a given receptor at 
different points in time. A linear relationship is assumed between the emissions leaving the field 
and the impact at the receptor. Finally, they used a linear program to determine the price and 
permit allocations that maximize the total surplus in the permit market subject to water quality 
standards and initial permit allocations. The authors simulated the outcomes of their proposed 
trading system using a hypothetical groundwater watershed draining into a lake, with six farms 
and five land options. An environmental authority decides environmental standards for two 
receptors and allocates the nitrate permits among the farms to satisfy the standards. Within the 
trading system, every farm estimates the profits from each land-use option and submits five 
bids/offers. The prices depend on the farm size and are equal to shadow prices of the individual 
environmental constraints. Their findings showed that the pollution offset trading, while 
incurring small transactions costs, can achieve environmental constraints in a cost efficient way. 
2.6. Solving for the Least-cost Allocation  
To improve the water quality, best management practices or conservation practices that 
involve either the retirement of land from production, or practices that can be implemented 
parallel with the agricultural activity, have been viewed as potential ways to reduce the adverse 
effects of agriculture on water quality.3 There are many studies that have modeled and 
                                                 
3 Examples of conservation practices that can be used together with the agricultural activity are 
no till, cover crops, and reducing the fertilizer application rate. 
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researched the impact of different conservation practices on reducing the nitrate, phosphorus, and 
sediment loading both at field level and at the watershed scale as well (Vache et al. 2002; 
Maringanti et al. 2009; Panagopoulus et al. 2011; Inamdar et al. 2001). The effectiveness of a 
conservation practice in reducing the field emissions depends on a various number of factors: the 
field characteristics such as soil, slope, location, and mostly importantly the conservation 
practices on the adjacent fields and elsewhere in the watershed. This implies that the off field 
impacts on the total pollution cannot be accurately determined as a proportion of the emissions 
generated at field level (Rabotyagov et al. 2010). 
There are a number of federal and state programs that provide either cost-sharing or full 
financial support for the implementation of conservation practices in agricultural areas. A 
primary concern in administering the limited public funds is finding the most cost effective way 
to allocate the conservation practices (Schleich and White 1997; Rabotyagov et al. 2010). This is 
equivalent to solving the least-cost placement of the conservation practices under a limited 
budget. Solving for the least-cost allocation is also relevant for the instance when a cap is set on 
the total level of pollution, and a regulator is interested in finding the least-cost method to 
achieve that cap or pollution target. 
The water pollution in a watershed is a spatially complex process that involves many 
nonpoint sources. Additionally, there is an imperfect relation between adopting a conservation 
practice and its efficiency in reducing field emissions (Malik et al. 1994; Crutchfield et al. 1994). 
Many of these problems have been overcome by the development of the physically based, 
spatially distributed models that are able to simulate the impact of different conservation 
practices at field level and the field emissions’ fate and transport to the main watershed receptor 
where the ambient pollution level is measured.  
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Finding the optimal placement of conservation practices in a watershed is a discrete 
optimization problem with the search space defined by the possible combinations of the fields 
located in the watershed and the available conservation practices.  
Schleich and White (1997) were among the first to show how linear programming models 
can be used to identify the least-cost solution to reach the predetermined targets for a watershed 
in Wisconsin. Their model included both point and agricultural sources, with the latter being 
aggregated in subwatersheds. By aggregating costs and phosphorus data for each source, the 
model identified what source should be the target. The model primarily selected the 
subwatersheds as areas to be policy targets for achieving the desired reductions. 
Khanna et al. (2003), using an integrated framework that combines the spatial and 
biophysical attributes with a hydrological and economic model, developed an analytical 
framework to determine cost effective cropland enrollment in the Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program, a program designed for reducing off-site sediment. Their study 
highlights the fact that the amount of sediment transported from a field to a water body also 
depends on the land-use decisions on the upslope and downslope fields. Therefore, the 
contribution of each field to the total amount of sediment (the transport or delivery coefficient) 
needs to be determined jointly or endogenously with the land-use decisions of all the other fields. 
In order to cope with the complexity of the water pollution process, the authors focused on a 
narrow strip of land up the stream and only two alternatives for each field: crop production and 
land retirement. Additionally, they show that the payments per acre offered for the land 
enrollment should take into account the field’s location and specific characteristics. 
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2.7. Linking the Water Quality Programs to a Carbon Offset Market 
The last chapter of my dissertation explores the conceptual links between a nonpoint-
source program for water quality and a carbon offset market. Since many of the same land 
management actions that improve water quality also may store carbon in soils, it is natural to 
study the possible links between the two trading markets. In this section, I review the literature 
that examines the links developed between the two markets. 
Carbon has been found in all living organisms, and can be found in many forms such as 
plant biomass, and soil organic matter. Carbon sequestration can be defined as the long-term 
storage of carbon that can be found in oceans, soils, and geologic formation, with soils 
containing more than 75% of the carbon pool. Carbon sequestrated in the soil, also known as soil 
carbon matter, is the result of the life cycle of a plant. During the process of photosynthesis, 
plants assimilate carbon—some of it is released into the atmosphere as carbon respiration, some 
of it remains as plant tissue. The latter one is added to the soil as the plant decays and 
decomposes. Many factors determine how long the carbon remains in soils, such as climatic 
conditions, natural vegetation, soil texture, etc. 
The amount of carbon in the atmosphere that was once stored in the top soils has 
increased by more than 30% in the last 150 years. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that 
the higher level of atmospheric carbon dioxide is contributing to the rising levels of global 
temperature. It has been established that soils have a great potential to store up to five times more 
carbon than currently, given that the current land management is changed (Lal et al. 1998). For 
example, conservation tillage can enhance the carbon sequestration in soils by minimizing or 
even eliminating the manipulation of the soil before a new crop production. Cover crops offer 
another example of conservation practice that can enhance the soil structure by adding organic 
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matter to the soil. Given that many of the same land management practices that store carbon in 
soils also may improve water quality, it is natural to study the possible links between the two 
markets. 
Although trading programs involving nonpoint sources and carbon sequestration offsets 
have many similar characteristics, the two literatures have developed separately and have used 
different language to describe the policies related to credit trading. Stephenson and Bosch (2003) 
summarized the lessons learned from nonpoint-source and carbon sequestration credit trading 
and identified some possible areas where the two programs can overlap and improve the policy 
design for trading programs for environmental protection. They found that areas such as 
measurement uncertainty, baselines, leakage and trading flexibility are treated differently in the 
two settings, but the lessons learned can be used to improve the cross design of these programs 
(nonpoint sources and carbon). 
The conservation payments, such as the Conservation Security Program and the 
Environmental Incentive Quality Program, also known as green payments, have been considered 
as possible policy instruments to induce the adoption of conservation practices that can enhance 
the amount of carbon sequestrations.  
A larger number of previous studies have investigated the environmental benefits 
associated with land retirement programs. Antle et al. (2001) compared the relative cost 
efficiency of two alternative policies. Under the first policy, farmers receive payments for land 
retirement. Under the second policy, farmers receive payments for changing their crop rotations. 
The authors linked an econometric cost model with carbon simulation model to obtain estimates 
for the marginal cost of sequestration that accounts for both spatial heterogeneity in land use and 
the rates of carbon sequestrations. Their empirical findings for the agricultural area in the 
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Northern Plains show that the first policy is a relatively inefficient way to increase carbon in soil, 
and the second policy has the potential to increase the carbon sequestration at a much lower cost. 
Feng et al. (2006) investigated the carbon sequestration potential and the corresponding 
co-benefits associated with land retirement policies, where farmers are paid to take land out of 
production, and a working land program where farmers are paid to adopt certain conservation 
practices by considering an index of multiple environmental benefits such as soil erosion 
reduction, carbon sequestration, and nutrient discharge reductions. They found that conservation 
payment policies that maximize the land enrollment provide higher carbon benefits than the 
payments designed to maximize other carbon benefits. Another finding of the same research 
shows that a working land program is more cost effective for low targets of environmental 
improvement, while a land retirement program provides better benefits for higher target levels. 
The concept of participating in multiple markets, where the participation is driven by the 
same abatement action, is known as credit stacking or double dipping. Woodward (2001) 
attempted to answer the question of whether or not it is socially optimal to allow for double 
dipping. He considered a multiple pollutant abatement cost technology where the pollutants are 
complements, meaning that the abatement actions that reduce one pollutant also reduce the other 
pollutant. Two cases were considered: a multiple or double dipping policy market and a single 
market policy. Under the multiple market policy, firms can sell credits generated by the same 
abatement action in multiple markets, while under a single market policy firms can participate 
only in a single market. To find which policy, the single or double market, yields higher benefits, 
the authors analyzed the degree of complementarities between the two pollutants, the degree of 
heterogeneity among the pollution abating firms, and the slopes of the marginal benefit curve. 
They also pointed out that the caps in the two markers have to take into account the possible 
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complementarities. The authors found that a multiple market policy leads to the cost effective 
outcomes when the caps are set up correctly (i.e., the caps are set by taking into account the 
interactions between pollutants) when there is evidence for substantial complementarities, and 
when the marginal benefit curves a single market policy is preferable. 
Reeling and Gramig (2012) investigated the possible cost and environmental implications 
of using the carbon offsets to fund the conservation practices targeted for improving the water 
quality. The authors used a novel approach that combined the outputs provided by a GHG model 
and a hydrological model with a genetic algorithm optimization to determine the optimal 
placement of different conservation practices. Their findings showed that the emissions trading 
markets that are proposed under the Kyoto protocol have the potential to improve the outcomes 
of water quality programs. 
Yeo et al. (2012) recognized that many abatement practices adopted by farmers can 
reduce both the GHG emissions and the nutrient runoff, and that there is a potential cost savings 
from having two pollution permit trading schemes running simultaneously. The authors modeled 
the abatement costs, the potential level of total cost savings, and the environmental impacts 
under three scenarios farmers are allowed to participate in: the nitrogen trading market only, the 
GHG emission trading scheme, and two markets simultaneously. Their model was calibrated for 
a watershed in New Zealand, New Zealand being the first country worldwide to implement a 
trading scheme for trading GHG. Several findings emerge from their study: (a) the total level of 
GHG is lower when the two markets function simultaneously; (b) there is an inverse relationship 
between the permit price in the nutrient markets and the price of carbon offsets; and, (c) the 
amount of abated nutrient is does not change in the presence of the two markets, but decreases 
with the permit price for nitrogen. 
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2.8. Modeling and Optimization Techniques 
In addition to building on previous literature in nonpoint emission trading, I use a number 
of models and tools to evaluate the empirical part of my dissertation. In this section, I provide a 
short description of these tools. Difficulties in establishing a direct link between the agriculture 
activity and ambient pollution level measured at receptors, where each source is made liable for 
its discharges, has been one of the main impediments in the development of a trading system that 
approaches agricultural nonpoint sources. Better understanding of the interactions between 
agriculture activity and water quality has been achieved with development of a hydrological 
model. 
2.8.1.  Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) 
The Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) is a complex water quality watershed-
based hydrological model developed by the US Department of Agriculture to simulate the impact 
of point and nonpoint-source emissions (Arnold et al. 1998; Arnold and Fohrer 2005; Gasmann 
et al. 2008). The model is designed to run watershed simulations based on a wide range of inputs 
such as climate data (precipitation, temperature, etc.), soils characteristics information (slope, 
soil quality, topography, erosion, etc.), plant growth and crop rotations, nutrient management, 
nutrient transport and transformation, and land use and management practices. Using the above 
data as input, SWAT outputs consist of in stream concentration estimates for nitrogen, 
phosphorous and sediment loadings. The output provides overall measures of the concentrations, 
as well as detailed information about the components of each type of discharge. For example, for 
nitrogen loadings, I can retrieve detailed information about components of nitrogen loadings. 
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The obtained information can be used to predict watershed loadings on a wide time range, from 
daily to annual estimates. 
The SWAT model is used to estimate the changes in nutrient loadings as a response to 
alternative conservation practices under different crop choices and rotation alternatives. In order 
to run simulations, the watershed, a well-defined geographical entity, is divided into several 
subwatersheds or subbasins. In SWAT, each subwatershed is delineated further into small 
hydrological response units (HRU). An HRU is a conceptual entity, with no precise spatial 
location within the subwatershed, and identified as a percentage of the area in the subwatershed 
with homogenous soil, land use, and management practices. The primary water and loading 
simulations are made at the HRU level. The estimated loadings can be interpreted as edge-of-
field runoff emissions. The nutrient loadings measured at the final outlet located at the base of 
the subwatershed are obtained by adding the loadings corresponding to each HRU that 
previously have been routed through a network of channels and reservoirs. 
The development of hydrological models like SWAT, calibrated with watershed specific 
data, makes the simulation of impact on water quality of different watershed scenarios possible. 
A watershed is divided into hundreds of fields, and each field may have multiple agricultural 
practices that are suitable for its type of soils. For example, for a set of 9 agricultural practices 
and 2,900 fields, the total number of possible watershed scenarios is 9ଶ,ଽ଴଴ possible scenarios. 
Using SWAT, a water quality level can be estimated for each watershed configuration. With 
appropriate economic data the cost of agricultural activity associated with a particular scenario 
can be assessed. The question arises: which of those scenarios is most desirable from a cost 
and/or pollution reduction perspective? Unfortunately, the high dimensionality of the problem 
makes finding a solution through traditional optimization tools practically impossible. 
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2.8.2. Evolutionary Algorithms 
One way to deal with the combinatorial nature of the watershed simulation-optimization 
model is the implementation of an evolutionary algorithm. Evolutionary or genetic algorithms 
are designed to mimic biological evolution, considered by Mitchel (1996) to be “in effect….a 
method of searching for solutions among an enormous set of possibilities.” Genetic algorithms 
are heuristic global search algorithms that are able to find the nearly optimal solution by using 
principles like “natural selection” and “survival of the fittest.” The first studies that use 
evolutionary algorithms for finding the “nearly optimal” solution for conservation practices best 
placement were published only in the early 2000s, even though the theoretical background for 
evolutionary computation started at the beginning of the 1950s. 
The main terminology used in defining evolutionary algorithms s is similar to that used in 
biology, and consists of terms such as: population, genome, individual, allele set, offspring, 
recombination, mutation, etc. In a broad sense, a population is defined by the individuals that 
share the same defining elements or characteristics known as an allele set (allele set or genome). 
Within a population, each individual has a unique combination of genes from the allele set. The 
evolution process is an iterative, continuous, and dynamic process that allows the formation of 
new generations from an original population. The evolutionary process assumes that only the 
fittest individuals (the ones that have the best characteristics or genes) can generate offspring 
(known as crossover) by combining their genes. However, with a given probability, an offspring 
can suffer mutations. Following the crossover process a new generation or population is created. 
This process can span over an unlimited number of generations. 
Genetic or evolutionary algorithms can successfully handle optimizations problems: (a) 
that have a large space whose characteristics are not well known or have complex properties 
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such as nonconvexities and discontinuities; (b) are complex; and (c) when a solution near global 
is acceptable.  
In the context of agricultural pollution, the goal is to find the watershed configuration that 
achieves a predefined level of water quality in the least-cost way. If the number of fields and 
conservation practices are small enough, given a set of costs, one could evaluate each possible 
combination of fields and conservation practice to find the corresponding costs and water quality 
levels and rank order the solutions. As mentioned earlier, in a watershed there are at least a few 
hundred fields, and considering only two conservation practices, the number of possible 
combinations increases exponentially. However, the least-cost allocation problem can be 
emulated as an evolutionary process where: (a) a watershed represents an individual, (b) a field 
in the watershed represents a gene, and (c) the set of agricultural practices represents the allele 
set (the properties a field can take). Hence, an individual (a watershed) is defined by a particular 
combination of fields and conservation practices, whereas a population is a set of watershed 
configurations that have the same set of conservation practices in common. Therefore, an 
individual represents a possible candidate solution to the pollution cost minimization problem, 
whereas a population (a set of watershed configurations) represents the set of all potential 
solutions to the same problem.  
The goal of the evolution process is to find the watershed configuration that achieves a 
given level of ambient standard at lowest cost, or alternatively given a budget achieves the 
lowest level of ambient pollution. Moreover, since there are measurement errors in quantifying 
the effectiveness of different conservation practices in reducing emissions, an average realization 
of the water quality target is considered sufficient. This is another reason the watershed pollution 
problem is a suitable area for the use of the evolutionary algorithms. 
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When water quality optimization is considered with respect to a single pollutant, the 
optimization problem can be defined as a single objective optimization problem. In most cases, 
water quality impairment is not limited to a single pollutant; hence, the optimal solution requires 
solving a multi-objective optimization problem. In some cases, evolutionary algorithms can 
accommodate this by combining competing multi-objectives into a single known objective 
function—the solution yielding a single optimal solution. In the cases where a single objective 
function cannot be determined, the solution to a multi-objective optimization will consist of a set 
of solutions, or a Pareto frontier optimal set. This is a "near-optimal" set that reveals the tradeoffs 
between the different objectives. The near optimal characteristics come with the “temporal” 
aspect of the algorithm. More precisely, since there are no clear stopping criteria, the solutions 
can always improve if more generations are allowed to survive. The solutions are optimal given 
the number of generations that survived. 
Earlier applications of evolutionary algorithms to watershed management focus on a 
single objective function, either pollution reduction effectiveness or cost (Srivastava et al. 2002), 
or on sequential optimization of effectiveness and cost (Gitau et al. 2004; Veith et al. 2003), 
where optimization is made in stages. Bekele and Nicklown (2005) used a multi-objective 
function, but the set of agricultural practices is limited to crop management practices. Maringanti 
et al. (2009) provided a recent application of an evolutionary algorithm for a watershed-scale 
optimization problem with two conflicting objectives simultaneously: a cost increase and 
pollution reduction. The set of conservation practices consisted of 54 different combinations. 
Three different nonpoint pollutants were considered: phosphorus, nitrogen, and sediment; but 
only one pollutant was considered at a time, hence three different optimization models were 
estimated. For each model, a Pareto frontier depicts the tradeoff between the two objectives. The 
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allocations of conservation practice in the watershed according to the optimization results were 
shown to be superior to random allocation, resulting in reductions of 33% in sediment loading, 
32% in nitrogen loadings, and 13% in phosphorus loadings. 
In the empirical part of my dissertation, I use an evolutionary algorithm application to 
solve for the cost effectiveness—first for a single pollutant case (nitrogen or phosphorus), and 
second for multiple pollutant case (both nitrogen and phosphorus). The fact that one conservation 
practice often has the potential to reduce more than one pollutant provides a solid reason for this 
joint approach. Next, I provide a brief description of the particular multi-objective evolutionary 
algorithm (MOEA) that was used to obtain one set of the empirical results (Rabotyagov 2007). 
The MOEA is a modification of the Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm2 (SPEA2), 
proposed by Zitzler and Thiele (1999). The basic logic of the algorithms is as follows: (a) 
generate an initial population and a storing (temporary) population; (b) create offspring that, 
together with the parent population, are saved in the storing population; (c) define the objective 
by creating a metric function given the characteristics of the optimization problem; (d) for each 
individual compute the corresponding metric value; (e) rank individuals in order according to 
metric value, (f) decide a cutoff point, individuals whose metric values are below the cutoff point 
are disregarded, while the individuals that are above the cutoff point define the next generation 
(population); and finally, (g) repeat the above steps for a sufficient number of iterations. 
Two types of populations are required at any given iteration of the evolutionary 
algorithm: the current generation and a temporary, or storing, population. At the starting 
iteration, the current generation is generated by randomly assigning individuals with different 
values from the allele set and the temporary population is empty. The random population plays 
the same role as starting values do in ordinary optimization routines. The temporary population 
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is populated with offspring created by the mean of crossover and mutation using the individuals 
from the current population. 
Next, a fitness value is calculated for each individual form the current and temporary 
population sets. In order to determine the fitness value, each individual is compared with all 
other individuals. For example, take two individuals A and B, individual A is said to dominate, 
in a Pareto sense, individual B, if all its genes have better values. In this case, individual B is said 
to be dominated. Strength value is a metric measure that defines the number of individuals that 
individual i dominates. An individual i can dominate some individuals but can be dominated by 
other individuals. Another metric measure, the raw fitness, is obtained by summing the strength 
values of individuals j that dominate. The raw measure is also a metric of the likelihood of 
individual i to generate offspring that pass his characteristics to next generations. If its raw 
measure is high, this means that it is dominated by many individuals and less likely to survive, 
hence it is desirable that the raw measure to be as close to zero as possible. A nondominated 
individual is an individual with a zero raw value. 
The searching process can create individuals that do not spread uniformly over the search 
space. Some of them tend to cluster into certain areas, leaving some others areas sparse. The 
metric measures defined above do not provide any information about the degree of clustering. 
Another two metric measures are defined to incorporate information about clustering around 
certain areas of the search space. One of the measures differentiates among individuals that are 
too close one to another, and the second measure preserves diversity in the search space by 
rewarding the individuals that are further away on the frontier. The resulting individuals are 
spread more uniformly over the search space. 
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The selection is made based on a fitness score. The fitness score of each individual takes 
into account all the metric defined above. A lower fitness score implies the individual is closer to 
the Pareto frontier, and a zero value implies that the individual is on the frontier. 
2.8.3. Environmental Policy Integrated Climate Model (EPIC) 
SWAT is a model that operates on a large-scale level and is able to simulate the levels of 
nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment losses under a wide range of scenarios of the agricultural 
activities that take place in a watershed. Yet, SWAT cannot capture the impact of agricultural 
activity on the total levels of GHGs or the carbon sequestration potential. In the case of water 
quality, the discharges of one field can be influenced, among other factors, by the distance to the 
outlet where water quality is measured, and agricultural activity of the neighboring fields. 
Carbon sequestration of a given field, however, is independent of location and what happens on 
surrounding fields. Thus, a field-scale model can be employed to measure the potential of carbon 
sequestration that is associated with an agricultural activity on a given field. 
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) is a field-scale biophysical model of 
crop productivity originally developed to assess the effect of soil erosion on agricultural 
productivity (William et al. 1984). The field unit is assumed to be homogeneous with respect to 
soil, crop management, and topography. EPIC can simulate the effects of agricultural practices 
on crop yields, measure environmental indicators such as edge-of-field losses from fertilizer and 
pesticide applications, and soil-carbon sequestration potential. 
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CHAPTER 3. A MODEL OF WATER QUALITY POLLUTION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present a conceptual model to manage the ambient water quality in a 
watershed impaired by agricultural runoff (nitrogen and phosphorus). I examine a command-and-
control (CAC) approach where the regulator has the ability to mandate specific abatement 
actions to each field in the watershed. The second approach is a performance standard (PS) 
where each farm has to meet predetermined farm-level performance requirements by choosing 
the relevant abatement actions. The last approach is a trading setting, where farmers, conditional 
on meeting their farm-level performance requirement, can trade credits or points assigned to the 
abatement actions with other participants in the watershed (Kling 2011). Additionally, I present a 
method of estimating the credits or points, where a point measures the ability of an abatement 
action to reduce the field-level emissions and the overall ambient pollution level. 
My model captures several critical aspects of agricultural pollution such as: (a) imperfect 
information on the abatement costs of individual farms; (b) difficulties in measuring and 
monitoring the effectiveness of the abatement action at the field level; and (c) inherent  
nonlinearities in the transport and fate of emissions from the edge-of-field to the watershed outlet 
(the water quality production function).  
Agricultural producers or farmers have a variety of abatement actions from which to 
choose for reducing farm-level emissions. Adopting an abatement action imposes both direct and 
implicit costs (e.g., lost yield, additional risk, etc.) that are likely to vary by farm characteristics: 
location, climate, and other farm-related characteristics, such as the farmer’s knowledge and 
experience; thus, the abatement costs are heterogeneous across farmers. In this context, farmers 
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are more likely to be better informed about their cost of adopting the abatement actions than a 
potential regulator. Given that the regulator has incomplete information on the costs, in general, 
it is not possible to identify ex ante the least-cost solutions that efficiently allocates the 
reductions (the abatement actions) across the sources (fields or farms). However, incentive-based 
instruments can improve the cost efficiency of this allocation by transferring the burden of cost 
minimization from the regulator to farmers. Moreover, the incentive based instruments can offer 
cost savings relative to command-and-control regulations, with the heterogeneity being a 
fundamental factor in determining the size of the potential cost savings (Newell and Stavins 
1999). 
Next, observing and monitoring the pollution impacts of farming activities on water 
quality is difficult to conduct and imposes significant costs, thus there is imperfect knowledge of 
the true relation between the abatement actions and the edge-of-field reductions. Focusing on the 
observable abatement actions or targeting observable inputs represents a possible solution to this 
problem as suggested by Griffin and Bromley (1982), and Shortle and Dunn (1986). A cost 
efficient outcome is expected if the targeted inputs are correlated with the field emissions 
(Shortle and Horan 2013), but this is generally an empirical question. 
A third challenging issue of nonpoint-source pollution is the emissions movement (the 
ultimate fate and transport process) from a field to the point they reach the water bodies where 
the ambient pollution is observed. Earlier theoretical papers assumed that the fate and the 
transport process is linear and separable between emissions originating from different fields 
(Carpentier, Bosch, and Batie 1998; Ribaudo 1989). However, water quality scientists and 
hydrologists note that the impact of emissions from different fields on the overall level of water 
quality is non-constant and depends on the field’s location; hence, the process is likely to be non-
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linear and nonseparable. Additionally, the emissions from one field interact with the emissions 
from the surrounding fields (Horan and Shortle 2013), making it even more difficult to observe 
the individual farm impacts (Braden 1989; Lintner and Weersink 1999, Khanna et al. 2003). In 
practice, researchers rely on the use of the various biophysical simulation models to capture the 
key features of the water pollution process. This process is referred to as the water quality 
production function. In the section introducing the conceptual model, I assume that this function 
is differentiable, although for the empirical results I employ a biophysical model to capture the 
key characteristics of the water quality process. 
As mentioned earlier, the current regulatory framework is another difficult issue in 
addressing agricultural pollution, as the property rights to pollute are assigned to nonpoint 
sources. In spite of the missing regulations at the federal level, there are cases where states have 
opted to apply the ‘polluter pays’ principle and to reverse the property rights for agricultural 
polluters. It is worthwhile to mention the case of the Everglades Agricultural Area in Florida, 
where as part of the Everglades Forever Act (1996), the South Florida Agricultural Management 
District has established mandatory source controls to lower the phosphorus level in the 
Everglades Agricultural Area by implementing a best-management permitting program. The 
program includes performance metrics for each best management practice, on site verification, 
and monitoring to ensure that the conservation practices are implemented consistently, and 
recommends adjustments if the water quality goals are not achieved. Each landowner in the 
Everglades Agricultural Area needs to hold a permit that includes an approval for a best 
management practice for each crop or land use, and an approval for a monitoring discharge plan. 
Over the 17-year history of the program, a measurable reduction in the ambient pollution of more 
than 55% has occurred (Daroub et al. 2011). 
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In this dissertation, I model the water pollution as a cost effectiveness problem, where the 
ambient pollution target is given to the environmental authority and his goal is to achieve the 
target in a least cost way (Horan and Shortle 2013).4 Moreover, cost effectiveness became the 
preferred conceptual approach as the issue of achieving increasing levels of abatement became 
more stringent (Newell and Stavins 1999). 
This chapter is organized into several sections. In the first section, I introduce a 
conceptual model of pollution as it relates to agricultural pollution, outline the different policy 
approaches proposed for addressing water quality, and predict their theoretical outcomes under 
the different sets of assumptions. In the second section, I outline a multistep employed for 
obtaining the credits or points to be assigned to each abatement action. In the last section, I 
present the two watersheds together with various data inputs used as support for the empirical 
evaluation of my model—results that will be introduced in the next chapter. Within the same 
section, I also summarize and discuss the results from the estimation of the point values. 
3.2. Conceptual Model 
I consider a simple model of pollution where the water quality in a watershed is impaired by 
runoff from agricultural fields (for example, nitrogen or phosphorus). There are N farms in the 
watershed indexed by ݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ. The farms are heterogeneous with respect to physical 
characteristics such as soil, slope, rainfall, etc. The ambient water quality level is monitored in-
stream at the outlet of the watershed. Next, I consider a set of conservation practices or 
                                                 
4 Shortle and Horan (2013) show that the two problems are equivalent only under special 
conditions.  
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abatement actions, ݔ ൌ ൫ݔଵ, ݔଶ, … , ݔ௃൯, which can be implemented at the farm level to reduce the 
edge-of-field runoff emissions, with J representing the number of abatement actions available at 
the watershed level.5 Let ݎ௜ be the ith farm's reduction in pollution measured at the edge-of-field 
(that is, farm-level pollution abatement). If no abatement action is taken, then ݎ௜ ൌ 0. The 
relation between the vector of abatement actions and the farm-level abatement is represented by 
an abatement function, with the abatement levels denoted by: 
ݎ௜ ൌ 	 ݎ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߦሻ						∀	݅ ൌ 	1, … ,ܰ			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 							ሺ1ሻ	
where ݔ௜		represents the ܬ ൈ 1 vector of abatement actions implemented by farm i, where the jth 
element ݔ௜௝ takes a value of 1 or 0, ߛ௜ represents the farm's physical characteristics such as soil 
type and topography, and ߦ	represents the random factors that are influenced by weather or by 
the pollutant fate and transport through the watershed.6 The abatement actions are the farmers’ 
input choices that can be used at farm level to reduce the field level runoff (Horan, Shortle and 
Abler, 2002). The distribution of ߦ is assumed to be known and it could be given by the 
historical distribution of the stochastic weather. 
The baseline edge-of-field emissions are the result of the farmers’ profit maximization 
behavior given that no abatement actions are implemented. Farmers are assumed to be rational, 
perfectly informed, and risk neutral optimizers and price takers in both output and input markets. 
                                                 
5 Conceptually, conservation practices and abatement actions can be used interchangeable 
without any loss of meaning. However, an abatement action can be defined as a combination of 
two or more conservation practices that can be implemented simultaneously. 
6As equation (1) indicates,  I recognize the role and impact of the weather stochastic elements. 
However, addressing the stochastic elements is not a focus of my current work. Therefore, for 
the remainder of my dissertation, I abstract away from the stochastic elements by considering the 
mean of the edge-of-field abatement value and suppress the ߦ from the notation. However, I 
reserve one section of the empirical part to assess the robustness of my results under the 
historical weather distribution. 
38 
 
Additionally, the abatement actions are mutually exclusive; only one abatement action can be 
chosen at a time, but some abatement actions can be defined as a combination of different 
conservation practices. Abatement costs are defined as the difference between baseline profits 
when no abatement action is taken and the profits associated with the adoption of an abatement 
action (Freeman, 1993). The abatement costs are farm and abatement action specific. The costs 
are defined on a per acre basis; hence I am assuming constant economies of size.7 Let the 
abatement cost function be defined as a function of the vector abatement actions :8,9 
ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ					∀	݅	 ൌ 	1, … ,ܰ		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 							(2ሻ	
 I assume that the costs of adoption vary across locations due to both differences in 
physical characteristics (soils, slope, etc. ߛ௜.) and management abilities or farming experience, 
where the  management abilities are reflected by ߠ௜, a scalar index of farmer’s profitability (the 
farmer’s type). Hence, equation (2) defines the abatement costs for a farmer type ߠ௜ if he or she 
uses the abatement actions vector ݔ௜. The regulator does not know the farmer’s type, however, I 
assume that the regulator knows that each ߠ௜ follows a certain distribution.10 By allowing farmers 
to have different types that are not known to the regulator, I assume that certain information such 
as the abatement costs is known only by farmers and not by the regulator. Given that the 
                                                 
7 Economies of size are used to describe a situation where as a farm expands its output, the cost 
per unit of output decreases. By analogy, under constant economies of size, the farm abatement 
costs increases by a factor equal to the number of its acres.  
8 Conventionally, costs are modeled as an increasing function of the abatement level, however in 
the case of nonpoint source, the abatement cost functions are defined as a function of the input 
chosen to reduce the emissions (Horan, Shortle and Abler, 2002). In this case, the abatement 
actions represent the input choices. 
9 Cost function could also include the weather stochastic factor, ߦ 
10 The distribution of the farmers’ type is not essential for the presented model. Standard 
assumptions include a uniform distribution with support on unit interval, or on ሾߠ௅		ߠ௎ሿ (Smith 
and Tomasi, 1999). 
39 
 
regulator knows the farmers’ type distribution, he can identify a cost function for the average 
type farmer,	̅ߠ, ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ̅ߠሻ, ∀	݅	 ൌ 	1, … ,ܰ. In terms of abatement costs, this means that the 
regulator can infer an average cost estimate for each abatement action. 
The total ambient pollution is given by an expected water-quality production function 
ܹሺܚሻ, represented as a function of the vector of each farm’s individual edge-of-field emission 
reductions ݎ௜, ܚ ൌ ሺݎଵ, ݎଶ, … ݎேሻ, and the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of ߦ. 
Recall that other factors such as the location in the watershed, the agricultural activities on the 
surrounding field, and hydrology elements enter into the ambient production function in addition 
to the edge-of-field emissions. However, addressing the stochastic elements is not the focus of 
my dissertation, hence for the remainder of my dissertation I suppress the stochastic elements for 
notational simplicity.11 
The exact water-quality production function is unlikely to be known given the complexity 
of the biochemical and hydrological process that takes place in a watershed; but there is a range 
of watershed-based water quality models that approximate these hydrological and biophysical 
processes, such as the SWAT model.  
Let, ܹሺܚሻ ൌ ܹ଴ െ ܣሺܚሻ be the ambient water quality at the watershed outlet, where ܹ଴ 
is the level of water quality given the current activity, and ܣሺܚሻ is the expected ambient pollution 
reduction associated with ܚ, the vector of field individual emission reductions, or more simply 
the abatement function.12 The expected ambient water quality level can be expressed as the 
                                                 
11 In the empirical work described later in the dissertation, I use the five-year average of the 
edge-of-field reduced emissions. 
12 The literature uses the terminology of water-quality production function and abatement 
function interchangeably. For the reminder of my work, I will refer to ambient function as 
representing the change in the ambient water quality at the watershed outlet. 
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difference between the no-control (baseline) expected ambient water quality level,	ܹ଴, and the 
in-stream expected abatement associated with the edge-of-field emission reductions given that an 
array of abatement actions is implemented, ܣሺܚሻ. 
I consider an environmental authority or a regulator who seeks to achieve a particular 
expected abatement pollution level, denoted as ̅ܣ, by finding a least cost allocation of the 
available abatement actions to the fields in the watershed. First, I identify the first-best solution 
to this problem assuming that the regulator and farmers both have complete cost information 
(hence, the regulator knows the farmers’ types). This “perfect cost information” solution is 
contrasted to the solution where the regulator does not know the true abatement costs. Instead, 
only the average costs of each abatement action is known (hence, the regulator does not know 
the farmers’ types), and used to solve for the least-cost solution, by imposing the same per acre 
cost for each farmer. 
3.2.1. First-best  
I begin by assuming that the regulator knows: (a) the field level abatement costs, (b) the relation 
between abatement actions and reduced emissionsݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ, and (c) the true form of the ambient 
abatement action	ܣሺܚሻ.13 The cost minimization problem faced by a regulator seeking to 
minimize the overall abatement costs to meet the expected ambient reductions by choosing field-
level abatement actions is: 
݉݅݊௫೔ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ
ே௜ 			ݏ. ݐ. ܣሺ࢘ሺݔሻሻ 	൒ 		ܣ		 		 	 	 	 	 	 								(3) 
                                                 
13 For simplicity  of notation, I drop out ߛ௜ from the notation ݎ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜ሻ 
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where ߠ௜ shows that true field level abatement costs are used in solving the cost minimization 
problem. Next, consider the discrete change in the total abatement,߲ܣሺݎሺݔሻሻ/߲ݔ௜௝ given that 
abatement action ݆ is adopted by the  field ݅ defined as: 
డ஺൫௥ሺ௫ሻ൯
డ௫೔ೕ 		ൌ 			
డ஺ሺ௥೔ሺ௫೔ሻ,௥ష೔ሺ௫ሻሻ
డ௥೔ ∆௫௜௝ሺݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻሻ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(4) 
where, ∆ is used to show the discrete nature of the set of abatement actions, and  ିݎ ௜	ሺݔሻ accounts 
for the fact that the abatement actions on other farms affect the impact of farm ݅ (Braden et. al. 
1989;Lintner and Weersink 1999; Khanna et al. 2003). The first term of the right-hand side of 
equation (2) , డ஺ሺ௥೔ሺ௫೔ሻ,௥ష೔ሺ௫ሻሻడ௥೔ , captures the nonseparability and is associated with endogenous 
transfer or delivery coefficients (Khanna et al., 2003). The presence of nonseparability is what 
makes a trading program difficult to implement. Next, nonlinearity refers to the fact that impact 
depends on the abatement action, ∆௫௜௝ሺݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻሻ ( i.e. not being constant in ݔ௜௝ ) (Shortle and 
Horan 2013).  
The solution vector ܠ∗ to the problem defined by equation (3) identifies for each field ݔ௜∗, 
the least-cost abatement action assignment and thus implies an optimal amount of edge of field 
pollution ݎ௜∗ሺݔ௜∗ሻ, ∀	݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ farms and ∀	݇ ൌ 1,… , ܬ available abatement actions. The total 
cost is given by 		ܶܥ∗ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜∗, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ 	. An “*” is used to indicate that this is the least-cost 
solution.  
The first-best solution is achieved when the regulator has the ability to solve the problem 
defined by equation (3) in the presence of complete cost information. Additionally, I assume he 
has the ability to implement a command and control policy where he can mandate the abatement 
action ݔ௜∗	; however, it is unlikely for the regulator to have complete cost information. 
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The cost asymmetry can be overcome by pursuing incentive based policies that shift the 
burden of optimization from the regulator to private farmers such as PS and trading. The 
implementation of any of the incentive based policies requires a functional form for the 
abatement function ܣሺܚ) and for the relation between field level abatement actions (ݔ௜) and the 
expected edge-of-field abated emissions (ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ).  
Next, I consider how these different policies perform relative to the first-best by 
considering two different assumptions for the abatement function. First, I assume that the 
abatement function is defined as an exact combination of edge-of-field reduced emissions and a 
set of fixed and exogenously determined delivery coefficients. Next, I assume the abatement 
function is non-linear and non-separable in the individual field-level reduced emissions, but 
policies are implemented using an approximation that is a linear combination of individual edge-
of-field reduced, and delivery coefficients where the delivery coefficients are fixed. 
3.2.2. A linear and separable water quality production function (ۯሺܚሻ ൌ ∑ ܌ܑܑܚ ሺܠܑሻܑ ) 
First best, complete cost information, CAC and incentive-based policies  
Suppose that a regulator seeks to achieve a given level of total ambient emissions 
reductions, ̅ܣ, and ambient function is exactly a linear combination of the individual edge-of-
field reductions and a set of delivery coefficients. The delivery coefficients determine how much 
of the edge-of-field reductions contribute to the total abatement level. Moreover, it is assumed 
that the delivery coefficients are exogenously determined. According to earlier studies on air and 
water pollution, the abatement function can be expressed as an exact combination of delivery 
coefficients and site specific emissions (Montgomery, 1972). Assuming perfect cost information 
(the regulator and the farmers have the same cost information), this solution can be replicated 
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with the same outcomes in any number of ways: a command-and-control, a performance 
standard, and a permit trading setting.  
Under command-and-control, each farm is mandated to adopt,	ݔ௜∗. Alternatively, the 
environmental agency could require that each farm meets an individualized performance 
standard	ሺݎ௜∗ ൌ ݎ௜∗ሺݔ௜∗ሻ	ሻ. In this case, the farmer can choose the abatement action that minimizes 
the abatement cost at field level: 
݉݅݊௫೔ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜	ሻ	ݏ. ݐ		ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൒ ݎ௜
∗			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(5)	
Another alternative is to rely on private optimizing behavior and to allow trading among 
farmers such that a total ambient emissions cap is met. As Montgomery (1972) demonstrated, an 
“ambient based permit system” where each firm is faced with an ambient cap such that the total 
ambient emissions reduction target is met can achieve the least-cost allocation.  
In short, under perfect information on costs and farm-level emissions, and a linear and 
separable water quality production function, the three above mentioned regulatory approaches 
can be employed to achieve the least-cost solution. Another alternative is to rely on private 
optimizing behavior and to allow trading among farmers such that a total ambient emissions cap 
is met.  
First-best, cost asymmetries, CAC and incentive-based policies 
In reality, it is likely that while the farmer knows the true cost of their abatement actions, 
the environmental authority does not. Thus, the environmental authority is unable to identify the 
abatement actions cost efficient allocation. However, the regulator is likely to have some limited 
information on the distribution of costs, such as the mean of the abatement costs. I assume that 
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the regulator knows the vector of average costs for each abatement action. In this case, the 
regulator solves the following problem:14 
݉݅݊௫೔ ∑ ܥ௜൫ݔ௜,ߛ௜, ̅ߠ൯
ே௜ ݏ. ݐ.		 ∑ ݀௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻே௜ 	൒ 		 ܣ,               (6) 
where, ߠ denotes that the regulator uses his best estimates of costs (i.e. average estimates of the 
costs) and the total cap is set at the ∑ ݀௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻே௜ ൌ ̅ܣ. The solution to this problem, denoted by 
“ܠො”, will generally differ from that obtained in solving equation (4), and the assignment of 
abatement practices, ݔො௜, will not necessarily coincide with the least-cost solution, ݔ௜∗. Likewise, 
the edge-of-field emissions reductions,	̂ݎ௜ ൌ 	 ̂ݎ௜ሺݔො௜ሻ, will be different from the first-best, ݎ௜∗ ൌ
ݎ௜∗ሺݔ∗ሻ. The total estimated cost of the regulator is given by: ܶܥ෢ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔො௜, ߛ௜, ̅ߠሻே௜ . 
Under a command-and-control policy approach, the solution imposed by the authority,ܠො”, 
may not reflect the least cost allocation of abatement actions since individual farmers may have 
much lower or higher costs than the average cost estimates, which, if known by the regulator, 
could be used to more cost-effectively assign practices to fields. Nonetheless, the overall 
abatement target, ̅ܣ, is met. The total cost of a command and control can be lower or higher than 
the regulator estimated costs: 
෠ܶ ஼஺஼ 	ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔො௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ 			൏൐ 		 ܶܥ෢ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔො௜, ߛ௜, ̅ߠሻே௜ 			 	 	 	 	 								(7) 
In this case, the authority can potentially increase social welfare relative to a command-
and-control assignment of conservation actions, ݔො௜ by allowing firms to meet a performance 
standard, ̂ݎ௜ሺݔො௜ሻ,  set at a similar level as in CAC. Since farmers know their true costs, they may 
                                                 
14 In the case of abatement costs being nonlinear in ߠ௜, a smart regulator would want to minimize 
the expected costs by taking into account the distribution of the farmers’ type. However, given 
that I consider that ߠ௜ enters in a linear way, minimizing the sum of total costs evaluated at the 
average farm leads to the same interpretation.  
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be able to meet the standard allocated to them with less total costs by choosing a different 
abatement action. In the presence of a performance standard program, farmers face the following 
optimization problem:  
݉݅݊௫೔ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ	ݏ. ݐ		ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൒	 ̂ݎ௜	                           (8) 
Farmers minimize the abatement costs given the field level abatement costs, subject to a 
performance standard based on average estimates of true costs. The solution is given by 
ݔ௜௉ௌ, ݎ௜௉ௌ൫ݔ௜௉ௌ൯ and the corresponding costs, ܶܥ௉ௌ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜	൫ݔ௜௉ௌ, ߛ௜, ߠ௜൯.ே௜  Again, a clear 
comparison with: ܶܥ෢ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔො௜, ߛ௜, ̅ߠሻே௜ , the regulator estimated costs, cannot be made, however, 
there are cost savings relative to ෠ܶ ஼஺஼ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔො௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ , the total costs under a command-and- 
control. 
Additional cost savings are potentially achievable if the environmental authority makes 
the performance standard tradable. The farmer minimizes the abatement costs by choosing an 
abatement practice and the number of permits to trade, such that the total reductions measured at 
the edge-of-field level are less than the amount allowed by the number of permits held after 
trading. Let ݈పഥ଴ be the ݅th farm’s abatement permit requirement. Then, a farmer solves: 
݉݅݊௫ೕ,௟೔ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൅ ݌݈௜			ݏ. ݐ			݀௜	ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௜ ൒ 	 ݈పഥ
଴	 												 	 	 	 	 								(9) 
and the permit price is determined in a market equilibrium where ∑ ݈௜ே௜ ൌ 0. Indeed, when the 
performance standard is fully tradable, the least-cost solution would be achievable, as this would 
be equivalent to implementing Montgomery’s (1972) ambient-based permit system. Since by 
construction, ∑ ݈ప଴ഥே௜ ൌ ̅ܣ, unfettered trading between firms who each know their own true costs 
will achieve the least-cost solution and the ambient environmental goal is satisfied. 
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When the regulator has limited information on the abatement costs and the water quality 
production function is characterized linear and separable, his optimal solution, ܠො ൌ
ሺݔොଵ, ݔොଶ, … , ݔොேሻ, does not coincide with the solution under performance standard or permit 
trading. However, the water quality goal will be achieved under any of the regulatory 
approaches. Total costs across the three policy approaches will be lowest under a trading setting.  
The total costs of the regulator’s solution evaluated at the true abatement costs can be higher or 
lower than the total costs of the three approaches. The magnitude of the divergences is an 
empirical question. 
First-best, no cost information, CAC and incentive based policies 
In this case the regulator has no cost information but he has the ability to identify the 
combinations of abatement actions that achieves the water quality goal. Let the vector of 
abatement actions by identified as a satisficing solution ݔௌ௔௧; with ܣ൫ܚሺݔௌ௔௧ሻ൯ ൒ 	̅ܣ. Obviously 
the cost of implementing this solution via a command-and-control is likely to be very high. 
However, under a linear and separable production function with fixed and exogenously 
determined delivery coefficients, trading has the ability to achieve the first-best solution, with 
both the water quality target met and the abatement costs minimized.  
3.2.3. A nonlinear and non separable water quality production function 
A linear and separable form for  the water quality production  (abatement) function, while 
offering very attractive characteristics for  the incentive based policies  does not give an accurate 
description of the reality, where a more complex pollution fate and transport function is required 
to describe the how the on-field abatement actions reduce the overall ambient pollution level. In 
this case, the mapping between the edge-of-field reduced emissions and the ambient water 
quality is not linear. 
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Assuming differentiability of ܣሺܚሺݔሻሻ with respect to ܚ	and taking a second order Taylor 
approximation around the an initial vector of pollution reductions (baseline, ܚܗሻ 
Aሺܚሻ ≅ Aሺܚܗሻ ൅ ׏ሺܚ૙ሻሺܚ െ ܚܗሻ ൅ ሺܚ െ ܚܗሻ׏ଶሺܚܗሻሺr െ ܚܗሻ 
																								ൌ ૙ ൅ ࢊሺ࢘૙ሻሺ࢘ െ ࢘࢕ሻ ൅ ሺ࢘ െ ࢘࢕ሻࢺ૛ሺ࢘࢕ሻሺ࢘ െ ࢘࢕ሻ		 																																														(10) 
Given equation (10), delivery coefficients can be approximated by સሺܚ૙ሻ, the vector of 
marginal impacts of edge-of-field abatement on the ambient quality. However, as shown by 
equation (4), the delivery coefficients vector is determined endogenously, being a function of the 
abatement actions on the other farms. Moreover, in order to determine the delivery coefficients a 
set of initial abatement actions is needed. The choice of this initial vector will affect the quality 
of the ex post trading outcomes, because the approximation can be accurate in the vicinity of the 
initial abatement action but be poor for the post-trading vector of abatement actions. Next, given 
the curvature of the abatement function around the initial vector, (r െܚܗሻસ૛ሺܚܗሻሺܚ െ ܚܗሻ , the 
linear approximation may, on average, overstate (understate) the abatement if the ambient 
function is convex (concave) in abatement. Given the above approximation, the abatement 
function can be written as: 
ܣሺܚሻ ≅ સሺܚ૙ሻሺܚሻ ൌ ܌ሺܚ૙ሻሺܚሻ ൌ ∑ ݀஺௜ே௜ ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ		 	 	 	 	 	 						(11)	
where ݀஺௜ are fixed delivery coefficients obtained from equation (10). The abatement outcome of 
a trading program based on trading ratios defined by  ݀஺௜, and depending on the curvature of the 
abatement function around the abatement cap might be lower or higher than the initial target. In 
this case, the above linearization could be empirically adjusted by relaxing the abatement cap in 
the case of over attainment (convex curvature) or tightening the cap under attainment (concave 
curvature). Nevertheless, the magnitude and the direction of the corrections are determined 
empirically. 
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In the situation where a linear approximation to the water-quality production function is 
used, the farmer’s problem in a market-based system can be written as: 
݉݅݊௫ೕ,௟೔∈௑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜	ሻ ൅ ݌݈௜				ݏ. ݐ.				݀஺௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൅ ݈௜ ൒ 	 ݈௜̅
଴	 	 	 	 	 						(12) 
and the market clearing condition is ∑ ݈௜ே௜ ൌ 0. The only difference from the linear cases 
described in equation (9) is that, instead of ݀௜, ݀஺௜	being used, the “A” indicates that this is a set 
of derived delivery coefficients obtained from some form of linearization of the nonlinear water-
quality production function.  
Another important issue is the selections ݈௜̅଴ (i.e., the vector of on-farm ambient reduction 
requirements). In the previous case, under a linear and separable ambient function with known 
delivery functions, any combination of delivery coefficients (݀௜) and on-farm requirements (̅ݎ௜ሻ 
that satisfies ∑ ݈௜̅଴ே௜ ൌ ∑ ݀௜̅ݎ௜ே௜ ൌ ̅ܣ also achieves the water quality target. This means that a cap 
can be defined by choosing the right number of permits to be distributed when designing a cap-
and-trade program. Furthermore, a decrease in the abatement of one farm, when weighted by the 
appropriate delivery coefficient ratio, does not necessarily result in an increase in the abatement 
level on other farms. 
Once the ݀஺௜′ݏ are determined, a trading program could use the true monitored edge-of-
field reductions. However, monitoring imposes costs, ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ, and cannot be measured exactly, 
hence a simplification of ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ based on observable abatement actions has the potential to make 
the program easier to implement. Next, I consider that the regulator assigns weights for each 
abatement action to approximate the effectiveness of these abatement actions in reducing edge-
of-field emissions, ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ∑ ݓ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ .  
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Using a linear approximation of the abatement function, more flexible systems like the 
performance standard or trading program may outperform CAC in terms of abatement costs. 
However, they may also lead to non-attainment of the abatement target. The magnitude of the 
inefficiency or the extent of non-attainment is an empirical question and likely to be directly 
related to the accuracy of the approximation. 
However, the ability of a standard performance or trading program to achieve cost 
savings by placing the burden of the optimization on farmers makes them appealing for 
consideration and evaluation by imposing fixed and constant delivery coefficients for ambient 
impact of edge-of-field abatement, and an additional linearization of the edge-of-field reduced 
emissions function: 
ܣሺ࢘ሺݔሻሻ ≅ ∑ ݀஺௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ≅ ∑ ∑ ݀஺௜ݓ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵே௜ே௜ .		 	 	 	 	 	 						(13) 
In the next section, I describe an approach to linearize the abatement function and 
estimate the delivery coefficients. In addition to using a linear approximation of the water-quality 
production function, the true ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ functions are approximated as a linear combination of 
weights that measure the impact of the abatement actions on reducing the emissions. The 
combination of edge-of-field points and delivery coefficients results in a system of point 
coefficients, where a point can be interpreted as the impact of an abatement action on total 
abatement level when adopted by a particular field. The efficiency of a performance standard and 
a trading program in the context of the point coefficients is empirically assessed in Chapter 4.  
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3.3. Generating a Linear Approximation to the Abatement Function 
A trading program for pollution involves the existence of a tradable commodity that is able to 
measure the emissions or the discharges (Stephenson, Norris and Shabman 1998). In the context 
of water quality trading, it has been argued that the characteristics of nonpoint source represent 
barriers to the quantification of the emissions (Malik et al. 1994). Therefore the development of a 
tradable commodity by estimating a system of points that captures the abatement actions’ 
efficiency in reducing ambient pollution offers a possible solution to this problem. In the context 
of watershed pollution, different abatement actions have different impacts on edge-of-field 
abated emissions, and identical reductions in the edge-of-field emissions might have different 
impact on the ambient pollution level. 
A well designed system of points needs to account for all these characteristics. In this 
context, Kling (2011) proposed a point based trading system where agricultural producers would 
be required to implement abatement actions that accrue enough points per acre to meet a 
predetermined standard. The point values assigned to each abatement practice approximate:  
(a) how effective an abatement practice is in reducing the edge-of-field emissions and (b) the 
impact of the edge-of-field reduced emissions on the ambient water quality. Since the abatement 
function (ܣ	ሺܚሺݔሻሻ is approximated as a linear combination of the abatement actions impact 
measured at edge-of-field level and delivery coefficients, and the field level reduced emissions 
depend on the abatement action, without any loss, the abatement function can be written  as a 
function of the vector of abatement actions ݔ: 
ܣሺ࢘ሺݔሻሻ ൌ ܣ	ሺݔሻ ≅ 	∑ ݀஺௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻே௜ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 					(14) 
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Next, assuming that there are nonlinearities at the field level, the edge-of-field reductions 
are approximated as ݎ௜ሺݔሻ ≅ ∑ ݓ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ , where ݓ௜௝ measure the impact of abatement action ݆ 
given field ݅. The impact of field ݅	′ݏ	 edge-of field reductions on ambient water quality is 
݀஺௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ≅ ∑ ݀஺௜ݓ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ , where ܽ௜௝ ൌ ݀஺௜ݓ௜௝ , referred hereon as “point 
coefficient”, gives the number of points assigned to the abatement action ݆ given field i. Since 
the point values are defined in terms of abatement, they can be interpreted as the marginal 
contribution to the total abatement of a particular field ݅ given that the ݆௧௛ abatement action is 
taken. Finally, the linear approximation of the abatement function can be re-written as: 
ܣሺݔሻ ≅ 	∑ ݀஺௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻே௜ ൌ 	∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝	௃௝ே௜ ൌ ࢇ ∗ ࢄ				 	 	 	 	 	 	(15) 
where ࢇ is a ܬܺܰ column vector of  point values or coefficients to be estimated, and ࢄ is a ܬܺܰ 
row vector of abatement actions.  
The above linear approximation of the abatement function is made around the baseline 
emissions. Alternatively, the linear approximation can be made around the optimal solution (i.e. 
the optimal vector of abatement actions that achieves the desired abatement goal). In this case, 
the point coefficients can be interpreted as abatement impact relative to the optimal solution. 
3.3.1. An empirical approach for estimating the vector of point coefficients a 
To estimate the point coefficients for each abatement action and each field, I employ a 
multistep procedure using the special features of a watershed-based hydrological model, SWAT. 
In SWAT, a watershed is delineated into subbasins and further on into smaller fields units called 
hydrological response units (HRU). As a result, a watershed can contain thousands of fields. My 
method to estimate the point coefficients is to generate  ܯ sets of random allocations of 
abatement actions to the fields in the watershed, where each random allocation represents a 
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unique watershed configuration. The impacts on the ambient level of water quality, in terms of 
mean annual abatement loadings of nitrogen or phosphorus, are obtained by running the SWAT 
model for each configuration.15 The water quality outcomes measured in abatement levels 
(ܣሺܺሻ) are then combined with the vectors of abatement actions’ assignments (ܺ) to estimate the 
vector of point coefficients, ܉, by combining the  results of a series ordinary least square 
estimations min௔ ሺܣ െ ܺܽሻ′ሺܣ െ ܺܽሻ.16 
Often cases the number of fields (HRU) in a watershed is large, it is challenging to 
generate a sufficient number of watershed configurations to estimate NxJ point coefficients.17 
My approach to estimating point values takes advantage of the outputs generated by SWAT to 
break the above estimation into several steps. (a) estimate the point values at the subbasin level 
using the  ambient levels measure at the watershed exit, (b) estimate point values at the field 
level using the field provided outputs, and (b) combine the results to obtain field specific point 
coefficients for each abatement action. Combining the two sets of results allows me to estimate 
the field specific point coefficients for each abatement action but also to estimate the delivery 
coefficients. 
SWAT computes the ambient emissions at each subbasin outlet as a function of the 
component fields’ emissions. Next, the ambient emissions from each subbasin are routed into a 
nonlinear and nonseparable way to determine the ambient water quality at the main outlet. 
Hence, SWAT provides emissions outputs at the field, subbasin, and main watershed level. 
                                                 
15 The abatement levels are obtained by subtracting the impacts on the ambient levels from the 
baseline emissions.  
16 ܣ is a ܯܺ1 column vector,	ܺ  is a ܯܺሺܬܺܰሻ matrix  ܽ is a ܬܺܰ column vector 
17 In this case ܯ should be greater than ܰݔܬ, where ܰ is the number of fields and ܬ is the number 
of abatement actions  available at watershed level. 
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Three different set of point coefficients are estimated using a multistep procedure 
described in Appendix A. The sets of point coefficients differ in the degree of approximation. 
More specifically, the first set of point coefficients are field specific (i.e., for each field, I 
estimate a Jx1 point coefficients), the second set of point coefficients are subbasin specific (i.e. a 
given abatement actions has the same number of points for any field in a subbasin, and finally, 
the last set of point coefficients is watershed specific. 
The obtained point values implicitly contain information on the trading ratios across 
different locations within the watershed as well as the trading ratios between different abatement 
actions, hence any trading based on the point coefficients will be made on a one-to-one base. 
Once the environmental agency determines the point values that are credited to a 
particular abatement action in a specific field, he is able to compute the total point values 
associated with any water quality target. While the command and control policy is not affected 
by the total number of points, in the case of a performance standard and of a tradable credit 
program, the total point value chosen by the regulator will directly affect the total abatement 
level achieved at the watershed level. 
For the performance standard policy, the regulator needs to choose the appropriate farm-
level point requirements. Under the trading approach, credits or the point coefficients generated 
by abatement actions are tradable, on a one-to-one basis, across the watershed. As a result, a 
farmer solves: 
݉݅݊௫೔ೕ,௕೔ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൅ ݌ܾ௜								ݏ. ݐ.		 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝
௃
௝ୀଵ ൅ ܾ௜ ൒ 	ܾ௜௢		 	 	 	 	 						(16) 
where ݔ௜௝ is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the abatement action j is chosen, the 
abatement actions, ܾ௜ is the number of points to be traded, ܽ௜௝ the point values assigned to 
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abatement action j given field i, and ܾ௜௢ is the field level constraint assigned by the regulator to 
field i. The point price ݌ is determined in a points market equilibrium by ∑ ܾ௜ ൌ 0ே௜  
This trading approach can be conceptually viewed as a combination of an emissions 
permit and ambient permit system (Rabotyagov et al. 2012). Under an emissions permit system 
rights are defined in term of what firms emit. Under an ambient permit system, right are defined 
in terms of pollution contribution to a receptor (Montgomery 1972; Baumol and Oates 1988). In 
this case point credits are specified at farm (field) level allowing the trade to occur on a one-to-
one basis. Next, a point value approximates the impact of an abatement action on the total level 
of abated pollution measured at a single pollution receptor (watershed outlet). Trading ratios that 
account both for location and the abatement actions tradeoffs are embedded into the point 
coefficients. 
The point-credit approximation procedure can also be adapted (a) for a single pollutant 
market; (b) for multiple pollutant markets where a separate system of points is estimated for each 
pollutant, and (c) to extend the single pollutant market by including the participation in a carbon 
market. 
3.4. Empirical Framework 
In the next section, I describe the two agricultural watersheds used as support for my 
empirical estimations, the set of abatement actions with the corresponding estimates for the 
abatement costs, and provide a description of the estimates obtained for the point values assigned 
to each abatement action. The point values estimates are watershed specific, and within each 
watershed field pollutant-specific, with two pollutants being considered: nitrogen and 
phosphorus. 
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3.4.1. Watershed description 
I use the available data for two typical Midwestern watersheds, both located in Iowa: the 
Boone River Watershed (BRW) and the Raccoon River Watershed (RRW). The National River 
and Streams Assessment 2008–2009 includes Iowa in the Temperate Plains Ecoregion.18 The 
survey finds high levels of nitrogen in 58% of the rivers, and medium levels of nitrogen in 13% 
of the rivers. At the same time, 31% (24%) of the rivers have high (medium) levels of 
phosphorus. 
The Boone River Watershed 
The BRW is located in the north central part of Iowa. The watershed covers more than 537,000 
acres (2,370km2) in six counties (Hamilton, Hancock, Humboldt, Kossuth, Wright, and Webster) 
as shown in Figure 3-1. The watershed area is crop intensive, with the surface being intensively 
tile drained; consequently, the wetlands area has been reduced significantly. Moreover, the 
Boone River Watershed agricultural area has been found to be responsible for some of the 
highest nitrogen loadings among Iowa’s watersheds (Libra et. al 2004). 
                                                 
18 Other states included in the same ecoregion are eastern North and South Dakota, western 
Minnesota, portions of Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, western Ohio, central Indiana, Illionois, and 
southeastern Wisconsin. 
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Figure 3-1. Boone River Watershed. 
 
Land use in the watershed is dominated by agriculture: cropland represents 89.7% of total 
area, retired land represents 5.6% of total area, forestry represents 2.6% of total area, and urban 
areas and water surfaces account for the remaining 2.1% of total area. Most of the land is a flat, 
characterized by soils with low slopes (i.e., 73% of the areas have a slope less than 0.01 inches). 
The corn suitability rating (CSR) is another characteristic that defines potential yield.19 It is an 
index that ranges between 0 and 100, where high values are associated with high quality soils. A 
soil with a high corn suitability index value is less likely to have high rates of fertilization, and at 
the same time is less likely to be considered for land retirement as a solution for reducing nitrate 
                                                 
19 CSR is a ranking that rates different kinds of soils for their potential row crop productivity. It 
was developed for Iowa soils. Detailed information can be found at: (link) 
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loadings. In the BRW more than 50% of the soil has been rated with corn suitability index values 
ranging from 50 to 79, and 40% of the soil has corn suitability rating values higher than 80. 
The required data for our modeling system (i.e., SWAT 2009) was collected at Common 
Land Unit (CLU) level.20 More than 16,300 unit levels have been identified in the BRW. As an 
HRU is the unit required by SWAT model, the common land unit levels were regrouped into 
roughly 2,968 HRUs. Data related to crop rotation, land uses, fertilizer management, tillage, and 
conservation practices were provided by a field-level survey conducted by Kiepe (2005). Figure 
3-1 shows the subbasin boundaries together with the location of the weather stations that 
provided the historical weather data to calibrate the model. The approach for simulating the 
water quality impact of conservation practices as well as weather, soils, and management 
characteristics are described in detail in Gassman (2008). 
The Raccoon River Watershed (RRW) 
The Raccoon River Watershed (RRW), as shown in Figure 3-2, is one of the largest watersheds 
in the state of Iowa. It covers an area over 9,400km2 in west-central Iowa, being the Des Moines 
River major tributary. The RRW flows approximately 300 km from its origin in Buena Vista 
County to the confluence with the Des Moines River in the city of Des Moines. 
The landscape in the south part of the watershed is characterized by higher slopes with 
many hills and a well-developed drainage system, while the landscape in the northern part is 
                                                 
20 “A Common Land Unit (CLU) is the smallest unit of land that has a permanent, contiguous 
boundary, a common land cover and land management, a common owner and a common 
producer in agricultural land associated with USDA farm programs. CLU boundaries are 
delineated from relatively permanent features such as fence lines, roads, and/or waterways”( 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov). 
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characterized by lower slopes and poor surface drainage system (Schilling et al. 2008). With 
more than 73% of the planted area being use for corn and soybeans, the land use is dominated by 
 
 
Figure 3-2. Raccoon River Watershed. 
 
agricultural row production. Other land uses include grassland (16.3%), woodland (4.4%), and 
urban (4.0%) (Gassman and Jha, 2011). The applied fertilizer for corn is one of the main sources 
of nitrogen and phosphorus in the RRW. There are a significant number of cattle feedlots (135) 
and confinement operations (424), but there is little impact from cattle grazing on pasture 
(Schilling et al. 2008). Additionally, 77 waste facilities operate under the National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System permit, which contributes a small amount of nitrate. During recent 
decades, nonpoint sources have been identified as the main contributing source to the high levels 
of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment (Jha et al. 2010; Schilling et al. 2008). 
As stated earlier in SWAT, a watershed is divided into multiple subbasins or 
subwatersheds, further delineated into HRUs. A SWAT (2005) version is used for the baseline 
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calibration and for the results calibration (Schilling et al. 2008; Jha et al. 2010). In this 
framework, the RRW is divided into 112 subbasins and 3,640 HRUs, with 1,569 being 
agricultural HRUs.  
Figure 3-2 shows the subwatershed boundaries, the watershed stream network, and the 
location of climate stations used for establishing baseline stream flows and model testing, and 
impaired stream segments requiring the establishment of Total Maximum Daily Loads (as 
described in Schilling et al. 2008, and Jha et al. 2010). 
Table 3-1. Watersheds: Summary Information 
Watershed Baseline N (kg) Baseline P (kg) Subbasins Fields21 Area (km2) 
Boone  4,725,826 218,828 30 2,968 2,370 
Raccoon (RRW) 18,604,642 632,406 112 1,569 9,400 
 
Table 3-1 summarizes the baseline nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) emissions as well as 
some of the characteristics for the two watersheds. The baseline values for both nitrogen and 
phosphorus represent the annual mean values computed using the available historical data for 
1995–2001, and 1994–2000 for RRW with the first two years being dropped out for both 
watersheds. 
3.4.2. Abatement actions (Conservation practices) 
The set of conservation practices selected as abatement actions for achieving the nutrient 
loading standards includes reducing the rate of fertilizer application, conservation tillage (i.e., no 
till), cover crops, and land retirement.  Since land retirement is often associated with the federal 
Conservation Reserve program, the acronym CRP is used. The above set is augmented with all 
                                                 
21 SWAT HRUs 
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feasible combinations of these practices but land retirement (e.g.,. the combination of no till and 
cover crops is considered as an independent conservation practice). The baseline is also 
considered as a choice alternative. Table 3-2 provides a description of the abatement actions used 
in the empirical applications for BRW and RRW. 
Table 3-2. The set of abatement actions 
Abatement action Abatement action description 
Baseline No action required 
No Till (NT) No till and no more than 30% of crop residue removed 
Reduced Fertilizer (RF) Reduce fertilizer application rate by 20% 
Cover Crops (CC) Establish cover crops between crop rotations 
Land Retirement (CRP) Retire land from production 
NT, RF No till and 20% reduction in nitrogen application rate  
NT, RF No till and no more than 30% of crop residue is removed 
RF, CC Reduce fertilizer and establish cover crops 
NT, RF, CC No till, 20% reduction in nitrogen application rate, and establish 
cover crops 
 
3.4.3. The costs of abatement actions 
Costs for each conservation practice are drawn from several sources, and all costs are 
expressed in dollars per acre. Table 3-3 summarizes the mean and standard deviations for 
assumed abatement actions implementation costs for the two watersheds. Per acre average cost 
for “No Till” and “Reduced Fertilizer” is lower for BRW, while per acre average cost for “CRP” 
is lower for RRW. The per acre adoption cost of “Cover Crops” is assumed to be the same for 
both watersheds 
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Table 3-3. Abatement actions: assumed costs 
  Boone River 
Watershed 
Raccoon River 
Watershed 
  
  Cost ($/acre) Cost ($/acre)  
Conservation practice Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Cost source 
No action 0 0 0 0  
No Till 5.1 1.91 10.42 7.59 Kling et al. (2005) 
Cover Crop 24.09 4.71 19.28 10.5 T. Kaspar22 
Reduced fertilizer  7.25 5.22 2.52 1.37 Sawyer et al.(2006); 
Libra et al.(2004) 
Land retirement 196.42 33.58 185.56 10.78 Kling et al. (2005) 
 
An implied yield curve for corn-soybean rotation, where yield is estimated as a function 
of fertilizer applied, was used to derive the cost of reducing the fertilizer application rate. The 
procedure is similar to the procedure used by Rabotyagov (2007), Sawyer et al. (2006), and 
Libra, Wolter, and Langel (2004). Data from Iowa field experiments, available through ISU 
Extension was used to estimate an implicit nitrogen-based yield curve. The cost of nitrogen 
fertilizer reduction varies across fields based on the fertilizer application rate reported for the 
baseline scenario. The implied yield curve is a four-degree function of fertilizer rate.23 The cost 
of reducing fertilization is given by multiplying a 20% reduction in the baseline fertilizer rate by 
the price of corn, set at $3.08 per bushel.24 The cost of reducing the fertilizer application rate is 
reduced by the cost saving from applying less fertilizer. The cost of fertilizer is assumed to be 
$0.63 per pound. 
                                                 
22 Personal communication 
23 The coefficients of nitrogen response yield curve Y=-3.3-e9*N^4+8.8-e6*N^3-
0.005*N^2+0.83*N-0.37 
24 Price per bushel represents the average corn price for Iowa for 2004–2009. Source of corn 
price is: http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/crops/pdf/a2-11.pdf 
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Cash rental rates available online (Edward and Smith 2009) in conjunction with the corn 
suitability rate available were used to compute the cost of retiring land out of production. The 
cost of land retirement for each field is obtained by multiplying the cash rental rate per unit of 
corn suitability rate by area and corresponding corn suitability rate. The cash rental rates are used 
as proxies for the opportunity cost of land retirement (Secchi and Babcock 2007). A zero cost is 
considered for no change from the baseline practices. The cost of the abatement actions obtained 
as a combination of the primary ones (i.e. no till and reduced fertilizer) are obtained by summing 
per acre cost of each conservation practice considered in the combination.  
While watershed-level per acre abatement costs are assumed to be the same, the field 
abatement costs are a function of its characteristics. In the case of no till, the abatement costs 
depends on whether the baseline has conventional till or mulch till25. The full abatement costs 
applies if no till is adopted given that there is conventional till in the baseline while the cost for 
mulch till is half the full cost. Another example is the costs of land retirement. I assume the same 
costs per corn suitability index per acre, but the index differs across fields. The costs of reducing 
fertilizer varies across fields by construction, given that the fertilizer rate differs across field. 
3.4.4. Obtaining the Point Value Estimates  
Following the described procedure for obtaining the point coefficients, two sets of point 
coefficients are estimated for each watershed. The first set of points estimates the effectiveness 
of the abatement actions in reducing nitrogen emissions. The second set of points is estimated 
with respect to phosphorus emissions. A total of 2968 (fields) x9 (abatement actions) point 
coefficients are estimated for BRW and a total number of 1569 x 9  point coefficients are 
                                                 
25 Mulch till is an intermediate type of no till. 
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estimated for RRW. Table 3-7 presents the estimates for point values as an area weighted 
average of the point estimates across the watershed. The point coefficients are expressed as per 
acre kilogram of abatement. 
Table 3-4. Abatement point practices (area weighted average across watershed) 
 
No 
action 
NT 
 
CC NT 
CC RF 
RF 
NT RF CC 
RF,CC
NT CRP
Boone River Watershed   
Nitrogen 0.00 2.35 2.42 4.26 0.62 2.98 2.95 4.79 7.32 
Phosphorus 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.29 
Raccoon River Watershed   
Nitrogen 0.00 1.50 2.66 3.33 0.79 2.28 3.31 4.02 7.97 
Phosphorus 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.25 
 
Next, I turn to discussing the point coefficients’ results. In general, the results follow 
prior expectations. The abatement practices that are known to be highly effective at reducing one 
pollutant emissions are awarded higher point values than less effective practices (i.e., land 
retirement receives the highest number of points for both pollutants). No till for N reductions in 
BRW receives a higher number of points than in RRW, but cover crops for P reductions receives 
more points in RRW than in BRW. Reduced fertilizer has the lowest number of points as it is the 
less efficient abatement practice for reducing nitrogen loss and has virtually no impact on 
reducing phosphorus loss. 
Interesting sub-additivity patterns are realized in the points’ estimation—the points 
associated with adopting a combination of conservation practices are not equal to the summation 
of the individual points. For example, the abatement action that combines no till and cover crops 
receives a lower number of points (4.26) than the sum of the points assigned to each of them 
individually (2.34 +2.42 = 4.76 BRW, nitrogen). 
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The difference in the magnitude of estimates for the two pollutants is explained by the 
difference in baseline overall emission levels, where the quantity of nitrogen measured at the 
main outlet is much higher than the quantity of phosphorus measured at the same outlet (the N 
baseline emissions are on average 200 times higher than the P baseline emissions—see Table 3-1 
columns 2 and 3). Interestingly, the point estimates are comparable across the two watersheds 
(i.e., the point values for the same abatement practices are within comparable ranges).  
Table 3-5. Efficiency of the abatement actions under uniform implementation (same abatement 
action is implemented by each field in the watershed) 
Watershed  NT CC NT, CC RF RF,NT RF,CC RF, NT,  CC CRP
BRW 
N red., % 28.8 25.1 48.1 6.3 35.2 30.5 53.5 81.0 
P red., % 37.7 27.5 33.8 0.2 38.0 27.8 34.4 77.4 
RRW 
N red., % 10.9 26.4 31.5 8.9 19.8 33.9 39.3 84.2 
P red., % 37.5 34.1 48.5 0.8 37.7 34.5 48.9 72.7 
 
Prior expectations on the point coefficients’ performance can be inferred from analyzing 
the obtained nutrient reductions assuming that the same abatement action is taken by each field 
in the watershed. Table 3-5 summarizes the overall reduction expressed both in relative and 
percentage terms that would be realized under this assumption. Among the abatement actions 
that represent a single conservation practice, land retirement offers the highest level of abatement 
for both N and P. Land retirement is followed by no till. Interestingly, more than double the 
overall N reductions are obtained under no till in BRW (28.10%) relative to the RRW (10.88 %). 
At the same time, similar P reductions across the two watersheds are obtained under the no till 
option. The N reductions obtained under cover crops are similar across the two watersheds 
(25%). However, more overall P reductions are obtained in RRW (34%) than in BRW (27.5%). 
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Reduced fertilizer is the conservation practice that has the least impact on N reductions and 
almost no impact on the P reduction, an outcome that it is expected.  
The same pattern of sub-additivity is observed for the abatement actions that represent 
combination of two or more abatement actions, in the sense that less nutrient reductions are 
realized under the combination of conservation practice than the sum of the reductions obtained 
under the individual conservation practices. For example , in the case of BRW the combination 
no till and cover crops result in 48.1% N reductions which is less than the sum of individual 
reductions obtained under no till (28.8%) and cover crops (25.1%). This pattern is consistent 
across the two watersheds. 
By using data provided by SWAT, I estimate a different set of point coefficients at 
different levels of aggregation: field, subbasin and watershed specific. A priori, the fields 
specific point coefficients should give a better approximation of the abatement function. 
However, a less specific set of point coefficients might be more appealing for the 
implementation of a trading program.  
Figures 3-3 and 3-4 compare the point coefficients under three levels of specificity (field, 
subbasin and watershed) for BRW. The field and subbasin specific coefficients are obtained as 
an area weighted average. The nitrogen point coefficients are similar across the three types of 
estimation, with the exception of no till at field level, which has the average slightly below the 
average of no till subbasin and watershed point coefficients. More variation can be found across 
the phosphorus point coefficients, especially for no till, and the abatement actions that include no 
till, and land retirement 
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 provide the same comparison for RRW. In the case of nitrogen, the 
no till average field level coefficient is higher than the other two types, while the land retirement 
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field level average point coefficient is higher. Similar patterns as in BRW are observed for 
phosphorus in RRW. 
Detailed results of the point value estimation can be found in the Appendix B. The 
summary statistics for the field specific points for each pollutant are presented in Table A-1 
(nitrogen) and A-2 (phosphorus) for BRW and Tables A-3 (nitrogen) and A-4 (phosphorus) for 
RRW. Next, the subbasin specific point coefficients are presented in Tables A-5 and A-6. For 
BRW and  Tables A-7 and A-8 for RRW. Finally, Figures A-1 to A-4 describe the distribution of 
point coefficients, where the point coefficients are field specific. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-3. Boone River Watershed: different sets of point coefficients, nitrogen 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Boone River Watershed: different sets of point coefficients, phosphorus 
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Figure 3-5. Raccoon River Watershed: different sets of point coefficients, nitrogen 
 
 
 
Figure 3-6. Raccoon River Watershed: different sets of point coefficients, phosphorus 
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Delivery coefficients 
Estimating the delivery coefficients was an intermediate step in obtaining the field level 
point value estimates. The two additional approaches for estimating the point coefficients offer 
another two alternatives. The results for the delivery coefficients are presented in the Appendix 
B, Tables A-9 and A -10 for BRW, and respectively RRW. 
Figure 3-7 compares the BRW distribution of the nitrogen delivery coefficients obtained 
under the three approaches. The delivery coefficients obtained under the three approach are 
labeled as Field, the ones obtained under the second approach are labeled as Subbasin, and 
finally the last ones are labeled as Watershed.  
 
Figure 3-7. Boone River Watershed: nitrogen delivery coefficients 
 
The “Field” and “Subbasin” delivery coefficients are very similar. Moreover, the t-test 
for equal means does not reject the equal mean hypothesis. However, the distribution of the 
Watershed delivery coefficients is different from the previous two (see subbasins 9 and 16 where 
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the delivery coefficients are larger and subbasin number 26 and 27 where the coefficients are 
lower).  
The literature related to delivery coefficients assumes that the delivery coefficients 
should between zero and one, or constrained to be between zero and one. In my empirical 
application, since my goal is to find a good linear approximation for the abatement function, I do 
not impose any constraint on the values the delivery coefficients can take. In the case of BRW, 
the delivery coefficients tend to be lower than one, however there are a few subbasins when the 
coefficients are higher than one. The average values across the watershed are 1.07 (Field), 1.14 
(Subbasin) and 1.07 (Watershed). 
 
Figure 3-8. Boone River Watershed: phosphorus delivery coefficients. 
 Table 3-8 summarizes the distribution of the delivery coefficients for the transport of 
phosphorus in BRW. The average values across the watershed are 0.59 (Field), 0.63 (Subbasin) 
and 1.12 (Watershed). Hence, in this phosphorus case there is higher variations across the three 
types. As in the nitrogen case, the same subbasins (9 and 16) have the largest “Watershed” 
delivery coefficients with values much higher than one. There are no negative delivery 
coefficient
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Figure 3-9. Raccoon River Watershed: nitrogen delivery coefficients. 
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Figure 3-9 summarizes the delivery coefficients distribution for nitrogen in RRW. As in 
previous cases, the Watershed delivery coefficients present the highest variations, with a few 
subbasins having negative delivery coefficients (subbasins 85 and 112). The average value of the 
delivery coefficients is smaller than in the BRW case: 0.67 (Points), 0.68 (Subbasin), and 0.98 
(Watershed).  
The phosphorus delivery coefficients follow similar patterns as the nitrogen in RRW, in 
the sense that the “Watershed” delivery coefficients have higher variability and the highest 
values (their overall average is 1.70, compared to 0.43 and 0.44—the averages for “Point” and 
“Subbasin”). As in BRW, the phosphorus delivery coefficients have lower values than the 
nitrogen coefficients. 
The flow of trading 
Once the point coefficients and delivery coefficients are estimated, the regulator can set 
up an abatement-action-based trading program where farmers can trade points associated with 
the abatement actions, or alternatively they can trade emissions based on the trading ratios 
defined by the true delivery coefficients. Next, I present the steps that would be followed in 
setting up a trading program based on the estimated point coefficients. 
Determining the watershed configuration that achieves a water quality goal, ̅ܣ 
The regulator sets up a water quality goal, expressed as percentage reduction in the baseline level 
of total nitrogen or total phosphorus. Given no cost information is available, the regulator can 
identify a random placement of abatement actions such that the water quality goal is achieved. 
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Computing total number of points associated with a particular water quality goal ̅ܣ 
Let ̅ܣ be the water quality target and ܺ be the vector of abatement actions that is determined by a 
random watershed configuration that achieves the desired water quality target, then the number 
of points corresponding to that water quality target, ܤ, is equivalent to: 
ܤ ൌ ܣሺݔሻ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ே௜ ݏ௜,            (17) 
 
where ݔ௜௝∗  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if practice ݆ is assigned to field ݅, and 0 
otherwise, ܽ௜௝ denotes the number of points corresponding to field ݅, given the abatement 
action	݆, and ݏ௜ is the area of field ݅. 
Allocating a number of points to each field (this represent the field level constraints) 
Next, the regulator has to decide how he is going to set the field- or farm-level 
constraints. In terms of practical implementation, farmers are provided with a set of point value 
estimates that specifies the points earned from the adoption of each abatement action. Given a 
watershed configuration that achieves a particular level of abatement, the corresponding total 
level of points is ܤ ൌ ܣ	ሺݔሻ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݏ௜௝௝௝ே௜ ൌ 	∑ ܾ௜଴ே௜ . The total number of points can be 
assigned as initial farm-level requirements in two ways: allocate the points according to the 
initial watershed configuration, or equally divide the total number of points among farms. The 
initial allocation of points will affect the final outcome of a performance-based program, but will 
not affect the final outcome in the case of a trading program.  
The realization of the trading outcomes 
Given the farm-level constraint, farmers choose the abatement actions and the number of 
points to trade. The final costs and abatement outcomes are realized.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I outlined the properties of three polices under different assumptions for 
the abatement function and proposed an approach for linearizing the abatement function using a 
system of point coefficients that measures the impact of an abatement function on the overall 
abatement level. I presented the results of estimating the point and delivery coefficients under 
different degrees of specificity.  
In the next chapter, I evaluate these policies in a real watershed framework, where I 
anticipate potential tradeoffs between the cost efficiency and effectiveness of different policy 
programs, given that the complex water pollution process is simplified by using the proposed 
linearization.  
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CHAPTER 4. FLEXIBLE PRACTICE-BASED APPROACHES FOR 
CONTROLLING MULTIPLE AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT-
SOURCE WATER POLLUTION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I empirically evaluate the proposed policy approaches—focused on the 
set of abatement actions introduced earlier—for regulating emissions from nonpoint sources 
within two typical agricultural watersheds: the Boone River Watershed (BRW) and the Raccoon 
River Watershed (RRW). Specifically, I evaluate the potential tradeoffs between cost efficiency 
and effectiveness given that the different policies are implemented using a system of point 
coefficients that approximate the abatement actions’ efficiency in reducing both field-level 
emissions and overall abatement.  
Three different policies approaches are proposed: (a) a command-and-control program 
(CAC), where a regulator can mandate field-level abatement actions; (b) a performance standard 
program (PS), where the regulator provides only the field-level requirements (expressed as point 
values), but the farmers, given their private cost information, have the ability to choose the 
abatement action; and (c) a trading program where farmers can additionally choose the 
abatement action and trade point values as long as they meet the field requirements. 
I begin by considering a case in which the proposed policies focus on either nitrogen (N) 
or phosphorus (P) abatement. Next, I consider the case where the proposed policies target both N 
and P simultaneously. I present the results for three levels of desired water quality improvement: 
20%, 30%, and 40% desired reductions in mean annual loadings (N and/or P) relative to the 
baseline. A second set of simulations is obtained for the policies that target either nitrogen or 
phosphorus abatement under the assumption of cost heterogeneity. 
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The empirical assessment of the proposed policies for the single pollutant case is 
extended to include risk analysis under different time periods using the available historical 
weather data and a comparison of the trading outcomes when subbasin or watershed-specific 
points are used instead of field-specific coefficients. 
4.2. Single Pollutant Policies Assessment 
4.2.1. Evaluation of alternative policies using the points coefficients 
To evaluate the performance of the three regulatory approaches, I solve for the least cost 
placement of the abatement actions across the watershed to achieve any given level of ambient 
water quality level using the full abatement function, instead of a linear approximation of it. As 
shown, in Chapter 2, Section 3.2.2, this problem has a high combinatorial nature, with a large 
search space and evolutionary algorithm that have been used to find the nearly optimal solutions, 
known as Pareto frontiers. I use a simulation-optimization system using SWAT and a 
modification of the Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithms 2 (Zitzler et al. 2002, as modified 
by Rabotyagov et al. 2010) to approximate the solution to a two-objective minimization problem, 
which simultaneously minimizes the five-year mean annual N (P) loadings and the costs of the 
abatement practices for each of the watersheds. The solution consists of a set of specific 
watershed configurations (placement of abatement action in the watershed) that achieves a 
particular level of N (P) loadings in the least cost way. The set of all least cost solutions obtained 
by using the evolutionary algorithm can be interpreted as an approximation to the first best 
solution, given a set of costs for the abatement actions. 
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4.2.2. Setting the goals for the three policies approaches 
Under a CAC program, the regulator can mandate the farm-level abatement actions. If he 
is interested in achieving the abatement target,̅ܣ, then he needs to find the set of abatement 
actions corresponding to a watershed configuration  (ܺ஼஺஼ሻ	that satisfies {ܣሺܺ஼஺஼ሻ ൌ ̅ܣሽ. He has 
at least two options to find the desired watershed configurationܺ஼஺஼. 
The first option does not require any cost information and involves the evaluation of a 
range of different watershed configurations until the regulator finds one that meets his criteria 
ሼܣሺܺ஼஺஼ሻ ൌ ̅ܣሽ. This configuration is referred to as “satisficing” ܺ஼஺஼ௌ௔௧ ,{ܣሺܺ஼஺஼ௌ௔௧ ሻ ൌ ̅ܣሽ. 
Alternatively, the regulator can use the abatement cost information available to him and solve for 
the least cost solution to achieve ̅ܣ. Since this solution is the result of an optimization, it is 
referred to as “optimizing” ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧, {ܣ൫ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧൯ ൌ ̅ܣሽ. In terms of my empirical applications, finding 
the optimizing watershed configuration implies selecting an individual (a solution) from the 
Pareto-frontier set that achieves the abatement level ̅ܣ.  
Under a CAC program, both ܺ஼஺஼ௌ௔௧  and ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧ can be implemented directly, by mandating 
field level implementation. However, under the on-farm PS program or the point (credit) trading 
program, setting field-level requirements implies mapping the abatement actions to the on farm 
point coefficients or total watershed points requirements. For the performance standard, the 
farm-level requirements, ܾ௜଴,௉ௌ,௠		݉ ൌ ܵܽݐ, ܱ݌ݐ , are computed using the field-level point 
estimates as ܾ௜଴,௉ௌ,௠ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௠௃௝ , where ݔ௜௝௠is the abatement actions assigned to field ݅ under 
ܺ஼஺஼ௌ௔௧  (ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧ , respectively), and ܽ௜௝ is the corresponding number of points assigned.  
Next, the on-farm requirements can be summed up to determine the total watershed 
points, ܲ௠, required for setting up a trading program, ܲ௠ ൌ 	∑ ܾ௜଴,௉ௌ,௠	ே௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝௠௃௝ே௜ . The 
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total number of points under a trading program, ܲ௠ is translated into farm individual-point 
requirements, ܾ௜଴,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚,௠, as ܲ௠ ൌ 	∑ ܾ௜଴,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚,௠	ே௜ .  
The initial (pre-trading) point allocations ܾ௜଴,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚,௠ may or may not correspond to the 
point requirements under a PS program ( ܾ௜଴,௉ௌ,௠), as it can be translated into farm-level 
allocation of point requirements in any number of ways, such as using the same initial allocation 
used under a PS program, or alternatively to divide the total number of points equally across all 
the fields in the watershed. 
Evaluating the three policies under the two options available for defining the field 
requirements (satisficing and optimizing) results in six different policies to simulate for each 
pollutant and each watershed. The results are obtained for three levels of water quality 
improvements: 20%, 30%, and 40% abatement in the mean expected annual loadings of N (P). 
Next, the results for each water quality target and pollutant are obtained using two sets of 
simulations. 
In the first set of simulations, I assume that the farmers and the regulator have the same 
information on the costs of the abatement actions. The goal of this set of simulation is to assess 
the empirical performance of the three policies given a linear approximation of the abatement 
function is used. For each watershed and for each pollutant, using the evolutionary algorithm 
together with SWAT, I generate the set of least cost solutions for an entire range of abatement 
levels. Next, I am able to select the watershed configurations that achieve the desired abatement 
level ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧, {ܣ൫ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧൯ ൌ ̅ܣሽ, where ̅ܣ ൌ 	20, 30, or	40%	  abatement target. Keeping the above 
costs assumption, I simulate the outcomes of the three policies with the targets being obtained 
both as ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧, or ܺ஼஺஼ௌ௔௧ . The outcomes of different policies are compared to achieving the 
abatement target (effectiveness) and relative to the cost of achieving the target given ܺ஼஺஼ை௣௧  
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In the second set of simulations, I assume that the farmers and the regulator have 
different cost information. Hence, I explore how programs behave in the presence of information 
asymmetry, where the information asymmetry is simulated as cost heterogeneity. In this case, I 
assume that the regulator knows how the costs vary by field characteristics, but the costs also 
vary across the farms in the watershed due to the farmers farming abilities,ߠ௜. 
4.2.3. The set of least-cost solutions 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 depict the set of all least cost solutions (Pareto solutions set)  for the 
single pollutant optimization cases, for BRW, and RRW respectively.26 The abatement levels as 
percentage reductions are depicted on the horizontal axis while the total costs expressed as 
thousands of dollars are depicted on the vertical axis. The Pareto solutions sets can also be 
interpreted as total abatement cost curves. Generally, the nitrogen and phosphorus frontiers 
follow similar patterns for the two watersheds. For lower abatement levels, the slope of the 
phosphorus frontier is lower than the slope of the nitrogen frontier. This implies that, generally, 
the phosphorus abatement levels can be obtained at lower costs than similar levels of nitrogen 
reductions. Only above a certain level of abatement is reducing phosphorus more expensive than 
reducing nitrogen. This threshold level is higher for RRW (about 60% abatement level) than for 
BRW (about 40% abatement level). The steeper curves should imply higher shadow prices for 
higher levels of abatement. The shape and the curvature of the Pareto sets suggest that although 
the same set of abatement actions is used in addition to having different set of abatement costs, 
the two watersheds also have different soil and agricultural characteristics. 
                                                 
26 Table B1 in Appendix B summarizes the main parameters used by the evolutionary 
algorithms. 
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The presented least solution sets serve as a benchmark for comparing the performance of 
all three regulatory approaches, assuming that the cost of abatement actions are known both by 
the farmers and the regulators. Next, I summarize the cost-efficiency performance of the 
proposed policies assuming that the regulator and the farmers have the same cost information. 
 
Figure 4-1. Boone River Watershed: Nitrogen and Phosphorus Pareto frontiers. 
 
Figure 4-2. Raccoon River Watershed: Nitrogen and Phosphorus Pareto frontiers. 
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4.2.4. Cost-efficiency performance under the same cost information 
In this set of simulations, I assume that the costs of abatement actions are known to both the 
farmers and the regulator, where the per acre abatement costs vary with the field characteristics. 
In the context of the empirical applications, the farm-level abatement cost functions are given by 
ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ̅ߠሻ ൌ ∑ ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ∗ ݏ௜௃௝ 				∀	݅ ൌ 1,…ܰ	            (18)	
where ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ is the per acre abatement costs for the abatement action ݆ –per acre costs vary with 
field characteristics, ݔ௜௝ takes a value of 1 for abatement ݆ and 0 otherwise (i.e. the abatement 
actions are mutually exclusive), and ݏ௜ represent the area of field ݅. 
The regulator finds the set of least-cost allocation solutions by using the cost functions 
detailed above. He chooses the solutions under which the desired abatement levels are met. In 
order to assess the cost efficiency and effectiveness of the three policies under a linear 
approximation of the abatement function (i.e., using the point coefficients) , I assume that the 
farmers have the same cost functions when they minimize their abatement costs under the PS or 
trading program. 
The optimal solution under the PS program is obtained by solving the following linear 
programming problem: 
݉݅݊௫೔ೕ ∑ ∑ ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ∗ ݏ௜
௃
௝ே௜ 					  
ݏ. ݐ.			 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝ ൒ ܾ௜଴,௉ௌ,௠	௝ 			∀݅ ൌ 1,… , ܰ			, ݉ ൌ ܵܽݐ, ܱ݌ݐ	   
∑ ݔ௜௝ ൌ 1		∀݅ ൌ 1,… , N௃௝ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 						(19) 
where ܽ௜௝ is the number of point coefficients assigned to abatement action ݆, and ܾ௜଴,௉ௌ,௠ is the 
field standard given by the regulator. The field constraint can be obtained based on the least cost 
solution or based on a random allocation. The first set of constraints specify the field specific 
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constraints, and the last set of equality constraints reinforce the fact that the choice is a binary 
variable. 
The optimal solution under the trading program is obtained in a similar fashion by solving: 
݉݅݊௫೔ೕ ∑ ሼ∑ ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ∗ ݏ௜
௃
௝ே௜ 	൅ ݌ܾ௜ݏ௜ሽ			
ݏ. ݐ.			 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝୎୨ ൅ ܾ௜ ൒ ܾ௜଴,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚,௠∀݅			, ݉ ൌ ܵܽݐ, ܱ݌ݐ			 	
∑ ݔ௜௝ ൌ 1					∀݅ ൌ 1,… , ܰ	௃௝ 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			(20) 
where ܾ௜ represents the number of per acre points a farmer will trade. The constraints for the PS 
program are adjusted to take into account the traded point values.  Additionally, the market 
clearing condition is given by ∑ ܾ௜ݏ௜ே௜ ൌ 0. I assume that all gains from trade are realized; hence 
the trading solution coincides with the solution of an omniscient social planner that solves the 
cost minimization problem defined by equation (18). 
݉݅݊௫೔ೕ ∑ ሼ∑ ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ∗ ݏ௜
௃
௝ே௜ 	ሽ			ݏ. ݐ.		 ∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝ݏ௜	୎୨ே௜ ൒ 	∑ ܾ௜଴,௧௥௔ௗ௜௡௚,௠ݏ௜ே௜ 		,			∑ ݔ௜௝୎୨ ൌ 1		 		(21)	
It can be shown that the shadow price of the constraint to the problem defined by 
equation (19) is equal to the equilibrium price for the point trading. Next, I discuss the cost 
efficiency and the effectiveness of the three different policy programs. 
A priori, the realized abatement goal is expected to be achieved under a CAC policy, 
since the abatement actions are mandated. However, the outcomes of the PS and the trading 
policy are mandated. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the PS and the trading policy are the results 
of reallocating the points associated with the CAC set of abatement actions. Since the points are 
an approximation of both the abatement actions’ effectiveness and of the fate and transport of the 
nutrients, these reallocations may result in the non- or over-attainment of the abatement goals. 
The extent to which the abatement goal is not met depends on the quality of the point 
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approximation. The direction of the deviation depends on the curvature of the abatement function 
around the abatement goal. If the abatement function is concave in the edge-of-field reduced 
emissions, then a linear approximation results in an over achievement of the abatement goal. The 
reverse holds for a convex curvature of the abatement function. 
Another conjecture that can be empirically tested is whether the realized abatement levels 
under the PS satisficing are higher than the corresponding abatement levels realized under the PS 
optimizing approach. This conjecture would hold if the satisficing approach, ܺ௉ௌௌ௔௧, selects more 
effective abatement actions, which in turn are more cost effective.27  
The PS program allows only for within farm trading where farmers choose the abatement 
action based on the cost and the farm-level imposed constraint. The trading program allows for 
both within farm and across farms trading. This implies that both PS and trading outcomes 
should result in cost savings relative to the CAC costs. The magnitude of the cost savings should 
be higher for the satisficing approach and lower for the optimizing one, since the CAC-
optimizing approach already represents the first best. 
Given that the same costs information is used (i.e., the costs are assumed to be known by 
both the farmers and the regulator), the cost effective performance of the simulated outcomes can 
be compared with the corresponding CAC outcomes.  
The PS optimizing and trading outcomes are expected to perform well relative to the 
CAC optimizing outcomes. Alternatively, the least flexible approach, CAC-satisficing, is 
                                                 
27 The correlation between the point coefficients and per abatement costs is as it follows: 0.82 for 
N points and 0.7 for P point in BRW, 0.82 for N points and 0.39 for P points in the RRW. The 
correlation values are determined as average of the field-level correlation values. 
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expected to have a lower performance, and more flexible approaches gradually increase their 
performance as more freedom in choosing the abatement actions is allowed.  
The emergence of hotspots, fields where the environmental outcomes get worse than 
under the baseline conditions, is a concern that may arise in the context of trading outcomes. To 
check if hotspots emerge as a result of the points based trading, I determine the number of fields 
that have negative abatement (i.e., an increase in the N or P emissions) relative to the baseline. 
The PS and the trading optimal solutions are the result of the reallocations of the initial 
points (abatement actions) prescribed by the CAC. To measure the dynamic of the points’ 
reallocation across the two programs, I determine the percentage area of a subbasin that switches 
to a different abatement action than the one prescribed by the CAC policy. 
In the next section, I present the assessment of alternative policies using the point 
coefficients estimated at field level first using data available for BRW and RRW. I start with the 
policy programs focusing on the abatement of nitrogen in BRW, and continue with the program 
targeting the phosphorus abatement in the same watershed. The corresponding policy assessment 
for RRW is summarized in the second part of this section. 
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Table 4-1. Boone River Watershed: Simulated policy performance under varying nitrogen abatement targets28,29,30 . 
Target N 
reduction, 
% from 
baseline 
CAC, optimizing  CAC, satisficing  PS, optimizing  PS, satisficing  
Trading, 
optimizing  
Trading, 
satisficing  
 N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
20 20.73 1.79 20.86 7.23 26.34 1.67 31.52 5.80 19.81 0.85 22.21 1.10 
30 30.12 3.23 30.12 19.78 30.05 3.10 40.24 18.59 29.47 2.27 31.98 2.99 
40 40.00 9.01 40.00 29.60 39.37 8.94 45.30 28.55 39.35 6.06 41.40 7.16 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 The placement of optimal abatement actions as well the cost values are obtained by solving equations (19)(PS) and (20 )(trading). 
29 The abatement values are obtained by running the watershed configuration (the placement of optimal abatement actions) in SWAT 
for a period of seven years, disregarding the first two years and taking the average of the remaining five years. 
30 The satisficing allocations represent single random realizations of the abatement goals. The results obtained under this approach 
need to be interpreted with caution as these random realizations can results in higher or lower total costs.  
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Boone River Watershed nitrogen simulated policy performance 
Table 4-1 summarizes the results for the reductions in expected mean annual loadings for 
nitrogen in the BRW under the three policy approaches. The table rows summarize the results for 
different levels of abatement expressed as percent reductions relative to the baseline mean annual 
loadings. The policy outcomes under the “Optimizing” and the “Satisficing” approaches are 
presented as ex-post mean annual percent reductions to the baseline and the total costs are 
expressed in millions of dollars. 
Under the CAC policy, abatement actions are mandated, so the attainment of the 
abatement target is assured (see column 2). Notice that the cost of a CAC-satisficing policy is 
very large relative to the cost of a CAC-optimizing policy, being from four to seven times higher 
(see columns 3 and 5). With the exception of the 40% optimizing PS program, the PS 
reallocation of points result in the over-attainment of the abatement goals (see columns 6 and 8). 
The over-attainment is much higher for the satisficing PS approaches, being on average 5% 
higher than the original targets (e.g., the 30% satisficing PS results in a 40.24% abatement level, 
as shown column 6 vs. column 2). This finding supports the conjecture that the realized 
satisficing abatement levels are higher than the optimizing levels. While the costs of the PS 
policies are lower than the costs of CAC policies for both satisficing (columns 9 vs. 5) and 
optimizing approaches (column 7 vs. 3 ), the PS-satisficing costs are still higher than the PS-
optimizing costs (column 9 vs. 7), although the magnitude of the differences is lower, ranging 
from three to five times higher.   
In contrast, mixed results are obtained under the trading approaches. Under the satisficing 
approach the abatement targets are, on average, slightly over achieved (column 12), while they 
are slightly under achieved under the optimizing approach (column 10), although the magnitude 
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of the non-attainment is fairly small (less than 1%). Further cost reductions relative to the CAC 
polices are observed under both optimizing and satisficing approaches. The magnitude of the 
cost reductions under the satisficing approach (column 13) is higher than 80% of the CAC 
satisficing total costs (column 5). Although the optimizing and satisficing trading costs are 
within similar ranges, a direct comparison cannot be made since they do no achieve the same 
level of N abatement. 
The outcomes of the two trading approaches do not coincide because the total number of 
points is different (see Table 4-2 column “Total point values”). The total number of points is 
higher under the satisficing approach suggesting that abatement actions that accrue more points, 
and hence are more effective, are chosen under this approach. The equilibrium point prices that 
represent the shadow price of the environmental constraint are summarized in Table 4-2. As 
expected, the price per point increases with the abatement target. The obtained prices could be 
also interpreted as a per acre N reduction subsidy that should be offered as an alternative to a 
trading program. The prices under the optimizing approach are smaller than under the satisficing 
approach, as expected. This suggests that it is useful for a regulator to acquire some information 
on abatement costs and use that information to find the least cost solution 
Table 4-2. Boone River Watershed: Total point values and point prices31 
 Trading Optimizing Trading Satisficing 
Target  Total point values Price ($) Total point values Price ($) 
20% 862,241 2.14 967,653 2.58 
30% 1,288,380 5.13 1,412,248 6.38 
40% 1,791,383 9.8 1,897,278 11.18 
                                                 
31 Equilibrium prices are determined by solving equation (21) 
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As stated earlier, the PS and trading outcomes are the results of optimally reallocating the points 
initially assigned according to the CAC solutions. The results of these reallocations can also be 
summarized by: (a) the percentage of watershed’s area allocated to a particular abatement action; 
and (b) the percentage of a subbasin’s area that switches to different abatement actions other than 
the one prescribed by the CAC optimizing or CAC satisficing policy.  
 
Table 4-3. Boone River Watershed:The distribution of abatement actions, optimizing policies, 
nitrogen (% area) 
   Abatement goal 20%  Abatement goal 30% Abatement goal 40% 
Abatement     
Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
No Action 31.9 34.1 64.0 0.1 2.4 25.6 0.1 0.9 9.1 
No till (NT) 67.4 64.0 31.5 86.4 84.8 62.1 35.8 39.1 52.0 
Cover Crop (CC) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 
NT,CC 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.2 8.3 12.4 
Red.Fert. 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.9 
Red.Fert., NT 0.2 1.1 3.0 12.1 10.7 9.9 32.6 28.1 17.1 
Red.Fert.,CC 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.3 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 30.8 21.5 7.3 
LandRetirement 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 
 
Table 4-3 summarizes the distribution of abatement actions expressed as percentage of 
total watershed area allocated to an abatement action under the optimizing approach. The CAC 
and PS optimizing distributions for 20 % and 30 % N abatement tend to concentrate around “no 
till”, while the distribution for 40% N abatement is more evenly distributed between no till, 
reduced fertilizer and no till, and reduced fertilizer, no till and cover crop. Additionally, the CAC 
and PS distributions are very similar (see column 1 vs. 2, 4 vs. 5, and 7 vs. 8). The trading 
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distribution is more heterogeneous, including more abatement actions, but still similar to the 
CAC or PS distributions (column 3 vs. 1 , 6 vs. 4, and 9 vs.7). 
Table 4-4. Boone River Watershed:The distribution of abatement actions, Satisficing policies, 
nitrogen (% area) 
  
Abatement goal 20% 
 
Abatement goal 30% 
 
Abatement goal 40% 
Abatement     
Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
No Action 19.9 23.5 56.7 20.5 23.1 17.7 17.1 18.7 7.6 
No till (NT) 17.6 39.0 37.3 1.0 21.7 64.2 1.1 13.1 45.5 
Cover Crop (CC) 13.5 5.6 0.0 8.2 3.2 0.0 10.1 5.3 0.4 
NT,CC 2.4 3.8 0.3 1.4 6.4 2.6 13.8 17.1 15.9 
Red.Fert. 19.6 4.3 1.3 21.9 5.0 0.8 9.1 2.5 0.9 
Red.Fert., NT 16.9 18.3 4.1 10.1 11.6 13.4 8.2 9.8 18.5 
Red.Fert.,CC 4.4 0.7 0.0 3.9 0.9 0.1 4.4 0.8 0.4 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 4.5 3.8 0.2 21.7 16.7 1.0 16.3 12.8 10.2 
LandRetirement 1.1 1.1 0.0 11.4 11.4 0.2 19.8 19.8 0.7 
 
Table 4-4 summarizes the distribution of abatement actions expressed as a percentage of 
total watershed area allocated to an abatement action under the satisficing approach. Relative to 
the CAC optimizing, the distributions under CAC present more heterogeneity. For example, 
under 30% N optimizing abatement, 86% of the area is allocated to no till and 12% is allocated 
to the combination of no till and reduced fertilizer, while the distribution under 30% satisficing 
has the following structure: 20% no action, 8% cover crop, 21%  reduced fertilizer, 10 % 
reduced fertilizer and no till, 21% reduced fertilizer, no till and cover crops, and 11% land 
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retirement. The PS distributions tend to have a different structure than the corresponding CAC 
(see columns 1 vs 2, 3 vs 5, and 7 vs 8). 
 Interestingly, the distributions under trading tend to have the same structures as the 
distributions under trading optimizing outcomes.  This result highlights the fact that, for a trading 
program, the quality of cost information known by the regulator does not have a big impact on 
the trading outcome. 
The change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions relative to the CAC 
distribution is measured at subbasin level as the percentage area that switches to a different 
abatement action. Table 4-5 and 4-6 summarize the above change for both optimizing and 
satisficing as the distribution of the subbasins across different levels of change. The first column 
in these tables gives the different levels of change (e.g., the first entry,”<=10%”, the change in 
the area is less than 10% of the subbasin area). The rest of the columns counts the number of 
subbasins within a given level of change across different abatement targets (e.g., PS 20%, 24 
subbasins out of 30 switch less than 10% of their total area to a different abatement action. 
Table 4-5. Boone River Watershed: The change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, Optimizing 
  Optimizing Approach 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area/Abatement 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 
<=10% 24 22 12 1 0 0 
(10%- 20%] 6 6 8 0 3 0 
(20%- 30%] 0 1 3 1 5 1 
(30%- 40%] 0 1 6 3 5 2 
(40%- 50%] 0 0 1 2 4 5 
(50%- 60%] 0 0 0 6 5 2 
(60%- 70%] 0 0 0 9 4 0 
(70%- 80%] 0 0 0 7 1 7 
(80%- 90%] 0 0 0 1 2 8 
(90%- 100%] 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Counts of subbasin 30 30 30 30 30 30 
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Under the optimizing policies, the intensity of change in the distribution increases with 
the level of abatement. Additionally, the change following the trading program presents more 
heterogeneity than under the change following the PS program. For example, for a 30% N 
abatement goal under PS optimizing 22 subbasins, out of 30, have less than 10% of their area 
switching to a different abatement action, while under the trading 4, 14, and 8 subbasins have 
30%, between 30% and 60%, and more than 60%, respectively, of their total areas allocated to 
different abatement actions( Table 4-5). 
Same patterns are observed for the change in the distribution of the abatement actions 
under the PS optimizing. However, relative to the optimizing case, the change following the 
trading program is more intense, in the sense that a larger number of subbasins switch a higher 
percentage of their area to a different abatement action. For example, under 30% N satisficing 25 
subbasins have more than 90% of their area allocated to a different abatement action (Table 4-6). 
Table 4-6. BRW: The change in the relative distribution of abatement actions relative to CAC, 
satisficing 
  Satisficing approach 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area/Abatement  20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 
<=10% 0 1 0 0 0 0 
(10%- 20%] 3 3 9 0 0 0 
(20%- 30%] 10 11 14 0 0 0 
(30%- 40%] 8 5 6 0 0 0 
(40%- 50%] 7 8 1 0 0 0 
(50%- 60%] 2 2 0 0 0 0 
(60%- 70%] 0 0 0 1 0 0 
(70%- 80%] 0 0 0 11 0 1 
(80%- 90%] 0 0 0 12 5 5 
(90%- 100%] 0 0 0 6 25 24 
Counts of subbasin 30 30 30 30 30 30 
 
The above results obtained for both the distribution of the abatement actions as well as 
the change in the distribution relative to the CAC outcomes are as expected. The CAC 
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optimizing is an approximation of the least cost solution, hence the distribution of the abatement 
actions is more homogeneous, and less change is expected under the PS and trading program. 
Moreover, since PS is less flexible, less change in the distribution is expected. The CAC 
satisficing is a random allocation; hence significant changes are expected under the PS and 
trading when the abatement cost information is used. 
The fact that the PS-optimizing and trading outcomes are comparable to the CAC 
optimizing solutions indicates that the overall mix of the abatement actions and their spatial 
distribution is similar to the solutions discovered by the evolutionary algorithms. Figures 4-3 and 
4-4 represent the spatial distribution of the abatement action for a 30% N reductions abatement 
goal for both satisficing and optimizing approaches. Figure 4-4 also suggests similarities 
between the CAC optimization solution discovered via evolutionary algorithm and the PS and 
trading outcomes, the solutions discovered via linear programing, while Figure 4-5 depicts the 
spatial heterogeneity under the satisficing approaches for CAC, and similarities between the two 
trading outcomes (optimizing and satisficing). 
As shown above, although the distribution of the abatement actions within watersheds for 
the satisficing and optimizing trading outcomes are similar, the changes at subbasin level are 
different. Figure 4-3 depicts the spatial representation of the change in the distribution relative to 
CAC for 30% N abatement by subbasins. The overall change at watershed level measured as a 
weighted average of the within subbasin change is summarized in Table B-4. In the case of 30% 
N abatement goal, on average 93% ( 47%) of the area is allocated to a different abatement action 
under the trading satisficing (optimizing), hence the change in the distribution is more intense 
under the satisficing as expected. 
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Figure 4-3. Boone River Watershed: Spatial representation of the change in the distribution 
(percent of subbasin area), 30% N abatement goal.  
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Figure 4-4.  Boone River Watershed: The spatial distribution of abatement action, 30% N abatement goal, optimizing,  
94 
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Figure 4-5. Boone River Watershed: The spatial distribution of abatement action, 30% N abatement goal, satisficing
95 
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 Figure 4-3 depicts  the spatial representation of the changes in the distribution of the 
abatement actions under CAC for 30% N abatement. The lighter colored areas show that in that 
subbasin a smaller percentage of the area switch to a different abatement actions.32The figure 
depicts the changes across PS and trading, for both satisficing and optimizing.The emergence of 
hot spots is a common concern for the trading settings. By evaluating the trading outcomes on 
the field (HRU) level, no evidence is found to support the existence of hotspots. Figure 4-6 
introduces the histogram of abatement efforts corresponding to satisficing and optimizing trading 
outcomes for a 30% N abatement goal, where the abatement effort is measured as a percentage 
reduction relative to the baseline. Notice again, the similarities of the distributions across the two 
trading approaches. Similar distributions for 20% and 30 % can be found in Appendix B, Figures 
B1 and B2. 
 
Figure 4-6. Boone River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, N 30% abatement goal 
  
                                                 
32 The lighter contour lines delimitate the subbasins  
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Table 4-7. Boone River Watershed: Simulated policy performance under varying phosphorus abatement targets 
Target N 
reduction, 
% from 
baseline 
CAC, optimizing  CAC, satisficing  PS, optimizing  PS, satisficing  Trading, 
optimizing  
Trading, 
satisficing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
 N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
N red. 
$, 
million 
20 21.57 1.24 20.04 9.45 21.66 1.07 26.63 3.72 21.92 0.49 20.50 0.42 
30 29.82 2.15 30.12 16.35 29.86 2.00 34.90 11.25 29.98 1.03 29.35 0.97 
40 40.00 8.14 40.01 35.53 40.08 7.28 41.75 32.39 40.30 4.60 37.07 2.02 
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Boone River Watershed phosphorus simulated policy performance  
Table 4-7 summarizes the results for reductions in the phosphorus mean annual loadings 
in the BRW under three different policy approaches. As in the case of nitrogen, the CAC-
satisficing outcomes have much higher costs than the CAC-optimizing outcomes, again the 
magnitude being between four and seven times higher (column 3 vs. 5). The realized abatement 
levels under the PS-optimizing almost replicate the corresponding levels under the CAC (column 
6 vs. 2). Again, the PS-satisficing results in higher realized levels of abatement than the 
corresponding PS-optimizing. The magnitude of the overachievement in the abatement PS-
satisficing outcomes is large in the case of 20% and 30% P abatement (see column 8). However, 
mixed results are obtained under the trading policies. For example, the abatement goal is not 
achieved under the 40% abatement trading-satisficing approach, but it is achieved under the 
trading-optimizing (see columns 10 and 12). 
An interesting result emerges for the PS and trading-optimizing results: for all three 
abatement goals, the CAC-optimizing solutions are outperformed by the PS outcomes, implying 
that more reductions are obtained at lower cost (e.g., the CAC-optimizing cost for achieving 30% 
P abatement is $2.15 million, while the costs under PS is $2.0 million) . This is explained by the 
fact that the solutions provided evolutionary algorithms are themselves an approximation, and 
further improving can be obtained through linear programming (Whittaker et al. 2009).  
The optimizing and satisficing trading outcomes cannot be compared directly since the 
total point values are different. Compared to the nitrogen case, the total points under the 
satisficing policies is higher than the satisficing one. The trading equilibrium prices reflect the 
difference in the total point values being higher for the optimizing outcomes. The shadow prices 
also reflect a sharp slope of the least-cost solution set around 40% P. The price per point for 40% 
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P optimizing is much higher than the price for 30% ($593 vs. $38.18), as shown in Table 4-8. 
The point prices for the P abatement are much higher than the corresponding prices for N 
abatement. 
Table 4-8. Boone River Watershed: Total point values and point prices, phosphorus33 
 Trading Optimizing Trading Satisficing 
Target Total point values Price ($) Total point values Price ($) 
20% 50,199 21.47 46,915 18.65 
30% 69,026 38.18 67,487 35.90 
40% 92,559 593.79 85,390 109.34 
 
The same patterns as in the nitrogen case are obtained for the spatial distribution of the 
abatement actions: the distributions under CAC and PS optimizing are more skewed towards no 
till, while the distributions under CAC and PS satisficing are more diverse. Again, the trading 
distributions across the approaches are similar. The detailed distributions are summarized in 
Appendix B, Table B-2 (optimizing) and B-3 (satisficing). 
Table 4-9. Boone River Watershed: The change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, satisficing 
  Satisificing approach 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
area 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
<=10% 0 0 0 0 0 0
(10%- 20%] 0 0 0 0 0 0
(20%- 30%] 0 1 9 0 0 0
(30%- 40%] 0 2 11 0 0 0
(40%- 50%] 4 7 5 0 0 0
(50%- 60%] 6 9 3 0 0 0
(60%- 70%] 9 8 1 0 1 0
(70%- 80%] 10 3 1 8 3 1
(80%- 90%] 1 0 0 11 17 8
(90%- 100%] 0 0 0 11 9 21
Counts of subbasin 30 30 30 30 30 30
 
                                                 
33 Equilibrium prices are determined by solving equation (19). 
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 The patterns in the change in the CAC abatement actions’ distributions follows the same 
patterns described for nitrogen (Table B-4) . However, in the case of phosphorus, the change in 
distribution is more intense under the PS satisficing, with more subbasin having more area 
switching to a different abatement action (Table 4-9). For example, under 30% N satisficing, in 
20 subbasin, less the 50% of area is switching, compared to 5 subbasins under 30% P satisficing. 
The same patterns are obtained under the 20% and 30% PS satisficing. Figure B-3 in Appendix 
B depicts the spatial representation of the change in the distribution relative to CAC for 30% P 
abatement. 
Several hotspots emerge under the phosphorus trading, although the number of fields is 
small relative to the total number of fields. For the 30% abatement level, there are 14 of 2,968 
fields that have worse outcomes than under the baseline. A complete summary of the number of 
hotspots that emerge can be found in Table B-6. The distribution of the abatement effort for a 
30% P abatement is provided below in Figure 4-7. Relative to the corresponding distribution for 
30% N abatement, the distribution under P have less variations, with a higher number of fields 
having similar values for the abatement effort. The distribution of the abatement efforts for the 
20% and 30 % P abatement are provided in Appendix B (Figure B-4 and B-5). 
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Figure 4-7.  Boone River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, P 30% abatement goal. 
 
Raccon River Watershed Nitrogen and Phosphorus Simulated Policy Performance  
Table 4-10 and 4-11 summarize the results for the reductions in mean annual loadings, 
for RRW under the three policy approaches, for N and P, respectively. The costs under CAC 
nitrogen satisficing approach are higher than under the CAC nitrogen optimizing approach, 
although the magnitude is much lower, up to 1.9 times higher compared to 4 to 7 times higher as 
it is the BRW case (Table 4-10 column 3 and 5). The magnitude in the cost difference is higher 
for the phophorus outcomes, up to five times higher. As in the BRW, significant cost savings 
relative to the CAC outcomes are observed across PS and trading policies.  
The PS realized abatement levels are almost identical to the abatement levels and the 
trading outcomes are slightly below the abatement targets. However, the optimizing PS realized 
abatement levels are slightly superior to the satisficing corresponding outcomes. As before, the 
outcomes under PS optimizing outperform the CAC optimizing outcomes both under N and P.
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Table 4-10.  Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated program performance under varying nitrogen abatement targets, nitrogen 
Target N 
reduction, 
% from 
baseline 
CAC, optimizing  CAC, satisficing  PS, optimizing  PS, satisficing  
Trading, 
optimizing  
Trading, 
satisficing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
  N red. $,million N red. $,million N red. $,million N red. $,million N red. $,million N red. $,million
20 20.20 23.77 20.01 36.03 20.43 21.61 20.31 33.26 19.97 14.36 20.47 15.22 
30 30.67 42.45 30.00 61.96 30.83 39.59 30.31 58.74 29.22 31.41 29.42 31.81 
40 40.23 75.25 40.00 130.64 40.34 70.91 40.23 126.75 38.94 56.39 39.18 57.54 
 
Table 4-11. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated program performance under varying nitrogen abatement targets, phosphorus 
Target N 
reduction, 
% from 
baseline 
CAC, optimizing  CAC, satisficing  PS, optimizing  PS, satisficing  
Trading, 
optimizing  
Trading, 
satisficing  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
  N red. $, million N red. $, million N red. $, million N red. $, million N red. $, million N red. $, million
20 21.77 7.70 20.00 36.60 21.81 7.53 21.89 30.61 21.62 4.30 18.65 3.17 
30 30.82 15.84 30.00 36.29 30.84 15.81 30.66 31.45 30.90 9.97 29.46 8.80 
40 40.02 28.14 40.01 102.13 40.02 28.07 42.24 92.86 40.07 20.15 37.57 16.76 
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Table 4-12 presents the total point values and the point prices for RRW for both nitrogen 
and phosphorus. The figures follow similar patterns to BRW: the total point values and the point 
prices are higher under the satisficing approach, and the total point values are lower for P 
abatement but the point prices for P are higher relative to the corresponding N values. 
 
Table 4-12. Raccoon River Watershed: Total point values and point prices, nitrogen and 
phosphorus 
 Nitrogen Phosphorus 
  Trading optimizing 
Trading 
satisficing   
Trading 
optimizing 
Trading 
satisficing 
Targ
et 
Total point 
values Price ($) 
Total point 
values 
Price 
($) 
Total point 
values Price ($)
Total point 
values Price ($)
20% 3,748,119 8.38 3,848,234 8.72 125,827 48.85 145,007 68.24 
30% 5,372,838 12.65 5,404,148 12.74 194,944 116.42 204,420 130.92
40% 6,979,735 19.08 7,039,798 19.27 247,321 189.39 263,615 229.01
 
Table 4-13. Raccoon River Watershed: The distribution of abatement actions, optimizing policies, 
nitrogen (% area) 
   Abatement goal 20%  Abatement goal 30% Abatement goal 40% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Abatement     
Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
No Action 0.6 5.6 20.8 0.0 3.6 9.7 0.1 3.0 3.8 
No till (NT) 0.2 7.3 9.1 0.0 2.5 7.2 0.2 1.7 3.1 
Cover Crop (CC) 0.3 2.9 1.2 0.1 12.9 7.4 0.3 13.5 11.3 
NT,CC 0.1 0.5 1.6 0.1 1.1 3.0 0.2 1.5 6.5 
Red.Fert. 48.7 44.7 40.2 15.5 14.4 21.4 0.2 0.1 4.7 
Red.Fert., NT 22.6 18.5 18.8 0.4 3.5 15.1 0.4 2.9 6.7 
Red.Fert.,CC 22.9 17.5 5.3 83.8 62.0 24.6 83.6 64.3 35.0 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 4.5 3.0 3.0 0.1 0.1 11.6 5.7 4.3 26.1 
LandRetirement 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 8.8 2.9 
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 Table 4-13 summarizes the distribution of the abatement actions under the N optimizing 
abatement. Similar patterns to BRW are obtained in this case too: the CAC and PS distributions 
have similar structure (see columns 1 vs. 2, 4 vs. 5, and 7 vs. 8). However, relative to the BRW, 
the distributions have a different structure - the abatement actions  reduced fertilizer and cover 
crop being predominant (see row Reduced Fertilizer). The distributions for N satisficing and P 
optimizing and satisficing have similar characteristics to the BRW, therefore the results can be 
found in Appendix B Tables B-7 (N satisficing), B-8 (P optimizing), B-9 (P satisficing). 
The changes in the CAC distributions of the abatement actions also follow similar 
patterns to the ones described in BRW: less area is switching to a different abatement action than 
the one described by CAC under the optimizing relative to the optimizing and more area is 
switching under the trading than under the PS program. The underlying results are summarized 
in Tables B-9 to B-12 in Appendix B. 
Table 4-14. Overall change in distribution of CAC abatement actions 
    Nitrogen Phosphorus 
Approach Target PS  Trading PS Trading 
Satisficing 
20% 20.46 78.76 41.08 73.91 
30% 19.77 86.89 58.84 99.13 
40% 14.90 93.66 42.61 96.51 
Optimizing 
20% 17.99 73.70 3.04 31.05 
30% 23.29 71.46 1.07 44.93 
40% 21.87 64.90 1.61 44.46 
 
Table 4-14 summarized the overall change in the CAC distribution as an area weighted 
average of the changes at the subbasins level. Overall, there is less change under the optimizing 
approaches. Notice that the overall change under phosphorus PS outcomes is less than 3%. Also, 
there is no clear relation between the magnitude of the change and the abatement target. 
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Performance Standard Optimizing  Trading Optimizing 
 
Performance Standard Satisficing  Trading Satisficing 
Figure 4-8. Spatial representation of changes in the CAC distribution (% of subbasin area), 30% N 
abatement goal 
 
Figure 4-8 depicts the spatial representation of the changes in the distribution of the 
abatement actions under CAC for 30% N abatement. The lighter colored areas show that in that 
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subbasin less area switches to a different abatement actions. The figure depicts the changes 
across PS and trading, for both satisficing and optimizing.  
There are no hotspots under the PS and trading outcomes in RRW. Moreover, the 
abatement effort is distributed in a similar manner to BRW. Figure 4-9 depicts the abatement 
effort across the fields for RRW, 30% N abatement goal. The shape of the distribution is 
comparable to the corresponding BRW distribution, shown in Figure 4-6. Similar figures are 
provided in Appendix B for the N satisficing and P optimizing and satisficing outcomes. 
 
Figure 4-9. Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, N 30% abatement goal 
 
Discussions 
I evaluated each of the three policy approaches to regulate nonpoint-source water 
pollution emissions, where emissions are defined in terms of either nitrogen or phosphorus for 
two different watersheds located in Iowa. The empirical assessment of the proposed policies 
shows an overall good performance of the trading programs based on field-specific points 
measuring the marginal impacts of abatement actions on the total abatement level. Trading and 
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PS optimizing outcomes are good approximations of the corresponding first-best outcomes, 
while the CAC and PS satisficing outcomes are generally cost ineffective. 
The policies focusing on N abatement are more costly than the policies focusing on P 
abatement, and this result holds for both watersheds. At the same time, the equilibrium point 
prices for N trading programs are lower than the corresponding prices for P trading programs, 
given similar level of abatement targets. Hence, the marginal cost of having an additional unit of 
P abatement is higher than the marginal cost for having an additional unit of N abatement. For 
example the equilibrium price for 30% N optimizing trading is $5.13 while the price for 30% P 
optimizing is $38.13. The corresponding total costs are $2.27 million for N trading and $1.03 
million for P trading. 
Given the same abatement targets, the spatial distribution of the abatement actions differs 
across the two watersheds. For example, for 30% N abatement goals in BRW, the distribution of 
trading-optimizing abatement actions is focused mainly around “no action” and “no till,” while 
in RRW the distribution is more evenly spread across the entire set of abatement options. The 
overall watershed activity is somewhat similar across the watersheds too, and the same patterns 
are observed in both of them: trading results in more activity relative to the PS approach, and the 
activity is more intense under the satisficing approach than under optimizing. 
The two watersheds, while located in the same state, differ considerably in size, with 
RRW being three times larger than BRW. Given that the estimated point coefficients are similar 
across the two watersheds, and that the per acre baseline N (P) emissions are similar across the 
two watersheds (BRW 9.1 kg N per acre, RRW 10.5 kg N per acre, BRW 0.42 kg P per acre, 
RRW 0.36 kg P per acre), the RRW total costs would be expected to be approximately three 
times higher than total costs for BRW, given the same set abatement targets. However, the per 
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acre abatement costs are larger for RRW than with similar abatement actions for BRW; and 
consequently, the total costs for RRW are much higher. For example, achieving 30% N 
abatement in BRW costs about $2.27 million, while reaching a similar level of N abatement in 
RRW costs $31.41 million. The area and the cost differences across the two watersheds are also 
reflected in the equilibrium prices, with RRW prices being, again, larger than those of BRW.  
4.2.5. The Assessment of Trading Outcomes with Less Refined Point Coefficients 
The assessment of the proposed policies shows that the point coefficients estimated by 
the multistep procedure offer a good approximation of the water quality function at a very fine 
scale (i.e., field scale). Using such a detailed system of point coefficients eventually represents a 
potential burden for the implementation of a trading program at a watershed scale. A natural 
question that arises is how much different would the trading outcomes be if subbasin-specific, or 
even watershed-specific point coefficients are used? 
A priori, given the same level of abatement, total trading costs are expected to increase 
when less refined sets of points are used, since there is less heterogeneity in the per abatement 
costs. Having less heterogeneity at the watershed scale implies that there is less gains form trade, 
and hence less cost savings relative to the command-and-control outcomes being realized. The 
total level of realized abatement can go up or down depending on the direction of the 
approximations. A trading program based on subbasin-specific points implies the estimation of a 
number of set of points equal to the number of subbasins, while a trading program based on 
watershed-specific points implies the estimation of a single set of points. 
Boone River Watershed 
Table 4-15 summarizes and compares the trading outcomes under the two approaches 
(optimizing and satisficing) when subbasin- or watershed-specific point coefficients are used 
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instead of field-level specific points for BRW. Using subbasin-specific points implies the use of 
30 sets of points, while the watershed-specific points implies the use of only one set of points. 
Table 4-15. Boone River Watershed: Trading outcomes based on watershed and subbasin specific 
points 
    Nitrogen Phosphorus 
    optimizing satisficing optimizing satisficing 
  
Points 
Level 
N 
red. 
Cost  
(mil $) 
N red. 
Cost  
(mil $) 
P red. 
Cost  
(mil $) 
P 
red. 
Cost  
(mil $) 
20
% 
Field 19.81 0.85 22.21 1.10 21.92 0.49 20.50 0.42 
Subbasin 16.88 1.14 17.57 1.22 17.00 0.71 18.89 0.83 
Watershed 16.77 1.42 18.05 1.59 18.21 1.21 13.94 0.93 
30
% 
Field 29.47 2.27 31.98 2.99 29.98 1.03 29.35 0.97 
Subbasin 28.53 2.41 28.84 2.45 27.15 1.33 27.51 1.39 
Watershed 28.60 2.40 29.04 2.44 26.66 1.81 26.86 1.82 
40
% 
Field 39.35 6.06 41.40 7.16 40.30 4.60 37.07 2.02 
Subbasin 36.22 6.74 36.34 6.84 38.40 4.12 38.52 4.43 
Watershed 37.60 8.10 38.19 8.48 39.65 6.12 39.06 4.85 
 
A clear pattern of non-attainment is observed under both approaches and for all 
abatement levels. Moreover, the trading outcomes based on subbasin- and watershed-specific 
points are outperformed by the trading outcomes based on field-specific points ( more 
reductions, lower costs; the outperformed outcomes are italicized in Table 4-15). With the 
exception of 40% satisficing P, less reductions are realized under both subbasin and watershed 
points scale. Overall, the outcomes based on watershed-specific points perform slightly better 
than the subbasin points in terms of deviations from the abatement target, but at the same time, 
they are more costly.  
A solution to increasing the realized abatement is to inflate the total points value 
corresponding to a given abatement target and the points requirement for each field by a 
coefficient based on the cost information available to the regulator. While the point coefficients 
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do not change, the field requirements are increased by a factor ݇, thus constraining the farmer to 
choose an abatement action that accrues a higher number of points. The factor k can be 
determined through trial and error and by simulating the trading outcomes under different values. 
Using an inflation coefficient is similar to tightening the overall cap for the case where the 
abatement function is concave and a linear approximation of the abatement function results in the 
under-achievement of the abatement function. 
The emergence of hotspots is not a significant problem for the field-specific points, the 
number of fields with worse water quality outcomes is relatively small (zero for nitrogen 
abatement and less than 20 for phosphorus abatement). More hotspots emerge under both 
subbasin- and watershed-specific points. For example, for 30% abatement levels, there are 
approximately 60 hotspots for trading nitrogen and 100 for trading phosphorus. Table B-6 
summarizes the total number of fields where hotspots emerge. 
The impact on the overall change in the CAC abatement actions’ distribution, measured 
as the percentage of the watershed area that switches to an abatement action other than the one 
assigned by the command-and-control policy, is summarized in Figure 4-10 for 30% abatement 
goal, and Figures B-11 and B-12 in Appendix B for the 20% and 40% targets.  
Figure 4-10 shows that for a 30% abatement goal, with the exception of N satisficing, 
less change in the CAC distribution is realized under the watershed- and subbasin-specific points 
than under the field-specific points. For example, for N optimizing, the change in the CAC 
distribution under the watershed-specific points is about one third less than the change under the 
field-specific points (29.9% versus 47.1%). A similar magnitude is realized for P optimizing 
(59.5% versus 38.1%). Additionally, Figure 4-11 compares how the change in the CAC 
distributions varies under the three types of points under 30 % N abatement trading program 
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(optimizing). The same figure also depicts the subbasins where the most change takes place (the 
darker colored-areas). The corresponding description for 30 % P abatement can be found in 
Appendix B (Figure B-13)
 
Figure 4-10. Boone River Watershed: The overall change in the distribution of abatement 
actions under CAC, 30% abatement goal (the height of the bar represents the percent of 
the total area that changes the abatement actions from CAC). 
  
 
Figure 4-11. Boone River Watershed: The spatial change in the CAC distribution under the 
three types of points, 30 % N abatement, optimizing. 
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Raccoon River Watershed 
Similar patterns are observed for RRW. The subbasin-specific point trading implies the 
estimation of 112 sets of point coefficients. The outcomes of trading simulations are summarized 
in Table 4-16. Generally, lower abatement outcomes are realized under both watershed- and 
subbasin-specific points for both N and P optimizing. Mixed results are obtained for the 
satisficing approaches, especially for a high level of abatement (e.g., 40%), when more 
abatement is realized under the watershed- and subbasin-specific points. Most of the trading 
outcomes are outperformed by the corresponding outcomes under field specific points. For 
example, for 30 % N optimizing goal, the realized abatement under the field specific points is 
29.2% N with a total costs of  $31.4 million. Under the subbasin specific points, the realized 
abatement is 28.9% N but costs $34.9 million, while under watershed specific points the realized 
abatement is 29.2 % N andcosts increase to $40.5 million. 
Table 4-16. Raccoon River Watershed:Trading outcomes based on watershed and subbasin specific 
points 
    Nitrogen Phosphorus 
    Optimizing Satisficing Optimizing Satisficing 
  
Points 
Level 
N red. 
Cost 
(mil $) 
N red. 
Cost 
(mil $) 
P red. 
Cost 
(mil $) 
P red. 
Cost 
(mil $) 
20% 
Field 19.97 14.36 20.47 15.22 21.62 4.30 18.65 3.17 
Subbasin 18.88 15.58 18.15 14.22 20.15 3.95 17.42 2.93 
Watershed 18.42 20.22 19.79 22.93 16.18 4.71 19.44 8.95 
30% 
Field 29.22 31.41 29.42 31.81 30.90 9.97 29.46 8.80 
Subbasin 28.94 34.90 28.28 33.29 29.07 10.05 27.32 8.60 
Watershed 29.19 40.46 29.36 40.64 21.84 12.16 30.12 14.83 
40% 
Field 38.94 56.39 39.18 57.54 40.07 20.15 37.57 16.76 
Subbasin 39.08 61.89 38.99 61.42 37.73 19.30 37.95 19.60 
Watershed 38.23 66.24 39.44 73.19 38.08 26.98 41.08 36.82 
 
113 
 
An additional number of hotspots emerge as a result of a trading based on less specific 
points; however, the number is not significant. The impact on the overall change in the CAC 
abatement actions’ distribution, measured as the percentage of the watershed area that switches 
to an abatement action other than the one assigned by the command-and-control policy, is 
summarized in Figure 4-12 for 30% abatement goal, and Figures B-14 and B-15 in Appendix B 
for the 20% and 40% targets. The direction and the magnitude of the change across the three 
types of outcomes does not follow a particular trend. However, as in the case of BRW, the 
change has the largest magnitude under N optimizing trading (71.5 % Field, 63% Subbasin and 
41.7% Watershed). Notice that the magnitude of these changes is higher than the corresponding 
outcomes for BRW (47.1% Field, 29.9 %, and Subbasin, 27.8% Watershed). The magnitude in 
the change under the P optimizing is slightly lower for the field level point outcomes. This is the 
opposite of the corresponding P optimizing outcomes  
  
 
Figure 4-12. Raccoon River Watershed: The overall change in the distribution of abatement actions 
under CAC, 30% abatement goal (the height of the bar represents the percent of the total area that 
changes the abatement actions from CAC). 
 
Figure 4-13 compares how the change in the CAC distributions varies under the three 
types of points under 30 % N abatement trading program (optimizing). The same figure also 
depicts the subbasins where the most change takes place (the darker colored-areas).  
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 Figure 4-13. BRW: The spatial change in the CAC distribution under the three types of points, 30 % N abatement, optimizing. 
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4.3.  Ex Post Assessment of Policies with Respect to Abatement Risk 
The abatement realizations for either pollutant under different policies is subject to the 
stochastic influence of the weather. Given the stochastic weather elements, some of the proposed 
policies can be riskier than others, since the cost minimization is solved to achieve an expected 
ambient pollution under risk neutral behavior. 
Using a historical climate data for a longer period of time than was used to generate the 
policy outcomes, I am able to provide an ex post empirical assessment of variability in attaining 
the five-year mean nitrogen (phosphorus) abatement targets. Given that CAC and PS satisficing 
policies select more expensive, and hence a more effective abatement action, a reasonable 
assumption is that abatement levels realized under these policies have a lower variance than the 
optimizing policies. Hence, to verify if the ambient outcomes depend on the historically 
observed weather variability, and if there are any policies that might have a lower risk, I simulate 
the outcomes for a longer time period, based on water quality and weather data availability for 
the watershed. Specifically, for each watershed, I run the SWAT model using the optimal 
placement of the abatement actions obtained as solutions for CAC, PS and trading for 22 years. 
Next, I disregard the first two years and I compute the new abatement values as the five-year 
moving average. 
The period used for Boone River Watershed spans the 22 years from 1988 to 2009 (the 
first two years are disregarded). By computing the five-year mean annual N (P) values for each 
policy, I obtain 16 additional mean annual values for each policy.  
Table 4-17 offers an example of a five-year moving average distribution for BRW, 30% 
N abatement optimizing policies. The below table summarizes per period annual average for N   
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loadings as well as the corresponding level of abatement. Similar distributions for all abatement 
levels and policy approaches are presented at the end of Appendix B.  For each distribution, I 
compute the mean and the standard deviations. Next, to check whether or not some policies are 
more risky than others, I apply various F-tests for equal variance. 
Table 4-17. Boone River Watershed: Per-period annual average distribution of N loadings, 30% N 
optimizing policies 
 Annual average N loadings (kg) N abatement (%) 
Year Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading
1990 - 1994 6,127,114 4,351,228 4,255,128 3,995,086 28.98 30.55 34.8 
1991 - 1995 6,169,094 4,373,346 4,271,720 4,011,852 29.11 30.76 34.97 
1992 - 1996 4,897,034 3,499,172 3,330,636 3,183,968 28.55 31.99 34.98 
1993 - 1997 4,751,094 3,375,132 3,210,366 3,070,394 28.96 32.43 35.38 
1994 - 1998 3,990,314 2,835,610 2,790,908 2,614,768 28.94 30.06 34.47 
1995 - 1999 4,592,024 3,216,136 3,326,134 3,020,930 29.96 27.57 34.21 
1996 - 2000 4,207,464 2,924,096 3,011,556 2,735,186 30.5 28.42 34.99 
1997 - 2001 4,795,664 3,316,182 3,380,982 3,085,434 30.85 29.5 35.66 
1998 - 2002 4,695,550 3,238,834 3,300,300 3,004,002 31.02 29.71 36.02 
1999 - 2003 4,129,190 2,848,230 2,921,210 2,650,526 31.02 29.25 35.81 
2000 - 2004 4,336,090 3,045,304 3,019,632 2,801,086 29.77 30.36 35.4 
2001 - 2005 4,702,210 3,293,698 3,258,116 3,030,406 29.95 30.71 35.55 
2002 - 2006 3,907,158 2,753,932 2,739,746 2,543,292 29.52 29.88 34.91 
2003 - 2007 4,893,212 3,459,562 3,416,934 3,199,554 29.3 30.17 34.61 
2004 - 2008 6,163,132 4,388,648 4,281,888 4,038,490 28.79 30.52 34.47 
2005 - 2009 5,448,292 3,878,852 3,803,942 3,586,424 28.81 30.18 34.17 
 
Table 4-18 summarizes the mean values and the standard deviations for the BRW 
nitrogen-based policies under both optimizing and satisficing approach. The standard deviations 
are relatively small—representing on average 15% of the mean values for nitrogen. These values 
are consistent across abatement targets and policies under both the satisficing and optimizing 
approaches. Next, testing for the difference in variances within satisficing (optimizing) policies 
and keeping the same abatement targets shows that, given the historical data, policies are equally 
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risky in terms of abatement (i.e., the abatement outcomes under CAC, PS, and trading have the 
same variance). Testing for the difference in variances across satisficing and optimizing policies 
further shows that there is no difference in terms of risk (i.e., given a policy approach, let say 
trading, the variance of the realized abatement is the same under both satisficing and 
optimizing).34  
Table 4-18. Boone River Watershed: The five-year moving average 1990-2009 N loadings 
distribution 
Abatement goal Satisficing Policies Optimizing Policies 
 20% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (mil kg,N) 3.87 3.87 3.61 3.87 3.76 3.82 
Std.dev. ( mil kg,N) 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.57 
Average N reduction (%N)  20.48 20.33 25.78 20.48 22.76 21.51 
 30% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (mil kg,N) 3.42 3.39 3.16 3.34 3.28 3.33 
Std.dev. ( mil kg,N) 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Average N reduction (%N)  29.57 30.19 35 31.37 32.52 31.52 
 40% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (mil kg,N) 2.99 2.98 2.82 3.82 2.90 2.91 
Std.dev. ( mil kg,N) 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.58 0.47 0.46 
Average N reduction (%N)  38.56 38.62 42.05 21.35 40.26 40.06 
 
Qualitatively similar results are obtained from phosphorus-based policies: there is no 
difference in risk when testing for differences in variance, either within or across the satisficing 
and optimizing policies. Table B-16 presents the summary of the phosphorus five year moving 
average distribution for BRW. 
                                                 
34 The variances are equal in statistical sense. 
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The period used for the Raccoon River Watershed spans 21 years from 1984 to 2004. By 
computing the five-year mean annual N (P) values for each policy, I obtain 15 additional mean 
annual values for each policy. Table 4-19 summarizes the mean and the standard deviation for 
nitrogen policies. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained from BRW, in the 
sense no policy can be assessed as being riskier than other policies. The standard deviations are 
relatively small, being less than 15% of the annual mean loadings. However, the percentage for 
nitrogen is, on average, 12, while for phosphorus the average is 15. The summary of the P 
distributions is presented in Table B-17. 
Table 4-19. Raccoon River Watershed. The five-year moving average 1990-2009 N loadings 
distribution 
  Satisficing Policies Optimizing Policies 
20% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (kg,N) 16.60 16.49 16.41 16.34 16.31 16.50 
Std.dev. (kg,N) 1.82 1.83 1.86 1.85 1.84 1.87 
Average N reduction (%N) 16.83 17.38 17.78 18.13 18.28 17.33 
30% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (kg,N) 14.08 14.04 14.44 14.13 14.18 14.48 
Std.dev. (kg,N) 1.66 1.66 1.72 1.90 1.87 1.73 
Average N reduction (%N) 29.47 29.67 27.67 29.20 28.96 27.46 
40% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (kg,N) 12.31 12.29 12.28 12.10 12.13 12.33 
Std.dev. (kg,N) 1.32 1.32 1.55 1.68 1.66 1.56 
Average N reduction (%N) 38.31 38.45 38.46 39.36 39.24 38.22 
 
Table 4-20 summarizes the five years moving average distributions for the baseline 
loadings for nitrogen and phosphorus for BRW and RRW. A direct test for equal variances is not 
meaningful since the baseline values for N and P have different magnitude (i.e, the P loadings 
are on average 4%–5% of the N total loadings). After scaling down the N loadings testing for 
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equal variances shows that the N and P baselines have the same variance. The null hypothesis of 
equal variances is not rejected. Figure 4-14 and 4-15 summarize the five-year moving average 
for baseline P loadings and rescaled N loadings35. Again, the figures suggest that there is no 
difference in the variability across pollutants for either of the two watersheds. 
Table 4-20. Five-year moving average baseline loadings distribution 
  BRW (1990-2009) RRW (1986-2004) 
  Nitrogen Phosphorus Nitrogen Phosphorus 
Mean (kg,P) 4,862,790 240,091 19,960,449 818,846 
St.dev. (kg,P) 748,522 33,977 2,276,340 117,106 
St.dev/Mean 15.39 14.15 11.40 14.30 
 
 
 
Figure 4-14. Boone River Watershed -baseline: five-year mean annual loadings distribution 
 
                                                 
35 Rescaling of N loadings is made with respect to the P loadings  
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Figure 4-15. Raccoon River Watershed -baseline: five-year mean annual  loadings distribution 
(kg/year)  
 
4.4. An Emission Based Trading Approach 
In Chapter 3, along with estimating the point coefficients for each pollutant and watershed, I 
estimated a set of delivery coefficients, where a delivery coefficient measures how much of the 
abatement leaving a field contributes to the total ambient level. In the context of my empirical 
application, the delivery coefficients are subbasin-specific. These delivery coefficients can be 
used in designing a trading program based on the edge-of-field reduced emissions, where trading 
ratios are defined as the ratio of the delivery coefficients.  
In this section, I compare the efficiency of the point-based trading with the efficiency of a 
trading program based on the reduced edge-of-field emissions. Under a point-based trading, a 
system of points is used as an approximation to the edge-of-field abated emissions, thus bringing 
a potential source of inefficiency. The goal of this comparison is to empirically measure the 
extent of these inefficiencies.  
I assume that the regulator is able to find a watershed configuration that achieves a given 
abatement level (let ࢘ത be the vector of corresponding emissions). Next, the field-level constraints 
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are set based on the simulated edge-of-field reduced emissions rather than on the estimated 
points:  
̅ܣሺ̅ܚሻ 	ൎ 	∑ ݀௜ே௜ ̅ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ			               (22) 
where ̅ܣ	is the desired level of abatement, ݀௜ is the delivery coefficient for field ݅, and ̅ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ is 
the simulated edge-of-field reduced emissions for field ݅ under the solution identified by the 
regulator. ̅ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ also represents the field level constraints.36 Delivery coefficients are obtained 
based on a linear approximation of the water-quality production function	∑ ݀௜ே௜ ̅ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൏൐ ̅ܣሺ̅ܚሻ, 
implying that there is no exact mapping between the field-specific constraints distributed as 
permits and the abatement cap. 
Under a trading program based on edge-of-field emissions, a farmer minimizes the 
abatement costs by choosing the abatement actions and the level of abated emissions ݁௜ to be 
traded as long as the edge-of-field constraint is satisfied 
݉݅݊௫೔,௘೔ 	ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൅ ݀௜݁௜							ݏ. ݐ			ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ ൅ ݁௜ ൒ ̅ݎ௜										 	 	 	 	 						(23) 
where ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻ	are the edge-of-field reductions associated with the chosen abatement actions. The 
market clearing conditions is given by ∑ ݀௜݁௜ே௜ ൌ 0 
Tables 4-21 and 4-22 summarize the results for the simulated outcomes of an emission-
based trading program for the two watersheds for both nitrogen and phosphorus considering the 
optimizing approach (columns 5, and 6 for N, and 8, and 9 for P). The outcomes are compared 
with the corresponding point based trading outcomes (columns 2, 3, 7, and 8).  In the, case of 
BRW (Table 4-21), slightly more reductions are obtained under the emission based trading (see 
                                                 
36 In the empirical applications all fields in a subbasin have the same delivery coefficient, 
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column 2 vs. 4). However, the additional reduction are reflected in slightly higher prices (see 
column 3 vs. 5).  
Table 4-21. Boone River Watershed: Simulated abated emission based trading program 
performance under varying abatement target vs points based trading performance 
Target Trading, points Trading, emissions Trading, points Trading, emissions 
 Nitrogen Phosphorus 
 N red, % $, million N red. % $, million P red, %. $, million P red, % $, million
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
20% 19.81 0.85 20.41 0.89 19.97 14.36 20.48 0.42 
30% 29.47 2.27 29.77 2.31 29.22 31.41 30.5 1.07 
40% 39.35 6.06 39.64 6.13 38.94 56.39 37.34 2.84 
 
The RRW nitrogen emissions based trading program has a similar performance to BRW, 
however, the phosphorus emission based trading program has a worse performance (see column 
8, Table 4-22.), with the realized abatement being much lower than the abatement targets (i.e. the 
realized abatement for 40% P abatement is 26.54%).. 
Table 4-22. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated abated emission based trading program 
performance under varying abatement target vs points based trading performance 
Target Trading, points Trading, emissions Trading, points Trading, emissions 
 Nitrogen Phosphorus 
 N red, % $, million N red. % $, million P red, %. $, million P red, % $, million
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
20% 19.97 14.36 19.16 14.66 21.62 4.30 16.17 3.48 
30% 29.22 31.41 30.23 35.60 30.90 9.97 21.22 6.35 
40% 38.94 56.39 38.74 59.35 40.07 20.15 26.54 10.44 
 
The above outcomes are simulated using the delivery coefficients corresponding to the 
field specific point coefficients. Furthermore, the delivery coefficients are constrained to be less 
than one. Another set of outcomes are simulated by using the unconstrained set of delivery 
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coefficients. Unsurprisingly, the results under the emission trading are very similar to the trading 
outcomes observed under the point-based trading. 
The above results show that on average the outcomes of a point-based trading program, 
where points are used as a proxy for the reduced emissions, and the outcomes of an emission-
based trading program, where delivery coefficients are used as trading ratios, are similar. These 
results are expected since the delivery coefficients are also estimated based on a linear 
approximation of the true abatement function. By using a linear approximation, there is no exact 
matching between the total number of permits and the abatement target. This is reflected in the 
ex post outcomes of N and P reductions that vary above or below the initial abatement targets. 
However, an emission-trading program assumes that the regulator and farmers agree that the 
emissions simulated by SWAT represent the true emissions which often is not the case. 
Alternatively, the points found by measuring the estimated impact on an abatement action on the 
total level of abatement are good substitute for measuring the corresponding reduced emissions. 
4.5. Simulated Policy Programs under Cost Heterogeneity and Significant 
Cost Asymmetry 
In this section, I explore how the proposed policies behave in the presence of significant 
cost heterogeneity and under simulated information asymmetry. In the previous sections, I 
assumed that the regulator and the farmers have the same cost information—implying that the 
abatement costs vary by field characteristics but do not vary by farmers’ management abilities. 
In this section, I consider a more realistic situation where the regulator has some information 
about the costs of abatement actions (the portion of the cost information that depends on the 
physical field characteristics, ௝ܿሺߛ௜)),  but I allow the abatement costs vary to across farmers’ 
abilities. This cost heterogeneity scenario is simulated by generating random draws of 
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ݑ~ܷሾെ0.8		0.8ሿ and multiplying, the part of the costs that is known by the regulator,	 ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ, by 
ሺ1 ൅ ݑሻ. Additionally, I assume that for a given farm the cost of each abatement action receives 
the same shock ݑ.37 
Thus, under cost asymmetry and heterogeneity, the regulator uses the costs functions 
given by equation (18) and uses this costs structure to: identify the least cost allocation to 
achieve a given level of abatement and to implement the incentive-based policies.  However, the 
farmers use the following cost information when choosing the abatement action under either the 
PS or trading program. 
ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ∑ ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ ∗ ሺ1 ൅ ݑ௜ሻ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ∗ ݏ௝௃௝ 				∀	݅ ൌ 1,…ܰ		 	 	 	 						(24) 
where the notation is similar to Equation 18. Additionally, the random shock ݑ௜ simulates the 
cost asymmetry. In order to create a distribution of outcomes under cost heterogeneity, I solve 
for the PS (equation (19)) and trading (equation (20)) solutions for a set of 1,000 uniform 
random draws. 
Table 4-23 and 4-24 summarize the mean and standard deviation for the simulation 
results under cost heterogeneity 30% N and 30 % P abatement for BRW and RRW, respectively. 
As expected, both CAC optimizing and satisficing have the highest variation in costs, but no 
variation in the realized abatement (columns 1 and 4). The lowest realization of CAC satisficing 
is higher than the highest cost realization of CAC-optimizing. Additionally, since the CAC 
satisficing selects more expensive abatement actions, the cost variability of the corresponding 
outcomes is much higher than the costs variability of the CAC-optimizing outcomes. For 
                                                 
37 The values of the random shock ݑ ݑ~ܷሾെ0.8		0.8ሿ are chosen at random. The goal is to create 
some heterogeneity across the field abatement costs. 
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example, consider the standard deviations under the CAC program for a 30% N (P) abatement 
goal for both watersheds. For these cases, the standard deviation for CAC satisficing is up to 10 
times higher than the CAC optimizing cost variation in the case of BRW. However, the variation 
in the case of RRW is lower, only up to a factor of 2. For both watersheds, the cost variation 
under phosphorus CAC policies is lower than the variation for nitrogen CAC policies. 
Next, I move to the outcomes obtained under the PS program. As expected, the total costs 
are lower than under the CAC policies (column 1 vs 3, and 4 vs 6). Given that the farmers have 
more flexibility in choosing the abatement actions, different cost draws result in some variation 
in the realized abatement levels. Two interesting outcomes emerge for the 30% P abatement for 
BRW ( Table 4-24 column 2) and the 30% N and 30% P abatement for RRW (Table 4-24 
column 2), when the PS optimizing does not result in any variation in the realized abatement. 
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Table 4-23. Boone River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity and asymmetric cost information, 30% abatement goal 
  CAC, optimizing 
PS, 
optimizing 
CAC, 
satisficing
PS,  
satisficing 
Trading,  
optimizing 
Trading,   
satisficing  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
BRW, Nitrogen 
  Cost, $mil N red.  % Cost, $ mil Cost, $ mil N red.  % Cost, $ mil N red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $N red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $ 
Mean 3.23 30.3 3.09 19.80 35.5 18.58 29.1 1.95 4.1 31.7 2.52 5.1 
StdDev. 0.06 0.1 0.06 0.65 0.1 0.64 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.2 
BRW, Phosphorus 
  Cost, $ P Red. % Cost, $ mil Cost, $ mil P Red.  % Cost, $ mil P Red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $P Red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $
Mean 2.16 29.9 2.00 16.35 34.9 11.24 30 0.91 38.3 29.4 0.86 35.9 
StdDev. 0.05 0 0.04 0.57 0 0.55 0.1 0.02 1.3 0.1 0.02 1.2 
 
Table 4-24. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity and asymmetric cost information, 30% abatement 
goal 
  CAC, optimizing 
PS,   
optimizing 
CAC, 
satisficing
PS,  
satisficing 
Trading,  
optimizing 
Trading,   
satisficing  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
RRW, Nitrogen 
  Cost, $mil N red.  % Cost, $ mil Cost, $ mil N red.  % Cost, $ mil N red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $ N red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $
Mean 42.43 30.9 39.56 62.26 30.4 58.65 29.7 24.25 10.1 29.9 24.56 10.1 
Std.Dev. 0.68 0 0.67 1.55 0 1.52 0.1 0.63 0.3 0.2 0.63 0.3 
RRW, Phosphorus 
  Cost, $  P Red.  % Cost, $ mil Cost, $ mil  P Red.  % Cost, $ mil  P Red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $  P Red.  % Cost, $ mil Price, $
Mean 15.81 30.8 15.79 36.28 31 58.64 30 8.41 113.1 29.4 7.39 101.3
Std.Dev. 0.36 0 0.36 0.97 0.2 1.52 0.1 0.25 3.8 0 0.23 3.5 
 
126 
127 
 
The overall level of abatement is higher for the satisficing approaches, offering more 
evidence for the conjecture made earlier that the higher cost abatement actions tend to be more 
effective (column 4 vs 2). The PS optimizing again outperforms the PS satisficing approaches in 
terms of costs, being up to six times less expensive in the case of BRW and up to three times less 
expensive for RRW (column 5 vs 3). 
Finally, the trading outcomes have a similar performance in terms of both cost efficiency 
and simulated cost variability, with the realized cost abatement outcomes being within similar 
ranges across the satisficing and optimizing approach (column 11 vs 8). On average, the 
abatement targets are met, with the exception of 40% phosphorus where the average realized 
abatement is 37%, for both watersheds (column 7 for optimizing and 8 for satisficing). The 
equilibrium point prices follow the same patterns as in the case of cost symmetry: the nitrogen 
prices are lower than the phosphorus prices (column 9 and 12) 
Figure 4-16 and 4-17 describe the distributions of the 1,000 simulated outcomes for 30 % 
N abatement for BRW (Figure 4-16) and RRW (4-17). Each cluster of points represents the 
simulated outcomes for a particular policy. It can be shown that the CAC satisficing policies 
have the highest variation followed by the PS satisficing policies. The optimizing policies have 
lower cost variance but have a larger abatement variance. The summary of the mean and 
standard deviations for the simulation of outcomes under cost heterogeneity for 20% and 40% 
abatement goals as well as the figures depicting the distributions are provided in Appendix B, 
Tables B-18 to B-21 and Figures B-16 to B-20. 
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Figure 4-16. Boone River Watershed Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, 30% 
N abatement goal 
 
Figure 4-17. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, 
30% N abatement goal 
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Discussions 
The simulated outcomes under cost variability support earlier findings: the CAC policies 
are cost inefficient. CAC satisficing offers a solution when abatement costs are not known. 
However, the magnitude of cost savings under the CAC optimizing suggests that a regulator 
would be better off if he obtains estimates on the abatement costs and uses them in finding a 
least-cost way to achieve the desired level of abatement, then uses this solution for designing his 
policies.  
Additional cost savings are realized under a performance standard program. The findings 
obtained for the 30% N and P optimizing target offer more evidence that if the regulator has 
good cost information, the PS program can be an attractive policy approach. Finally, under 
trading approach, the burden of the optimization is passed to the market and no optimization is 
required on the regulator’s side. However, using a linear approximation of the non-linear 
abatement function might result in the nonattainment or the over attainment of the abatement 
goals. 
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4.6. Multiple Pollutant Policy Approaches Assessment  
In his seminal work, Montgomery (1972) demonstrated that a trading system for point 
sources, where the emissions leaving a source are measurable and the contribution of each source 
to the downstream concentrations are linear, can achieve the economically efficient allocations 
of abatement to achieve a given ambient water quality level. He developed his mathematical 
models for the case of markets for a single pollutant. In addition, he showed that if multiple 
noninteractive pollutants are to be regulated in separate markets, his mathematical models can be 
extended to include multiple pollutants by adding the corresponding constraints. 
Since the problem of nonpoint-source water quality pollution is not easily measurable, 
and the ambient water quality effects are often thought to be nonlinear, water quality trading 
programs where agricultural nonpoint sources are required to hold permits to cover their 
contributions to pollution have generally been considered difficult or impossible to implement. 
Moreover, an efficient approach of water quality requires the consideration of multiple pollutants 
with potential synergistic and/or additive effects, such as nitrogen and phosphorus or sediments. 
In the previous sections, I empirically evaluated a set of policy approaches for reducing 
nonpoint-source pollution, where a set of point coefficients was used to estimate efficiency of 
different abatement actions assuming that only one pollutant, either nitrogen or phosphorus, was 
targeted at a time. When estimating the set of point coefficients for each pollutant, I assumed that 
each pollutant has a separate abatement function, and hence, the point coefficients were obtained 
independently. However, the same set of abatement actions is used for the abatement of both 
pollutants; thus, a policy targeting one pollutant will reduce the other pollutant also. This implies 
that there are complementarities in the abatement functions. Given the nature of these 
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complementarities, one question that arises in the context of multiple pollutants is whether it is 
more efficient to reduce the emissions for both pollutants (N and P in this case) or to focus the 
abatement efforts in reducing only one of them.  
In this section, I simulate and evaluate the three policy approaches (a command-and-
control, a performance standard and a point-based trading program) assuming that both nitrogen 
and phosphorus emissions are regulated. Next, to answer the questions of whether it is more 
efficient to reduce the emissions for both pollutants or to focus only on one of them, I compare 
the outcomes of the point-based trading when both markets for N and P function simultaneously 
with the outcomes of the point-based trading program with only one market available. 
4.6.1. Setting the on-farm and watershed goals 
Choosing the on-farm or watershed goals under the proposed policy approaches can be 
challenging under a nonlinear water-quality production function when multiple pollutants are 
targeted. Under a CAC program, the regulator can mandate the farm-level abatement actions. If 
he is interested in achieving the abatement target ܣ	ഥ ௘, for both N and P, then he needs to find the 
set of abatement actions (ܺ஼஺஼೐ሻ that satisfies {ܣሺܺ஼஺஼೐ሻ ൌ ̅ܣே		ܽ݊݀		ܣሺܺ஼஺஼೐ሻ ൌ ̅ܣ௉		}. One 
way to find the watershed configuration that simultaneously achieves the same level of 
reductions in both N and P is to randomly generate and simulate watershed configurations until 
the desired configuration is met. This approach does not require any cost information. Under a 
CAC program, the solution ሼܺ஼஺஼೐	ሽ can be implemented directly. For the on-farm performance 
standard program and the point trading program, the field level, as well as the watershed 
requirements, is determined in a similar way as to the single pollutant case, but now two sets of 
constraints are set instead of one.  
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4.6.2. Cost-Efficiency Performance under the Same Cost Information 
For generating the results presented below, I consider that the farmers and the regulator 
have the same information on the costs of the abatement actions. In terms of the model presented 
in the previous chapter, this implies that I solve for the PS and trading solutions the following 
cost function: ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ̅ߠሻ ൌ ∑ ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ ∗ ݔ௜௝ ∗ ݏ௜௃௝ .The results are obtained for three levels of 
desired water quality improvements: 20%, 30%, and 40% reductions in the mean expected 
annual loadings of nitrogen and phosphorus. The PS and trading cost minimization problems are 
similar to the ones described by equation (19) to (21). However, since a second constraint is 
added, the solution is likely to be different if the new constraints is binding. 
Next, I present the empirical assessment of the three policies with the assumption of cost 
symmetry. The set of point coefficients have been introduced previously. The field-level 
requirements have been set according to random watershed configurations that achieve the same 
level of abatement for both pollutants. The outcomes for the performance standard and the 
trading program are obtained by using linear programming methods. 
Table 4-25. Boone River Watershed: Multiple Pollutant Policy Approaches 
Abatement Target/CAC                Performance Standard Point‐Based‐Trading 
N P Total Cost N P Total Cost N P Total Cost
20% 20% 6.65 26.3 27.9 5.07 22 29.6 1.07 
30% 30% 17.99 34.5 35.3 15.85 32.2 37.6 3.04 
40% 40% 36.075 42.9 43.6 35.46 41.2 37.8 7.04 
 
Table 4-25 summarizes the simulated outcomes under the three policies approach when 
both N and P are targeted for the Boone River Watershed. Under the CAC approach, while the 
abatement targets are met, the total costs are very high. Under a performance standard program, 
more reductions are obtained while the costs are lower than in the case of a command and 
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control program. Under a point-based trading, the costs are much lower, being on average about 
20% of the costs under a command-and-control program. Both N and P abatement targets are 
over attained for both 20% and 30% targets. Interestingly, for 40% reductions in both N and P, 
under point-based trading, the N target is slightly over attained, while the P target is not attained. 
Table 4-26. Boone Watershed Single Pollutant Point‐Based Trading 
Boone Watershed  Single Pollutant Point‐Based Trading 
Abatement           Nitrogen only Point‐Based Trading   
   
Phosphorus only Point‐Based‐Trading 
N/P N P Total Cost N P Total Costs 
20% 22.0 29.6 1.07 12.6 19.3 0.37 
30% 32.2 37.6 3.04 19.2 27.9 0.85 
40% 41.2 37.8 7.04 27.4 36.7 1.90 
 
Table 4-26 presents the simulated outcomes for the point-based trading scenarios where 
only one pollutant is targeted. Interestingly, the outcomes of a nitrogen point-based trading are 
similar to the outcomes of the trading policy that targets both N and P. Under phosphorus only 
point-based trading approach, the P abatement targets are on average underachieved by 2.5%, 
and the total costs are much lower than for nitrogen only point-based trading. However, the total 
costs are much lower. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for the RRW: the outcomes of 
the trading setting have the lowest costs and the outcomes of a nitrogen point-based trading 
approach are the same as the outcomes of a nitrogen and phosphorus point-based trading 
approach. (see Tables B-22 and B-23 in Appendix B) 
Discussions 
In this section, I extend the point-credit approximation procedure to multiple pollutant 
markets where the regulator seeks to achieve simultaneous reductions for multiple pollutants by 
using a system with a separate point market for each pollutant. The findings show that abatement 
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outcomes of a trading program that considers separate markets for both pollutants are achieved at 
lower costs relative the CAC or PS policies. However, there are no additional gains relative to 
the case where there is only a market for nitrogen, since by targeting N reductions significant 
higher reductions for P are obtained. A trading program for phosphorus only has the potential to 
achieve its phosphorus abatement goal at much lower costs, but the associated nitrogen 
abatement levels are not met. The present findings show that there are no additional gains from 
focusing on both pollutants and the policy programs should be designed by focusing on the 
pollutant that raises the most interests. 
Conclusions 
In Chapter 3, I introduced a simple model of pollution and outlined the properties of three 
different policies under a linear approximation of the abatement function. In this chapter, I 
provided an empirical assessment of the tradeoffs between the cost efficiency and effectiveness 
across these policies given that a system of field-level point coefficients is used as a linear proxy 
for the abatement function. The outcomes of the policies were simulated under different set of 
assumptions: cost symmetry and cost heterogeneity, and single or multiple pollutants case. Three 
different levels of abatement were considered: 20%, 30%, and 40 % reductions in the baseline 
emissions. A robustness analysis for the single pollutant scenario was conducted by assuming a 
less precise point coefficients are used. The same single policy outcomes were compared to the 
outcomes of an emission based trading program where trading takes place according to the 
trading ratios defined by the delivery coefficients. Additionally, I tested whether the abatement 
outcomes are consistent under the historical weather distribution. Finally, the same set of policies 
was assessed assuming that two pollutants are simultaneously targeted. 
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Since I am interested in assessing how different policies perform under a linear 
approximation tot the abatement (water quality production) function, I assume that the 
biophysical model is the “exact” representation of the complex water quality model. However,  
this is clearly not accurate. In reality, using a water quality model like SWAT introduces another 
level of approximation which is not the focus of my work.  
Another note of caution arises from the assumption that the PS and trading outcomes 
achieves all gains from trade. However, as many authors have noted, when factors like the type 
of trading (sequential or bilateral), transaction costs or nonmonetary preferences are taken into 
account some of the gains of an efficient trade may not occurr (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1991; 
Stavins 1995; Shortle 2013). 
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CHAPTER 5. CREDIT STACKING IN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROGRAMS: WATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAM AND 
CARBON MARKETS  
5.1. Introduction 
Several environmental markets that trade a single ecosystem service have been 
established in the United States: markets for wetland mitigation, water quality trading, and 
permit trading markets for SO2 allowances, to name a few. Although the number of individual 
ecosystem markets has increased in the United States and around the world, credit markets that 
incorporate more than one ecosystem service are almost nonexistent. One example comes from 
Australia, where under an auction setting, water quality, greenhouse gases, and habitat are 
bundled together in a single auctioned commodity (Greenhalgh 2008). Agricultural activity as a 
provider of multiple ecosystem services will play a major role in the future development of these 
markets around the world. 
The poor development of bundling markets where multiple ecosystem services can be 
traded as a single commodity does not imply that there is little awareness about the multiple 
benefits of ecosystem markets. Farmers, as profit maximizing agents, are likely to maximize the 
economic returns associated with the entire range of ecosystem services provided by their 
actions. One question that arises is whether or not it is socially optimal to allow farmers to 
produce credits for multiple markets. 
In Chapter 4, I empirically evaluated the effectiveness of three policies for controlling 
nonpoint-source pollution based on a set of abatement actions, where a system of points 
coefficients are used as a proxy to the effectiveness of the abatement actions. The obtained 
results show that relative to a command-and-control or performance standard program, 
significant cost savings can be obtained under a trading program based on the proposed point 
137 
 
coefficients. Next, given that the same abatement actions have the potential to increase the 
amount of carbon sequestration in soil, the trading program can be extended by allowing the 
trading participants to enter a market for carbon and sell the carbon offsets associated with the 
abatement actions. 
The previous literature has been focused on the efficient design of carbon credit markets, 
where the abatement actions primarily directed towards the reduction of carbon emissions have 
indirect environmental co-benefits such as improving water quality or wildlife habitat. In this 
chapter, I investigate the implications of allowing the farmers to participate in two programs: a 
water quality trading program and a carbon offset market. My analysis departs from the previous 
research by considering the participation in the carbon offset market, a global environmental good, 
as a co-benefit of a water quality trading program, which has localized effects.  
The model introduced in Chapter 3  that captures the key attributes of the nonpoint source 
water quality problem as they relate to the agricultural emissions from farm fields is extended to 
include the soil carbon benefits associated with the conservation practices. Next, I maintain the 
same assumptions for the water quality model and I focus on simulating the outcomes of a point-
based trading model that includes the participation in the carbon offset market.  
This chapter is organized as follows: first, I extend the point trading model for water 
quality to incorporate the carbon offset component, and second I simulate and compare the 
trading outcomes in the presence of a carbon offset market with the outcomes obtained in 
Chapter 4. I consider the cases when the trading program focuses on: (a) the abatement of 
nitrogen, and (b) the abatement phosphorus. The simulations are made using the costs and 
environmental data for the Boone River Watershed. 
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5.2. Point-Based Trading in the Presence of a Carbon Market.  
As written in Chapter 4, in the case of a single pollutant market, under a point based 
trading a farmer solves the cost minimization problem at farm level: 
݉݅݊௫೔	,௕೔ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜	, ߛ௜, ߠ௜	ሻ ൅݌ ∗ ܾ௜ 			ݏ. ݐ					 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝ 	൅ ܾ௜ ൒ ܾ௜
௢௃௜ 		 																								 	 	 					(25)	
where ܾ௜௢ is the number of points requirement for a farmer. The equilibrium condition is: 
∑ ܾ௜ ൌ 0ே௜ . Hence, a farmer chooses the abatement actions and the number of points to meet a 
field level requirement given by ܾ௜௢.The trading outcome is determined by:  
݉݅݊௫೔,௕೔ ∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜	, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ
ே௜ 	ݏ. ݐ.			
∑ ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝ 	൅ ܾ௜	௃௜ே௜ ൒ ∑ ܾ௜௢ே௜ 					∑ ܾ௜ ൌ 0ே௜ 							 	 	 	 	 	      (26) 
where ݔ௜∗ represents the optimal abatement action chosen by field ݅. The total cost of the trading 
program is ܶܥ௉ ൌ 	∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜∗, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ .  
In the presence of a carbon offset market, where there are no constraints on the minimum 
or maximum amount of carbon offset that can be sold, and the farmers minimization problem 
becomes:  
݉݅݊௫೔ೕ,௕೔ 	ܥ௜ሺݔ௜	, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻെ݌௖݃ሺݔ௜ሻ ൅ ݌ܾ௜ 		ݏ. ݐ					 ∑ ܽ௜௝ݔ௜௝ 	൅ ܾ௜ ൒ ܾ௜
௢௃௜௝ 		 	 	 	 						(27) 
where, ݌௖ is the price of a carbon offset takes as given to the farmer and ݃ሺݔ௜ሻ represents the 
amount of soil carbon sequestration given the vector of abatement actions ݔ௜. While the field 
constraint remains unchanged, the objective function is adjusted to account for the revenue that 
can be obtained from selling carbon offsets. The carbon offsets are the amount of soil carbon 
sequestration resulting from adopting an abatement action. The total costs of the trading program 
to farmers in the presence of a carbon market are given by:  
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ܶܥ௉஼ ൌ ∑ ሼܥ௜ሺݔ௜∗∗	, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ 	െ ݌௖݃ሺݔ௜∗∗ሻሽ					           (28) 
where ݔ௜∗∗ represents the optimal abatement action chosen by field ݅ when they can sell carbon 
offsets. The total cost of a trading program, ܥ௉஼, has two components: the cost of implementing 
the optimal abatement practices,∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜∗∗	, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ , and the revenues from the sale of carbon 
offsets ∑ ݌௖݃ሺݔ௜∗∗ሻே௜ .  
Depending on the price of carbon, the carbon market creates incentives that can alter the 
choice of abatement action. Thus, farmers are able to reduce the cost of participation in the 
trading program or even obtain an additional income. At the same time, the carbon market 
introduces competition for land use. Farmers move towards conservations practices that might 
have more potential for carbon sequestration but are less effective in reducing the nitrogen or 
phosphorus emissions. The post trading water quality outcomes can be higher or lower compared 
to the case where farmers cannot sell carbon offsets, but the cost to the farmers will be lower 
(ܶܥ௉஼ ൏ 	TC୔ሻ At the same time,the cost of implementing the abatement actions may increase, 
because the abatement actions that are more effective for carbon sequestration may be more 
expensive (∑ ܥ௜ሺݔ௜∗∗	, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ ൏൐ ∑ ܥ௜ ሺݔ௜∗, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻே௜ . The direction of the realized abatement and 
the magnitude of the cost savings in the presence of a carbon market are empirical questions that 
I will evaluate in the next sections. 
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5.3. The Assessment of Point-Based Trading Market in the Presence of a 
Carbon Offset Market 
 
The empirical assessment of the trading program when farmers are allowed to participate 
in a carbon market is made under the assumption of cost heterogeneity. The cost heterogeneity is 
simulated using the same random draws used in Chapter 4, section 4.4. Hence, the costs are 
given by: 
ܥ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ∑ ሺܿ௝൫ߛ௝൯ െ ݌௖݃௝ሻሺ1 ൅ ݑ௜ሻݔ௜௝ݏ௜௃௝ 		∀݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ		 	 	 	 					(29) 
where ௝ܿሺߛ௜ሻ is the per acre cost for the ݆௧௛ abatement action, ݌௖ is the price per carbon, ݃௝ the 
amount of carbon associated with the ݆௧௛ abatement action, ݑ௜ is the  ݅ farmer’s random draw, 
ݑ௜~ܷሾെ0.8, 0.8ሿ, ݔ௜௝ is a dummy variable that takes value “1” if the ݆௧௛ abatement action is 
adopted and “0” otherwise, and ݏ௜ is the area of field i. The simulations are run for 1,000 
realizations of the random variable u. 
5.3.1. Obtaining the soil carbon values associated with each abatement action 
The field level soil carbon estimates associated with each abatement actions are needed in 
addition to the already estimated point coefficients for the empirical assessment of the extended 
trading policy. The field levels for soil carbon sequestration are simulated by running EPIC 
(Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator) for each abatement action and each field. The carbon 
benefit values for each field and each abatement action are equal to the difference between the 
annual carbon yield under the abatement action and the carbon yield under the baseline 
scenario.38The original EPIC values, originally expressed in kilograms of carbon per hectare, are 
                                                 
38 The annual carbon yields are measured as the average over 30 years. 
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multiplied by a factor of 3.67 for conversion to metric tons carbon dioxide equivalent 
(MtCO2e).39 
Table 5-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the simulated soil carbon sequestration 
values obtained for the fields in the Boone River Watershed. As expected, the “Reduce fertilizer” 
is the abatement action that has the least impact on carbon sequestrations. Interestingly, the same 
abatement action seems to slightly decrease the effectiveness of the “No till ” and “Cover crops” 
when combined together. This is similar to the sub-additivity patterns observed under the point 
coefficients assigned to the same abatement actions. By contrast to the point coefficients, a 
supper-additivity pattern is observed when no till and cover crops are combined together, in the 
sense that more soil carbon is sequestered under the combination of the two than the sum of the 
two taken individually. The combination of “No till and Cover crops” with an average of 0.816 
MtCO2e per acre is the most efficient abatement action for soil carbon sequestration. Compared 
to the point values estimated, “Land retirement” is not the most efficient abatement action for 
carbon sequestration. Likewise, the combination of “No till and Cover crops” is more efficient 
than the combination “Reduced fertilizer, no till and cover crops”. Similar to the phosphorus 
point value estimates, “No till” is more efficient in carbon sequestration than “Cover crops”. 
For the purpose of the trading simulations, I assume that a given abatement action, in 
terms of the amount of soil carbon sequestration, has the same per acre impact. This implies that 
for a given abatement practice j , the per acre carbon sequestration is the same, ݃൫ݔ௜௝൯ ൌ 	 ݃̅௝	, ∀	݅.  
                                                 
39 The EPIC values should be interpreted with caution, since the model was not fully calibrated 
at the simulation moment. A zero value is accounted for the fields where the EPIC failed to 
provide accurate estimates. 
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While this assumption is not likely to be perfectly accurate, it is likely that an actual carbon 
offset program would credit all fields in a given location that adopt the same practice the same 
amount of offsets. An example for this was the aggregation from no till sold as the Chicago 
Climate Exchange. 
The column labeled as “Trading” in Table 5-1 shows the per acre equivalent of carbon 
assigned to each field given an abatement action. Figure C-4 in Appendix B describes the field 
level distributions of the soil carbon values for each abatement action. Since a relatively high 
number of fields have zero values for the soil carbon sequestration, the distributions have a high 
density at zero. 
Table 5-1. Soil carbon sequestration (MtCO2e) 
 Abatement action Mean Std.dev. Min Max Median Trading* 
No Action 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No till 0.27 0.29 0.00 2.16 0.20 0.28 
Cover Crops 0.25 0.23 0.00 2.22 0.22 0.25 
No till, Cover Crops 0.82 0.42 0.00 3.78 0.74 0.79 
Red.Fert 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Red.Fert,No till 0.23 0.27 0.00 2.09 0.14 0.22 
Red.Fert, Cover Crops 0.21 0.21 0.00 2.03 0.16 0.19 
Red.Fert,No till, Cover Crops 0.76 0.39 0.00 3.60 0.69 0.72 
Land retirement 0.55 0.57 0.00 5.42 0.45 0.52 
*Represents the MtCO2e assigned to each field within the trading simulations. 
5.3.2. Empirical findings 
In Chapter 4, I simulated the trading outcomes of a point based-trading market for water quality. 
Next, I simulate the trading outcomes for the same abatement targets, but in the presence of a 
carbon offsets market. The two sets of outcomes are compared with respect to different aspects: 
the post trading abatement levels, the final costs of achieving the water quality target, the costs of 
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implementing the abatement actions in the presence of a carbon market, the total and the additional 
levels of soil carbon sequestration, and the levels of equilibrium price in the points-based market. 
I also analyze the extent of land use competition induced by the participation in a carbon market.   
I analyze two scenarios: in the first scenario, the trading market is focused on nitrogen 
abatement and in the second scenario, the trading market is focused on the phosphorus abatement. 
For each of these scenarios, I use three different abatement targets for the water quality trading 
program and three different price levels for the carbon offsets40. Given the possible combinations 
of abatement targets and carbon pricing levels, for each pollutant point-based trading scenario, 
there are nine additional sub-scenarios. For each sub-scenario, the trading outcomes are simulated 
by assuming the cost heterogeneity at the watershed scale.  
For the convenience of notation, the nitrogen (phosphorus) point-based trading baseline is 
denoted as PBT୒ሺ୔ሻ, and the case with a carbon market as PBTC୒ሺ୔ሻ. The nitrogen (phosphorus) 
point-based trading market only can be interpreted as the situation where the carbon offset price 
is equal to zero, hence the results obtained in the previous chapter can be interpreted as the 
outcomes when the price in the carbon market are zero. These outcomes will be used as a 
benchmark comparison for the results obtained in the presence of positive carbon prices41.  
In the presence of a carbon offset market that functions parallel with a trading market 
designed to improve the water quality, farmers will face a different set of incentives in choosing 
the abatement actions. This has further implications on the post-trading level of abatement, total 
                                                 
40 Water quality abatement levels: 20%, 30%, 40% reductions relative to the baseline; 
Price level for carbon offsets: $5, $15, $25 per metric tone equivalent of carbon dioxide. 
41 The trading outcomes are corresponding to the “satisficing” approach. Similar results are 
expected under the optimizing approach. 
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costs of trading program, the price of a point permit, and the total level of realized soil carbon 
sequestrations. Next, I present how these results change in the presence of a carbon market 
relative to the case where there is no such a market.42 
The attainment of the abatement target 
The first aspect I am interested in in the presence of the carbon offset market is the 
impact on the post trading level of abatement. Is the abatement target achieved? How does it 
compare relative to the corresponding outcomes with no carbon market?Let  Δܹܳ be the 
difference between the realized abatement levels in a PBTC market (ܹܳ௉஻்஼)  and the trading 
outcomes in a PBT market (ܹܳ௉஻்) 
߂ܹܳேሺ௉ሻ ൌ ܹܳேሺ௉ሻ௉஻்஼ െ 		ܹܳேሺ௉ሻ௉஻்	         (30) 
 
Table 5-2. Realized abatement levels: nitrogen  
 Nitrogen Point-Based Trading Market 
Price $0 $5 $15 $25 
Targe
t 
ܲܤ ேܶ	,% ܲܤܶܥே		,% Δܹܳே ,% ܲܤܶܥே ,% Δܹܳே ,% ܲܤܶܥே	,% Δܹܳே ,%
20% 22.1 22.1 0.04 22.0 0.0 24.9 2.8 
30% 31.7 31.8 0.1 32.0 0.3 32.0 0.3 
40% 41.4 41.5 0.1 41.6 0.1 41.6 0.2 
 
Table 5-2  presents the post-trading abatement levels for a nitrogen PBTC market 
(ܲܤܶܥேሻ	. On average, the post-trading abatement levels for  ܲܤܶܥே  are over attained and 
                                                 
42The results are presented both in absolute and relative level. 
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similar to the post-trading abatements level for a single market trading only (presented in the first 
column). The difference between the achieved abatement levels (Δܹܳே		,%ሻ  in the case of 
PBT-nitrogen are small, less than 0.05% However, the differences are statistically significant 
different than zero.43 
 
Table 5-3. Realized abatement levels:  phosphorus 
 Phosphorus Point-Based Trading  Market 
Price $0 $5 $15 $25 
Target ܲܤ ௉ܶ,% ܲܤܶܥ௉,% Δܹܳ௉ ,% ܲܤܶܥ௉,% Δܹܳ௉ ,% ܲܤܶܥ௉	,% Δܹܳ௉ ,%
20% 21.7 20.3 0.0 20.0 -0.3 26.5 6.2 
30% 29.4 29.3 0.0 29.0 -0.4 28.4 -0.9 
40% 37.0 37.0 0.0 36.7 -0.3 36.2 -0.8 
ܲܤܶܥ௉ phosphorus point-based trading market and carbon market 
Slightly different results are obtained for the trading market scenario that focuses on 
phosphorus abatement, as shown Table 5-3. On average, the post-trading abatement levels for 
PBTC-phosphorus are not attained but at the same time they are not very different from the PBT-
phosphorus outcomes.  For a given abatement target and a given price for carbon,  the difference 
between the post trading abatement outcomes is less than  0.1 %. 
Overall, comparing across the two types of pollutants, the post trading abatement levels 
in the presence of a carbon market are similar to the results observed in the presence of a nutrient 
trading market only. The post trading abatement levels are higher for a nitrogen point-based 
market and lower for a phosphorus point based market. 
                                                 
43 p_values for t_test for equal means is less than 0.05 
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Soil carbon sequestration gains in the presence of a carbon market 
The process of soil carbon sequestration takes place regardless the existence of the 
carbon offset market hence, carbon soil sequestration will be an accounted outcome of a trading 
program based on a set of abatement actions which in addition to  improving water quality have 
the potential for soil carbon sequestration. The total carbon sequestration gains are determined 
relative to the levels of soil carbon sequestration associated with the nitrogen (phosphorus) point-
based trading market, since soil carbon levels are realized even in the absence of a carbon 
market. The soil carbon sequestration gains (Δܥܩ஼ሻ are determined as: 
߂ܥܩ஼ ൌ ஼௦௢௜௟ುಳ೅಴ି஼௦௢௜௟ುಳ೅஼௦௢௜௟ುಳ೅ ∗ 100		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 						(31)		
where ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻் represents the total levels of soil carbon sequestration associated with PBT case 
and the ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  associated with the PBTC case. Both  ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻் and ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  levels are 
additional to the soil carbon values associated with the baseline.44’45 
Table 5-4. Soil carbon gains: nitrogen 
 Nitrogen Point-Based Trading Market 
Price $0 $5 $15 $25 
Target ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻் ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  Δܥܩ஼,% ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼ Δܥܩ஼ ,% ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  Δܥܩ஼,%
20% 71,429 80,057 12.1 108,003 35.6 156,234 118.8 
30% 135,833 148,069 9.0 171,017 25.9 190,630 40.4 
40% 200,251 215,537 7.6 242,933 21.3 267,776 33.8 
                                                 
44 The total amount of post trading carbon sequestration is computed by using the field specific 
values (the ones presented in Figure C-4) rather than the per acre average values used in 
obtaining the trading simulations. 
45 The carbon sequestration literature defines the baseline as existing levels of carbon had a 
program not been implemented.  While, for each abatement action, the field soil carbon levels  
are determined similarly, the trading simulations in the presence of carbon  do not take into 
account the soil carbon levels that would have been realized in the absence of the carbon offset 
market. The carbon gains presented in this section are determined ex post. 
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ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻், ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼ , expressed as MtCO2e,  
Table 5-4 summarizes the soil carbon levels associated with the nitrogen point based 
trading market both in absolute and relative size. For a given abatement target, the relative size 
of the carbon gains increases as the carbon price increases. For example, for a 20 % N abatement 
target, under a PBTC  the level of carbon sequestration increases by 12.10 % ($5), 35.61% ($15), 
and 144.56% ($25). For a given price for carbon, the relative size of the carbon gains decreases 
as the abatement targets increase. Given a price level of $5 for carbon, the relative carbon gains 
are 12.10 % (20%), 9.03 % (30%), and 7.64% (40%), respectively. 
Table 5-5. Soil carbon gains: phosphorus 
Phosphorus Point-Based Trading*  
Price $0 $5 $15 $25 
Target ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻் ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  Δܥܩ஼,% ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  Δܥܩ஼,% ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼  Δܥܩ஼,% 
20% 36,512 45,290 24.1 85,031 133.2 156,234 328.6 
30% 68,905 74,417 8.0 105,856 53.7 159,922 132.2 
40% 123,222 126,031 2.3 145,676 18.2 187,091 51.8 
*ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻், ܥݏ݋݈݅௉஻்஼ , expressed as MtCO2e,  
Similar trends are obtained for the phosphorus point-based trading market. For a given 
water quality abatement level, the relative size of the carbon gains increases as the carbon price 
increases (Table 5-5). For example, for a 20% phosphorus abatement, the average relative carbon 
gains are 6.9 % ($5), 133.16 % ($15), and 328.6% ($25). For a given price for carbon, the 
relative size of the carbon gains decreases as the abatement levels increase. Given a price level of 
$5 for carbon, the average relative carbon gains are 24.12 % (20%), 8.01 % (30%), and 2.28 % 
(40%).  
A cross comparison across the two points-based trading market settings shows that in the 
absence of the carbon market, the soil carbon levels are higher for the nitrogen point-based 
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trading market, being on average, two times higher than those observed in the phosphorus 
trading market. These patterns are consistent with the correlation values between the points 
coefficients and the carbon values summarized in Table 5-1( the correlation coefficient between 
N points and carbon values is 0.74 while the correlation coefficient between  P points and carbon 
is 0.53). Although these results hold in absolute terms, in relative  terms the carbon gains are, on 
average, higher in the latter case. This implies, that the marginal rate of carbon sequestration is 
higher when the trading program is designed for the phosphorus abatement. 
Cost savings to the trading program 
In the presence of a carbon market, the potential revenue for selling carbon offsets reduces the 
initial costs of the abatement actions to farmers. The relative size of the cost savings (Δܥܵ஼ሻ is: 
߂ܥܵ஼ ൌ ்஼ುಳ೅ି்஼ುಳ೅಴்஼ುಳ೅ ∗ 100			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			(32)	
where ܶܥ௉஻் is the total trading costs for a nitrogen (phosphorus) trading market and ܶܥ௉஻்஼  
are the total trading costs in the presence of the carbon market. Negative values for ܶܥ௉஻்஼ 
imply that by being able to sell carbon offsets, the abatement costs are more than offset by the 
revenues from the carbon market. Negative values for ܶܥ௉஻்஼ translate into values higher than 
100% for Δܥܵ஼, the relative size of the cost savings. 
Table 5-6. Cost savings to the trading program: nitrogen 
 Nitrogen Point-Based Trading 
Prices $0 $5 $15 $25 
Target ܶܥ௉஻் ܶܥ௉஻்஼ Δܥܵ஼,% ܶܥ௉஻்஼  Δܥܵ஼,% ܶܥ௉஻்஼  Δܥܵ஼,%
20% 939,440 550,550 41.4 -412,493 144.0 -1,740,452 285.5 
30% 2,515,932 1,798,621 28.5 191,169 92.5 -1,648,471 165.6 
40% 6,020,182 4,943,189 17.9 2,572,622 57.3 -46,975 100.8 
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Table 5-6 summarizes the gains in total trading costs for a nitrogen point-based trading 
market both in absolute and relative size. For a given level of abatement for water quality, the 
relative size of the cost savings increases as the carbon prices increase. For example, for a 20% 
nitrogen abatement level , the relative cost savings are, on average, 41.4 % ($5), 144.03% ($15), 
and 285.54 %($25). For a given price for carbon, the relative size of the cost savings decreases as 
the abatement levels increase. Given a price level of $5 for carbon, the relative cost savings are 
41.4% (20%), 28.53 % (30%), and 17% (40%).  
Table 5-7. Cost savings to the trading program: phosphorus 
  Phosphorus Point-Based Trading   
Price $0 $5 $15 $25 
Target ܶܥ௉஻் ܶܥ௉஻்஼ Δܥܵ஼,% ܶܥ௉஻்஼  Δܥܵ஼,% ܶܥ௉஻்஼ Δܥܵ஼,% 
20% 337,180 122,121 63.9 -516,067 253.5 -1,740,452 617.5 
30% 857,851 499,232 41.8 -373,236 143.6 -1,737,535 302.8 
40% 1,953,064 1,343,156 31.2 41,712 97.9 -1,624,690 183.3 
 
Similar trends can be observed for the phosphorus point based trading market.  For 
example, for a 20% phosphorus abatement, the relative costs savings are, on average, 63.9 % 
($5), 253 %($15),  and 582.15 %($25). For a given price for carbon, the relative size of the cost 
savings decreases as the abatement levels increase.  Given a price level of $5 for carbon, the 
means of relative costs savings are 63.9 % (20%), 41.8 % (30%), and 31.2 (40%). When the 
relative size of the cost savings is higher than 100 %, the total costs of PBTC are negative, 
implying that the revenues from the carbon market offset the abatement costs.  
Overall, the relative cost savings are higher in the case where the carbon markets are 
available parallel with a phosphorus point-based trading market rather than the nitrogen based 
scenario. Previously, results show that the relative carbon gains are higher in the case of 
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phosphorus scenario. These results can also explain why the relative cost savings from trading 
are higher for phosphorus scenario. 
Relative equilibrium price in the point-based trading market 
The point equilibrium price will be lower in the presence of a carbon market, since the 
carbon offset price can be interpreted as a subsidy for implementing an abatement action. Let 
߂ܴ݁ݍܲ஼ be the relative reduction in the equilibrium point price: 
߂ܴ݁ݍܲ஼ ൌ ோ௘௤௉ುಳ೅ିோ௘௤௉ುಳ೅಴ோ௘௤௉ುಳ೅ ∗ 100	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				(33) 
where ReqP୔୆୘େ is the equilibrium price in the presence of positive carbon prices and ܴ݁ݍܲ௉஻்஼ 
is the equilibrium point price otherwise. 
Overall, the equilibrium price in either point-based trading market decreases with 
abatement target levels and price levels of carbon. A similar trend is observed for the relative 
equilibrium price levels, ܴ݁ݍܲ஼. By fixing the price of carbon, ܴ݁ݍܲ஼ decreases as the 
abatement targets increase, while by fixing the abatement target, ܴ݁ݍܲ஼ increases as the carbon 
price increases. This relationship is not surprising as the price of carbon offsets decreases the 
abatement costs. Hence, if a subsidy were to be paid for adopting abatement actions at field 
scale, the subsidy’s size would be reduced by the value of the carbon offsets that could be sold in 
a carbon market. The results are summarized in Table  C-1 (nitrogen) and C-2 (phosphorus). 
Cost Savings for the implementation of the abatement actions 
As mentioned earlier, the carbon market induces competition for land use, the benefits for 
water quality are traded off with the benefits for carbon sequestrations. Facing more options and 
positive carbon offset prices, farmers may choose abatement practices that are more efficient for 
soil carbon sequestration, even though otherwise they are more expensive. As shown earlier, the 
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total trading costs in the case of a carbon offset market have two components: the implementing 
costs for the adopted abatement actions and the revenues from the carbon market. Next, I 
determine the first component of the total costs. (i.e. how much does it cost to implement the 
new optimal abatement actions)-ܥܫ௉஻்஼.  Next, I compute the changes in the total abatement 
costs relative to the case when carbon offsets are not available, 
∆ܥܫ஼ ൌ 	 ஼ூುಳ೅಴ି்஼ುಳ೅்஼ುಳ೅ ∗ 100		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 					(34) 
where the implementation costs for a point based trading program only are equivalent to the total 
cost of the trading program,	ܶܥ௉஻். 
 
Table 5-8. Additional costs to implementing the abatement actions: nitrogen 
 Nitrogen Point-Based Trading 
Price  $5 $15 $15 
Target ܶܥ௉஻் ܥܫ௉஻்஼ ∆ܥܫ஼,% ܥܫ௉஻்஼ ∆ܥܫ஼,% ܥܫ௉஻்஼ ∆ܥܫ஼,%
20% 939,440 962,971 2.5 1,273,419 35.6 2,294,890 144.6 
30% 2,515,932 2,545,813 1.2 2,782,293 10.6 3,218,989 28.0 
40% 6,020,182 6,324,207 0.6 6,324,207 5.1 6,797,785 12.9 
 
Table 5-8 presents the results for the abatement costs comparison. Overall, more 
expensive abatement practices are chosen in the presence of a carbon offset market. For a given 
price level,  ∆ܥܫ஼  decreases as the abatement level increases (i.e. for a carbon price of $5: 2.51 
(20%), 1.19 (30%), and 0.65 (40%)).  Alternatively, for a given level of abatement, ∆ܥܫ஼ 
increases as carbon price increases (i.e. 20% N reduction: 2.51 ($5), 51.26 ($15), and 118.84 
($25)). 
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Table 5-9. Additional costs to implementing the abatement actions: phosphorus 
Phosphorus Point-Based Trading  
Price  $5 $15 $15 
Target ܶܥ௉஻் ܥܫ௉஻்஼ ∆ܥܫ஼ ܥܫ௉஻்஼ ∆ܥܫ஼ ܥܫ௉஻்஼ ∆ܥܫ஼ 
20% 337,180 360,699 7.0 823,727 144.7 2,294,890 582.1 
30% 857,851 873,578 1.8 1,263,399 47.4 2,386,515 178.4 
40% 1,953,064 1,960,597 0.4 2,984,105 52.9 3,099,433 58.8 
 
A similar trend is observed in the case of phosphorus. For a given price level,  ∆ܥܫ஼  
decreases as the abatement level increases (i.e. a carbon price of $5: 6.9 (20%), 1.83 (30%), and 
0.83 (40%)).  Alternatively, for a given level of abatement, ∆ܥܫ஼ increases as carbon price 
increases (i.e.20% P reduction: 6.99 ($5), 253.5 ($15), and 328.6 ($25)) . The relative increase in 
abatement costs is higher in the phosphorus trading market. 
Land use competition 
In this section, I present an analysis of the land use competition in the presence of a carbon 
market. Table 5-10 presents number of fields (as both a percentage of total area and as a 
percentage of total number of fields) that switch to a different abatement action in the presence 
of the carbon market. Both nitrogen and phosphorus outcomes exhibit similar trends: keeping the 
abatement target fixed, more land or more fields switch to a different abatement action as the 
price of carbon increases. At the same time, keeping the price of carbon fixed, less total land and 
a fewer number of fields change the land use as the abatement target increases.  
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Table 5-10. Cost savings to the trading program, nitrogen 
  Nitrogen Phosphorus 
 Carbon price($) 
Area change , % 
Target $5 $15 $25 $5 $15 $25 
20% 21.10 40.66 62.07 21.05 44.84 69.83 
30% 18.58 31.44 43.41 18.87 38.35 62.69 
40% 18.56 33.36 44.31 14.56 24.32 40.83 
 Field switching, % 
20% 23.09 41.40 60.44 21.77 43.57 66.09 
30% 21.55 34.36 46.29 19.76 37.24 59.70 
40% 19.97 33.10 43.88 15.64 25.03 41.00 
Figure 5-1 summarizes the distribution of the abatement actions across different levels for 
carbon prices and 30% N abatement targets; as the carbon price increases more and more fields 
choose “No till” and the combination of “No till” and “Cover crops.” A similar pattern is 
observed for a 30% P abatement target. Figure 5-2 show compares the spatial distribution of the 
abatement actions across different prices and 30% N abatement goal for Boone River Watershed. 
Overall, when the price for carbon offsets is positive, more fields adopt an abatement 
action different from the baseline. These changes translate in the adoption of “No till” and “No 
till and Cover crops.” At the same time, fewer fields choose “Land Retirement” and “Reduced 
fertilizer.” These changes are as expected given that “No till and Cover crops” are more efficient 
abatement actions for soil carbon sequestration. Similar results for phosphorus-based trading can 
be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 5-1. The distribution of the abatement actions 30% N abatement goal. 
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Figure 5-2. Spatial distribution of abatement actions , 30 % nitrogen. 
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A few hotspots emerge in the presence of a carbon market. However, the number is small 
relative to the total number of fields in the watershed. Table C-3 summarizes the distribution of 
the hotspots under both abatement programs. Another aspect to be considered is the overall 
trading activity across the watershed, where the trading activity is measured as the weighted 
average area in a subbasin that chooses a different abatement action than the one given by the 
field level constraint. As Figure 5-3 shows for different levels of N abatement, the trading 
activity slightly increases as the price of carbon increase. However, the distributions are very 
similar. The results summarized in Figure 5-3 together with the results summarized in Table 5-8 
suggests that even though the trading activity does not change in a significant manner the trading 
quality is changed, in the sense that different abatement actions are traded as the price of carbon 
offset increases.  
 
Figure 5-3. Overall trading activity, nitrogen abatement. 
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5.4. Conclusions 
Water quality and improved soil can provide additional ecological services such as 
improved fishing and wildlife habitat and are among the most important qualities of a healthy 
watershed which. At the same time, the carbon sequestrated in soil plays one of the most 
important roles in reducing the greenhouse gases. 
This chapter explores the impact of participation in a carbon offset market on the cost 
efficiency of a water quality program designed for a typical agricultural watershed. The analysis 
considers participation in a carbon market, a global environmental good, as a co-benefit of a 
water quality trading program, which has localized effects. The water quality program is a cap-
and-trade type of program whereas there is no cap for the carbon market. 
This chapter highlights the changes in the social costs of achieving a water quality target 
when farmers are allowed to participate in two parallel programs: a water quality trading 
program and a carbon offsets market. My analysis considers three different levels of carbon 
pricing, $5, $15, and $25 per MtC, and three levels of water quality goal, 20%, 30%, and 40% N 
reductions. The realized abatement levels are not very different in the cases when a carbon 
market is available. The farmers’ total cost of a point-based trading program decreases as the 
price of carbon increases. As the price of carbon increases, for lower water quality abatement 
targets, the total costs become negative, meaning that farmers obtain extra revenues by selling 
the carbon offsets which offset the cost of implementing the abatement practices. While the costs 
of the program are reduced, the costs of implementing the abatement actions increases. This 
relative increase in the implementation costs is higher for lower water quality abatement targets. 
The equilibrium price of a credit in a water quality trading market is reduced when farmers are 
allowed to participate in the carbon offset market. Additionally, the results quantifying the extent 
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of land competition between two programs shows that, for the current application, the 
distribution of the abatement actions being similar across different levels of carbon pricing. 
This chapter offers a better understanding on how the agriculture can influence multiple 
environmental outcomes: water quality and carbon sequestration. It combines the outcomes of a 
two different watershed based models (EPIC and SWAT) together with an optimization 
algorithm to evaluate the implications on a hypothetical trading program designed for the non-
point sources.  
Several caveats must be taken into account. The EPIC estimates for soil carbon have not 
been fully calibrated for the watershed studied in this chapter. A caution, as in previous chapters 
in interpreting the results, applies in this case: the performance of the trading programs is based 
on the theoretical abilities of the optimization problem defined at the beginning of the chapter. In 
reality, the transaction costs and the nature of the trading may understate the efficiency gains. 
Moreover, I assume that the carbon offsets can be sold in the current units. In reality, carbon 
offsets are standardized and require minimum amounts of MtCO2, requirements that cannot be 
met at farm level. Additionally, leakage, the uncertainty related to the carbon emission, issues 
broadly discussed in previous literature, have been assumed away.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
  
Despite large public expenditures on programs such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program and state-based payment programs to encourage farmers to adopt conservation 
practices, water quality problems associated with agricultural nonpoint-source pollution remain 
significant in the majority of US watersheds. The observability of field-level emissions and the 
complex fate and transport relationship linking them to the ambient water quality, together with 
the imperfect knowledge of the abatement costs, have been critical aspects of the policy design 
of agricultural pollution. 
In my dissertation, I present a theoretical model of water quality that captures the main 
characteristics of pollution within an agricultural watershed. Next, I propose and empirically 
estimate a simplified proxy model for the complex process that characterizes the fate and the 
transport of agricultural pollutants, a process known also as the water production function. 
Finally, I apply this model in a variety of empirical studies to evaluate alternative policy 
programs (command-and-control, a performance standard and trading) designed to improve 
water quality. In my empirical evaluation, I use a data-rich, spatially detailed model of land use 
and water quality for two agricultural watersheds in Iowa: the Boone River Watershed and the 
Raccoon River Watershed. To my knowledge, this is the first time when a simplified trading 
program based on points that measure the impact of abatement actions has been carefully 
examined in a simulation environment, where the simulations are calibrated to real word 
watersheds.  
I begin by providing a literature review of the economics of nonpoint-source pollution 
associated with agricultural activity. I review the different policy approaches related to water 
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quality trading that involves agricultural nonpoint sources. I also provide a brief description of 
the biophysical models (SWAT, EPIC) and optimization tools used in my empirical analysis.  
In Chapter 3, I present a conceptual model to manage the ambient water quality in a 
watershed impaired by agricultural runoff. My model captures critical aspects of the agricultural 
pollution. Next, I outline the properties of three policies under two assumptions for the 
abatement function. The first approach is a command-and-control where the regulator has the 
ability to mandate specific abatement actions to each farm in the watershed. The second 
approach is a performance standard where each farm has to meet predetermined farm-level 
performance requirements by choosing relevant abatement actions. The third approach is a 
trading program where farmers, conditional on meeting their farm-level performance 
requirement, can trade points assigned to the abatement actions.  
The main message that echoes from the conceptual model is that under a linear 
approximation of the abatement function, more flexible policies like the performance standard or 
trading program may outperform a command-and-control program in terms of abatement costs, 
but they may also result in the non-attainment of the abatement goal. However, the incentive-
based policies can overcome, partially or totally, the issue of cost asymmetries, since the 
regulator does not need to know the farm-level abatement costs. My modelling framework 
allows me to estimate the magnitude of these efficiency tradeoffs for the first time. Furthermore, 
the close calibration to two real watersheds offers valuable insights for the design of the actual 
policy. 
Next, I propose and estimate an approach for linearizing the abatement function using a 
system of point coefficients that measure the impact of an abatement action on the overall 
abatement level. Three levels of specificity are used to estimate the point coefficients: field, 
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subbasin, and watershed level. The point coefficients are estimated for nitrogen and phosphorus 
with consideration that the two pollutants have separate abatement functions. The estimated 
values for the point coefficients follow a priori expectations. Moreover, the point coefficients 
have similar patterns across the two watersheds. 
In Chapter 4, I empirically assess the tradeoffs between the cost efficiency and 
effectiveness of the three policies when a system of field-level point coefficients is used as a 
linear proxy for the abatement function. For the first set of simulations, I consider that the 
regulator and the farmers have the same cost information. Under this assumption, the empirical 
assessment of the proposed policies shows an overall good performance of the incentives based 
programs: the deviations from the abatement goals are not significant and sizable cost savings 
relative to the command-and-control programs are realized. A robustness analysis shows that the 
results are consistent across different: (a) pollutants (nitrogen and phosphorus), (b) sets of point 
coefficients (field-specific level, subbasin specific, or watershed specific), and (c) the 
distribution of historical weather. The point approximation procedure is extended to two 
pollutant markets, where each market uses a separate set of point coefficients. The findings show 
that there are no additional gains from focusing on both pollutants. At the same time, it is 
important to acknowledge that these results may be a special case and do not have to be 
generalized. 
For the second set of simulations, I consider that the regulator and the farmers have 
different cost information, where the cost asymmetry is simulated as costs heterogeneity. The 
regulator uses some limited information (average of the abatement costs) when designing his 
policies. The simulated outcomes support the findings obtained earlier. 
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Water quality and improved soil are among the most important qualities of a healthy 
watershed. At the same time, the carbon sequestrated in soil plays one of the most important 
roles in reducing greenhouse gases. Given that the same abatement actions that have the potential 
to increase the amount of carbon sequestration in soil, the point-based trading program is 
extended to allow trading participants to enter a market for carbon, including selling the carbon 
offsets associated with the abatement actions. 
Chapter 5 explores the impact of participation in a carbon offset market on the cost 
efficiency of a water quality program designed for the Boone River Watershed. The water 
quality program is a cap-and-trade program whereas there is no cap for the carbon market. The 
empirical findings show that: (a) the realized abatement levels are not very different in the cases 
where a carbon market is available, (b) the farmers’ total cost of a point-based trading program 
decreases as the price of carbon increases, (c) as the price of carbon increases the total costs 
become negative, meaning that farmers obtain extra revenues by selling the carbon offsets, 
which offset the cost of implementing the abatement practices, (d) the costs of implementing the 
abatement actions increase, and (e) there are not significant changes in the distribution of the 
abatement actions. This is also one of the first empirical assessments of a functioning trading 
program for water quality in the presence of an outside carbon market. 
Many caveats regarding the assumption for the conceptual model, the water quality 
process and data availability underlie my empirical estimation. Moreover, the approaches 
presented here are simplified versions of any actual water quality program. 
First, for the conceptual model, I consider that the farmers are risk neutral and minimize 
their costs (maximize their profit). Future possible work can incorporate a more elaborate and 
complete behavior response that considers the farmers risk behavior in adopting different 
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abatement actions. Another note of caution arises from the assumption that the performance 
standard and trading outcomes achieves all gains from trade. However, as many authors have 
noted, when factors like the type of trading (sequential or bilateral), transaction costs or 
nonmonetary preferences are taken into account some of the gains of an efficient trade may not 
occur. Second, the efficiency results for the proposed policies are for two specific watersheds, 
two specific pollutants, and a given set of conservation practices. Differences in any of these 
aspects have the potential to generate quite different efficiency findings. A third caveat relates to 
the ability of SWAT and EPIC to mimic the environmental processes occurring in the 
watersheds. My empirical findings are all conditional on the calibration of the two watersheds 
within these two models. 
One of the possible future extensions of my work include adapting the point procedure by 
bringing cropping choices into the point coefficients system. In this case, crop rotations such as 
corn-corn would receive negative points while crop rotations as corn-soybean would be rewarded 
with positive points. Another extension is considering the case of multiple pollutant markets, but 
considering a single set of point coefficients instead of the two sets. It has been shown that there 
is a time lag between the moment the emissions leave the field and reach the water, especially for 
pollutants such as phosphorus. In this case, the point system can be extended by creating 
temporal markets, with each market having its own time-dependent point coefficients.  
In spite of these caveats, I believe that these should not hamper the consideration of 
proxies, such as the point coefficients, as efficient tools in implementing incentive-based 
programs designed for improving water quality in the agricultural watershed. 
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APPENDIX A. AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH FOR ESTIMATING 
THE VECTOR OF POINT COEFFICIENTS: A TECHNICAL 
APPROACH 
 
Before presenting the approach used in obtaining the point coefficients, a brief discussion 
of the SWAT outputs offers a better understanding on the logic behind the estimation of point 
coefficients. In SWAT, a watershed is delineated into several subbasins, with each subbasin 
being delineated further into several hydrological units which can be interpreted as fields. SWAT 
computes the ambient emissions at the each subbasin outlet as a function of the component 
fields’ emissions. Next, the ambient emissions from each subbasin are routed into a nonlinear 
and nonseparable way to determine the ambient water quality at the main outlet. Hence, SWAT 
provides emissions outputs at the field, the subbasin, and the main watershed level. 
Step 1: Estimate a set of point coefficients that vary by subbasin using the watershed level 
output.  
In this step, I estimate a set of point coefficients that is subbasin specific, implying that: (a) all 
the edge-of field reductions from a subbasin can be weighted by the same delivery coefficient, 
(b) a given abatement actions has the same edge-of-field impact in that subbasin (i.e., there is not 
nonseparability in ݎ௜ሺݔሻ at the subbasin level). Assuming that in a watershed there are S 
subbasins and J abatement actions, ܣ (ݔ) can be rewritten as: 
ܣሺݔሻ ≅ 	∑ ݀஺௜ݎ௜ሺݔ௜ሻே௜ ൌ 	∑ ∑ ݀௦ݎ௦௜ሺݔ௦௜ሻ ൌ	ே௦௜∈௦ௌ௦ ∑ ݀ௌܣ௦ሺݔሻௌ௦ , (1) 
where	ܣ is a vector ܯݔ1 of abatement levels measured at the watershed’s outlet,		ݏ is an index 
for the subbasins, dୱ is the delivery coefficient of subbasin ݏ,	ܰݏ the total number of fields in the 
ݏ௧௛	subbasin, and ܣ௦ሺݔሻ ൌ ∑ ݎ௦௜ሺݔ௦௜ሻே௦௜∈௦ 	sums up the total abatement realized at the level of 
subbasin ݏ. The term sum ∑ ݀ௌܣ௦ሺݔሻ௦  represents the total emission reductions corresponding to 
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subbasin ݏ௧௛ measured at the watershed exit. Next, the subbasin reductions are approximated as 
the sum of the total area allocated to the abatement action ݆, ܺ௦௝ ,weighted by a factor ݓ௝௦, 
ܣ௦ሺݔሻ ൌ ∑ ݓ௦௝௃௝ ∑ ݔ௦௜௝ே௦௜∈௦ ൌ ∑ ݓ௦௝ܺ௦௝௃௝ . (2) 
It should be emphasized that ݓ௝௦ measures the efficiency of practice ݆ at the ݏ௧௛ subbasin and has 
the same value for all fields in that subbasin. By combining equations (2) and (3), and by 
defining the product ܽ௦௝ ൌ ݀ௌݓ௦௝,	the abatement function can be written as: 
ܣሺݔሻ ≅ 	∑ ∑ ݀ௌ ∑ ݓ௦௝ܺ௦௝௝ே௦௜∈௦ௌ௦ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݀ௌݓ௦௝ᇣᇤᇥ
௔ೞೕ
௃
௝ ܺ௦௝ௌ௦ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௦௝ ∗ ܺ௦௝௃௝ேௌ௦ ൌ ࢄ ∗ ࢇ, (3) 
where ܺ is ܯݔሺܵܺܬሻ matrix, with each element ܺሺ݅, ݆ሻ representing the area allocated to 
abatement action ݆, in the subbasin ݏ. Finally, the vector of point coefficients, ܽ, is obtained via 
regression:  
ܣሺݔሻ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௦௝ ∗ ܺ௦௝ ൅௃௝ேௌ௦ 	ߝ				ߝ	~ܰሺ0,1ሻ	. (4) 
The point coefficients estimates,	 ොܽ௦௝, obtained above includes information on the delivery 
coefficients by definition. They can be interpreted as the marginal impact of abatement action ݆	 
on the total level of abatement given that it is implemented by a field located in the subbasin ݏ. 
The above estimation considers that, within a given subbasin, an abatement action has the 
same impact regardless the location in a subbasin. For an accurate representation of the true 
abatement function, field-specific point coefficients are indicated. Next, using SWAT data 
obtained at field level, I estimate a set of point coefficients for each field. 
Step 2: Estimate a set of point-coefficients for each field. 
Using the output available for each field, the reduced emissions for each field, ݎ௜	ሺݔሻ can be 
written as  
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ݎ௜	ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ∑ ݓ௜௝ݔ௜௝௃௝ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜			ߝ௜~ܰሺ0,1ሻ				∀݅ ൌ 1,…ܰ	 .   (5) 
This step implies running a regression and obtaining a set of ܬ coefficients for each field. 
By running a regression for each field, the field characteristic are taken into account.  
Let, ݓෝ௦௙ be the point coefficient estimate for abatement action ݆, given field ݅. By 
aggregating at the ݏ௧௛ subbasin level and assuming that the individual edge-of-field reduced 
emission within the same subbasin has the same impact on the abatement level at subbasin level, 
I retrieve the total reduced emissions at the subbasin level:  
ܣ௦ሺݎሻ ൌ ∑ ݎ௜	ሺݔሻே௦௦௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݓෝ௦௜௝௃௝ே௦௦௜ ݔ௦௜௝ . (6) 
Next, for a given subbasin and each abatement action, I compute a weighted average of 
the estimated point coefficients, ݓഥ௦௝, where the weight is given by the field’s area, ܽݎ௦௜௝, 
ݓഥ௦௝ 		ൌ ∑ ௪ෝೞ೔ೕೞ೔ 	௔௥ೞ೔ೕ௔௥ೞ 							∀	݆ ∈ 	ݏ	,     (7) 
where ܽݎ௦௜ are of field ݅ in subbasin ݏ; and ܽݎ௦ total area for subbasin ݏ. Given the above 
notation, equation (7) is becomes 
ܣ௦ሺݔሻ ൌ ∑ ݓഥ௦௝ 	∑ ݔ௦௜௝௦௜௝ ൌ ∑ ݓഥ௦௝	ܺ௦௝௝ 	,									       (8) 
where ܺ௦௝ ൌ ∑ ݔ௦௜௝௦௜ . 
Equations (8) and (3) are approximations of the same total reduced emissions in a given 
subbasin. Thus, for a given abatement action ݆ and a given subbasin ݏ, the following should hold 
on average : ݓഥ௦௝ ≅ ݓ௦௝ (i.e., the subbasin-level point coefficients should be an average measure 
of the field level point coefficients). 
Step 3: Obtain the delivery coefficients. 
The abatement function can be retrieved by aggregating over all subbasins: 
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ܣሺܺሻ ൌ ∑ ݀஺௦	ܣ௦ௌ௦ 	ൌ ∑ ݀஺௦ௌ௦ ∑ ݓഥ௦௝	ܺ௦௝௃௝ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݀஺௦ݓഥ௦௝	ܺ௦௝௃௝ௌ௦ ൌ ∑ ∑ ܽ௦௝	ܺ௦௝௃௝ௌ௦  . (9) 
Equation (4) is equivalent to equation (3). Thus, by comparing the results with the results 
obtained in step 1, the following relation should hold: ݀஺௦ݓഥ௦௝ ≅ ොܽ௦௝ (i.e., the impact of the 
abatement action on the overall abatement should be equal to its field level impact weighted by 
the delivery coefficient). All the elements but the ݀஺௦’s are known in equation (4) . In this case, 
delivery coefficients can be obtained as ݀஺௦ ≅ ௔ොೞೕ௪ഥೞೕ (i.e., the ratio of the subbasin point-specific 
coefficients to the weighted average of field-specific point coefficients). 
Finally, obtaining the delivery coefficients requires one more level of aggregation 
because there are ݆ abatement actions and only one delivery coefficient for each subbasin. 
Furthermore, since both ොܽ௦௝ and ݓഥ௦௝ being obtained via ordinary least square have normal 
distributions, averaging over the ܬ ratios ොܽ௦௝/ݓഥ௦௝ has a Cauchy distribution. As the Cauchy 
distribution does not have finite moments of any order, the average of J’s ratio has no meaning. 
Instead, I instead rely on the median measure  
݀̅஺௦ ൌ ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊	 ൜௔ොೞೕ௪ഥೞೕൠ௝
௃
 .  (10) 
Step 4: Using the delivery coefficients to obtain the final set of point coefficients. 
For a given field and a given abatement action, a more refined set of point coefficients can be 
obtained by multiplying the point coefficients obtained in the second step, ݓෝ௦௜௝, with the delivery 
coefficients estimated above:  
෤ܽ௦௜௝ ൌ 	 ݀̅஺௦ݓෝ௦௜௝,  (11) 
where ෤ܽ௦௜௝	is the point coefficient for the abatement action j, field ݅, subbasin ݏ . 
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Alternative Approach to Computing the Delivery Coefficients 
In the previous section, I show how to obtain the delivery coefficients and the field-specific 
point coefficients by using HRU and watershed-level SWAT outputs. This approach requires 
using data at a very fine scale. Alternatively, both the delivery coefficients and the point 
coefficient can be obtained using data at a less refined scale such as watershed and subbasin, or 
watershed only. 
Obtaining the delivery coefficients using SWAT watershed and subbasin level outputs 
This is also a multistep approach, with the first step being identical with the one described 
in section 3.2.1, where the estimated point coefficients are subbasin specific and include the 
delivery coefficients.  
Step 1:  ܣሺݔሻ ≅ ∑ ݀௦ܣ௦ሺݔሻ ൌ	௦ ∑ ݀௦ ∑ ݓ௝௦ ௝ܺ௦௝௦ ൌ ∑ ∑ ௝ܽ௦ ௝ܺ௦	௦௝ ൌ ܺܽ  (12) 
where ௝ܽ௦ ൌ ݀௦ݓ௝௦ . 
The first step implies the estimation of a set of point coefficients for each subbasin using 
a single regression. Let ܽ	ෝ  be the set of point coefficients, and ܽ	ෝ ௦ be the subset of point 
coefficients for subbasin ݏ. 
Step 2: In the second step, using the subbasin SWAT outputs, I estimate a set of point 
coefficients for each subbasin. The point coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal impact 
of an abatement level on the total abatement measured at subbasin level. The abatement function 
for subbasin	ݏ, ܣ௦ሺݔሻ, can be written as a linear combination of subbasin specific weights ݓ௝௦ , 
and the area allocated to a particular abatement action: 
ܣ௦ሺݔሻ ≅ ∑ ݓ௝௦ ௝ܺ௦௝ 	ൌ ܺݓ							∀ݏ ൌ 1,… , ܵ . (13) 
The second step implies the estimation of a number of regressions equal to the number of 
subbasins in a watershed, ܵ. Let ݓෝ௦ , be the set of point coefficients obtained for the	ݏ subbasin. 
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Step 3: By combining equations (7) and (8), for a given subbasin s, the delivery coefficients can 
be obtained as46: መ݀௦ ൌ ݉݁݀݅ܽ݊ሼ ොܽ௦/ݓෝ௦} 
Step 4: Next, the delivery coefficients are applied to let ݓෝ௦ obtain the final subbasin specific 
point coefficients: ෤ܽ௝௦ ൌ መ݀௦ݓෝ௝௦						∀݆	, ∀ݏ	 .      
Obtaining the delivery coefficients using SWAT watershed only outputs 
This approach is also a multistep procedure, with the first step being described before.  
Step 1: Obtain via regression subbasin-specific point coefficients. Let the ܽ	ෝ  be the set of point 
coefficients, and ܽ	ෝ ௦ be the subset of point coefficients for subbasin ݏ: 
Aሺxሻ ≅ ∑ ∑ a୨ୱX୨ୱ	ୱ୨ ൌ Xa	.   (14) 
Step 2: A unique set of point coefficients is obtained for the entire watershed. The abatement 
function is approximated as a linear combination of weights,	ܽௐ, assigned to each abatement 
action, with the weights being the same for each field, and the area allocated to that abatement 
action: 
ܣሺݔሻ ≅ 	∑ ܽௐ ௝ܺ	௝ .  (15) 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
46 The median is used instead of the average because ොܽ௦/ݓෝ௦ is the ratio of two normal 
distributions. 
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APPENDIX B. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Tables and Figures for Chapter 3 
 
Table A-1. Boone River Watershed: Point value estimates descriptive statistics, nitrogen 
Abatement practice Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Baseline 0.00 -4.15 0.00 0.08 
No till 2.65 -11.67 14.88 2.41 
Cover crops 2.72 -0.25 22.21 1.77 
No till, Cover Crops 4.86 -0.15 24.09 3.23 
Red.fertilizer 0.77 -12.09 11.60 0.81 
Red.Fert, No till 3.44 -2.53 20.89 2.63 
Red.Fert., Cover Crops 3.38 -20.94 27.81 2.18 
Red.Fert., No till, CC 5.52 -0.04 36.12 3.51 
CRP 8.40 0.18 85.29 5.51 
Rsquare 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.10 
 
  
Table A-2. Boone River Watershed: Point value estimates descriptive statistics, phosphorus 
Abatement practice Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Baseline 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 
No till 0.21 -0.05 1.74 0.21 
Cover crops 0.12 -0.08 0.75 0.11 
No till, Cover Crops 0.20 -0.08 1.73 0.22 
Red.fertilizer 0.00 -0.10 0.07 0.00 
Red.Fert, No till 0.21 -0.05 1.75 0.21 
Red.Fert., Cover Crops 0.12 -0.07 0.75 0.11 
Red.Fert., No till, CC 0.21 -0.07 1.75 0.22 
CRP 0.33 0.00 2.49 0.28 
Rsquare 0.98 0.09 1.00 0.08 
 
 
.  
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Table A-3. Raccoon River Watershed: Point values estimates descriptive statistics, nitrogen 
 
 
Table A-4. Raccoon River Watershed:Point value Estimates descriptive statistics, phosphorus 
Abatement practice Mean Min Max Std.dev 
Baseline 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
No till 0.13 0.00 1.16 0.18 
Cover crops 0.12 0.00 1.32 0.19 
No till, Cover Crops 0.17 0.00 1.66 0.25 
Red.fertilizer 0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.01 
Red.Fert, No till 0.13 0.00 1.16 0.18 
Red.Fert., Cover Crops 0.12 0.00 1.32 0.19 
Red.Fert., No till, CC 0.17 0.00 1.66 0.25 
CRP 0.23 -0.13 2.30 0.33 
Rsquare 0.91 0.07 1.00 0.00 
 
  
Abatement practice Mean Min Max Std.dev 
Baseline 0.00 -0.06 0.12 0.01 
No till 1.40 -0.31 11.42 1.85 
Cover crops 2.22 -0.08 13.30 2.16 
No till, Cover Crops 2.83 -0.04 17.17 2.87 
Red.fertilizer 0.60 -0.05 2.59 0.67 
Red.Fert, No till 1.97 -0.29 11.81 2.15 
Red.Fert., Cover Crops 2.70 -0.04 13.70 2.45 
Red.Fert., No till, CC 3.33 -0.04 17.17 3.15 
CRP 6.41 -1.17 25.96 5.17 
Rsquare 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.23 
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Table A-5. Boone River Watershed: Subbasin specific point coefficients, nitrogen 
Abatement practices 
Location 
No 
till 
Cover 
crops 
No till, 
Cover 
Crops 
Red.
fert 
Red.Fert, 
No till 
Red.Fert 
Cover Crops 
Red.FertNo 
till, CC 
CR
P 
Subbasin 1 3.45* 1.87* 5.35* 0.22 4.51* 2.7* 6.15* 10.26* 
Subbasin 2 3.96* 2.42* 5.34* 0.74*** 4.49* 2.49* 5.92* 9.55* 
Subbasin 3 3.55* 1.9* 4.59* 0.32 3.87* 2.56* 4.84* 7.49* 
Subbasin 4 2.5** 2.82** 4.53* 0.34 3.82* 2.09** 4.15* 5.86* 
Subbasin 5 2.03* 1.98* 3.97* 0.62** 2.61* 2.49* 4.7* 6.42* 
Subbasin 6 2.24* 2.15* 4.44* 0.74** 2.45* 2.9* 5.05* 7* 
Subbasin 7 6.33* 3.35** 6.51* 1.32 6.61* 3.26** 7.81* 10.13* 
Subbasin 8 2.83* 3.14* 5.19* 0.78 3.87* 3.17* 5.16* 7.44* 
Subbasin 9 0.86** 1.03* 2* 0.34 1.06* 1.77* 2.33* 4.33* 
Subbasin 10 1.67* 2.31* 2.99* 0.51 2.23* 2.7* 4.47* 5.91* 
Subbasin 11 2.08* 1.8* 3.39* 0.13 3.21* 2.83* 5.32* 7.29* 
Subbasin 12 2.94* 2.33* 4.04* 0.06 3.24* 2.97* 5.13* 6.98* 
Subbasin 13 2.17* 2.47* 3.53* 0.29 2.33* 2.46* 3.41* 5.83* 
Subbasin 14 2.04* 2.04* 3.23* 1.02** 2.53* 3.19* 3.98* 5.66* 
Subbasin 15 2.36* 1.68* 3.96* 0.09 2.67* 1.72* 3.84* 5.09* 
Subbasin 16 1.05** 1.12* 2.45* 0.23 1.55* 1.52* 2.76* 3.87* 
Subbasin 17 1.77* 1.9* 3.24* 1.03** 2.06* 2.45* 3.57* 4.43* 
Subbasin 18 2.88* 3.09* 4.09* 1.5** 3.42* 3.43* 4.82* 7.13* 
Subbasin 19 3.1* 1.71** 4.57* -0.5 2.76* 2.52* 4.52* 7.2* 
Subbasin 20 1.91* 2.58* 4.27* 0.85** 2.72* 2.5* 4.48* 6.59* 
Subbasin 21 4.13* 2.83* 6.71* 0.92** 4.92* 3.58* 7* 12.18* 
Subbasin 22 2.33* 3.11* 4.39* 0.62 3.69* 3.51* 5.37* 8.5* 
Subbasin 23 2.58* 3.05* 4.43* 0.43 3.64* 3.48* 5.76* 7.9* 
Subbasin24 2.14* 2.06* 4.37* 0.85*** 3.47* 3.08* 4.75* 7.77* 
Subbasin25 1.52** 1.65** 4.51* 0.15 2.49* 1.85** 4.18* 6.64* 
Subbasin 26 3.34* 3.75* 8.14* 0.69 5.57* 4.79* 7.35* 12.7* 
Subbasin 27 5.57** 5.02** 9.17* 1.47 3.91*** 3.22 9.09* 12.2* 
Subbasin 28 1.92* 2* 4.26* -0.2 2.54* 1.78* 3.77* 5.41* 
Subbasin 29 3.49* 2.7* 4.55* 0.52 3.75* 4.11* 5.25* 9.28* 
Subbasin 30 3.76* 2.2* 5.37* 1.26** 3.62* 3.4* 5.51* 8.28* 
Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, 
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Table A-6. Boone River Watershed: Subbasin specific point coefficients, phosphorus  
Abatement practices 
Location No till 
Cover 
crops 
No till, 
Cover 
Crops Red.fert 
Red.Fert. 
No till 
Red.Fert 
Cover 
Crops 
Red.Fert
No till, 
CC CRP 
Subbasin 1 0.18* 0.11* 0.15* 0 0.19* 0.09* 0.15* 0.42* 
Subbasin 2 0.22* 0.12* 0.19* 0.01 0.22* 0.12* 0.2* 0.43* 
Subbasin 3 0.19* 0.11* 0.16* 0 0.19* 0.13* 0.16* 0.37* 
Subbasin 4 0.23* 0.19* 0.24* 0 0.26* 0.15** 0.17* 0.31* 
Subbasin 5 0.13* 0.09* 0.11* 0.02 0.16* 0.1* 0.12* 0.33* 
Subbasin 6 0.18* 0.09* 0.14* 0 0.15* 0.12* 0.15* 0.34* 
Subbasin 7 0.33* 0.17** 0.22* 0.05 0.25* 0.12** 0.2* 0.36* 
Subbasin 8 0.1** 0.13* 0.15* -0.02 0.15* 0.13* 0.13* 0.25* 
Subbasin 9 0.04** 0.03** 0.02*** -0.01 0.03** 0.05* 0.03** 0.15* 
Subbasin 10 0.1* 0.12* 0.07* 0.02 0.1* 0.11* 0.12* 0.23* 
Subbasin 11 0.05** 0.05*** 0.02 
-
0.05*** 0.08** 0.1* 0.1* 0.19* 
Subbasin 12 0.17* 0.1* 0.12* -0.04** 0.15* 0.12* 0.15* 0.26* 
Subbasin 13 0.11* 0.09* 0.08* -0.04** 0.08* 0.1* 0.06* 0.19* 
Subbasin 14 0.11* 0.07** 0.06** 0.01 0.11* 0.13* 0.09* 0.2* 
Subbasin 15 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.01 0.08* 0.07* 0.08* 0.15* 
Subbasin 16 0.05** 0.05** 0.03** -0.02 0.05** 0.04** 0.03*** 0.14* 
Subbasin 17 0.1* 0.1* 0.08* 0.02 0.08* 0.1* 0.08* 0.18* 
Subbasin 18 0.19* 0.13* 0.15* 0.02 0.18* 0.13* 0.13* 0.34* 
Subbasin 19 0.19* 0.14* 0.16* 0.01 0.18* 0.15* 0.18* 0.36* 
Subbasin 20 0.08* 0.11* 0.09* 0.01 0.12* 0.09* 0.08* 0.21* 
Subbasin 21 0.23* 0.17* 0.25* 0.01 0.23* 0.16* 0.24* 0.58* 
Subbasin 22 0.11* 0.14* 0.12* -0.02 0.15* 0.1* 0.14* 0.37* 
Subbasin 23 0.22* 0.19* 0.21* 0.02 0.25* 0.2* 0.27* 0.41* 
Subbasin 24 0.19* 0.14* 0.17* -0.01 0.21* 0.12* 0.17* 0.44* 
Subbasin 25 0.16* 0.1* 0.17* -0.02 0.17* 0.09** 0.13* 0.35* 
Subbasin 26 0.28* 0.21* 0.33* -0.01 0.3* 0.23* 0.3* 0.61* 
Subbasin 27 0.32** 0.16 0.34** 0.02 0.22*** 0.09 0.32** 0.52* 
Subbasin 28 0.13* 0.11* 0.14* -0.04 0.13* 0.07** 0.1* 0.28* 
Subbasin 29 0.25* 0.18* 0.25* 0.01 0.23* 0.18* 0.25* 0.51* 
Subbasin 30 0.36* 0.17* 0.31* 0.05*** 0.33* 0.19* 0.32* 0.58* 
Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, 
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Table A-7. Raccoon River Watershed: Subbasin specific point coefficients, nitrogen  
Abatement practices 
Location No till 
Cover 
crops 
No till, 
Cover 
Crops 
Red.fert
ilizer 
Red.Fer
t, No till 
Red.Fer
t., 
Cover 
Crops 
Red.Fer
t., No 
till, CC CRP 
Subbasin 1 0.29* 1.42** 1.46** -0.16* 0.83** 2.19** 2.11** 5.36** 
Subbasin 2 0.6** 3.05** 3.15** 0.44** 0.77** 3.35** 3.44** 10.16**
Subbasin 3 0.33* 1.78** 1.97** 0.49** 0.35* 1.95** 2.01** 5.65** 
Subbasin 4 0.14* 2.33** 2.24** 1.12** 0.96** 2.93** 3.1** 5.63** 
Subbasin 5 0.17* 1.6** 1.49** -0.03* 0.26* 1.1** 1.21** 3.02** 
Subbasin 6 0.32* 1.67** 2.43** 1** 1.37** 2.86** 2.75** 9.11** 
Subbasin 7 0.08* 1.76** 2.2** 0.34* -0.02* 2.67** 2.87** 9.84** 
Subbasin 8 0.82* 2.45** 2.44** 0.65* 0.8* 3.15** 2.73** 7.86** 
Subbasin 9 -0.94* 1.86** 1.87** 0.22* 0.52* 2.01** 2.56** 4.24** 
Subbasin 10 0.11* 1.52** 1.91** 0.24* 0.22* 1.92** 2.54** 4.15** 
Subbasin 11 0.16* 2.56** 2.61** 0.12* 0.38** 2.64** 2.88** 8.36** 
Subbasin 12 0.81** 3.17** 3.3** 0.81** 1.91** 3.38** 3.79** 10.07**
Subbasin 13 -0.13* 2.18** 2.18** 0.74** 1.18** 2.93** 3.15** 5.31** 
Subbasin 14 -0.2* 0.97* 1.45** 0.64* 0.83* 2.07** 2.27** 3.85** 
Subbasin 15 0.8* 2.74** 2.88** 0.68* 0.82* 3.33** 3.3** 8.81** 
Subbasin 16 0.3* 1.87** 2.04** -0.1* 0.26* 2.15** 2.31** 7.04** 
Subbasin 17 0.39* 1.21** 1.79** 0.2* 1.03** 2.14** 2.35** 7.73** 
Subbasin 18 0.32* 2.02** 2.25** 0.29* 0.49* 2.31** 2.33** 6.27** 
Subbasin 19 0.1* 1.72** 2.1** 0.06* 0.36* 1.75** 2.26** 5.37** 
Subbasin 20 0.43* 2.1** 2.36** 0.91** 0.85** 2.29** 2.15** 5.65** 
Subbasin 21 -0.02* 1.12** 1.65** 0.4* 0.75** 2.35** 1.93** 5.2** 
Subbasin 22 0.37** 2.26** 2.62** 0.91** 1.72** 3.14** 3.46** 8.92** 
Subbasin 23 0.04* 1.88** 2.09** 0.71** 0.69** 2.43** 2.71** 8.97** 
Subbasin 24 0.76** 1.47** 2.24** -0.03* 0.8** 1.74** 2.36** 5.73** 
Subbasin 25 0.24* 1.75** 1.88** 0.63** 0.66** 2.27** 2.57** 6.21** 
Subbasin 26 -0.45* 1.05** 0.77** 0.62* 0.31* 1.38** 1.78** 4.62** 
Subbasin 27 1.27* 2.26** 2.33** 0.73* 1.41* 3.35** 3.83** 7.22** 
Subbasin 28 1.55** 2.93** 3.49** 0.56** 1.73** 3.4** 3.94** 9.05** 
Subbasin 29 0.84* 2.18** 2.55** 1** 1.16** 3.18** 3.4** 8.76** 
Subbasin 30 0.36* 2.76** 2.68** 1.6** 1.76** 3.45** 3.63** 6.35** 
Subbasin 31 0.12* 2.43** 2.5** 1.43** 1.6** 3.28** 3.36** 6.69** 
Subbasin 32 0.99** 2.33** 2.91** 0.25* 1.33** 2.52** 3.14** 9.83** 
Subbasin 33 0.29* 2.36** 2.3** 0.48* 0.95** 2.69** 3.38** 6.94** 
Subbasin 34 0.36* 2.31** 2.25** 0.45* 0.53* 2.58** 2.82** 6.67** 
Subbasin 35 0.24* 2.7** 2.71** 0.74* 1.05* 3.58** 3.81** 8.7** 
Subbasin 36 0.48** 1.75** 2.25** 1.76** 2.09** 3.32** 3.7** 8.29** 
Subbasin 37 0.68* 1.14** 1.17** 1.25** 2.57** 2.85** 2.77** 6.59** 
Subbasin 38 0.32* 2.25** 1.82** -0.04* 0.87** 2.75** 2.78** 8.79** 
Subbasin 39 0.36* 2.94** 2.77** 0.63* 1.09** 3.35** 3** 10.09**
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Subbasin 40 0.01* 2.42** 2.92** 0.53* 0.95* 3.25** 3.33** 11.12**
Subbasin 41 0.9** 2.79** 3.3** 0.69** 1.45** 3.61** 3.97** 8.73** 
Subbasin 42 0.79** 2.79** 2.63** 0.58** 1.23** 3.11** 3.41** 9.32** 
Subbasin 43 0.66** 2.68** 2.93** 0.53** 1.2** 3.09** 3.57** 6.79** 
Subbasin 44 -0.02* 2.19** 2.64** 2.01** 2.09** 3.64** 4.56** 9.44** 
Subbasin 45 3.7** 4.93** 6.14** 1.3** 4.98** 6.28** 7.74** 13.87**
Subbasin 46 0.49** 2.49** 2.57** 0.43** 1.15** 2.8** 2.8** 8.53** 
Subbasin 47 1.21** 3.26** 3.81** 1.77** 2.57** 4.14** 5.25** 9.78** 
Subbasin 48 1.05** 2.39** 2.79** 1.12** 1.95** 3.18** 3.35** 6.29** 
Subbasin 49 1.06** 2.66** 3.19** 1.71** 2.51** 4.2** 4.28** 9.03** 
Subbasin 50 1.23** 2.57** 3.43** 1.57** 3.12** 3.57** 4.83** 8.77** 
Subbasin 51 1.78** 2.46** 3.52** 1.22** 2.55** 3.55** 3.79** 7.56** 
Subbasin 52 4.55** 3.1** 6.79** 1.21* 5.02** 5.37** 7.26** 13.02**
Subbasin 53 2.09* -0.91* 1.97* 0.44* 1.97* 1.36* 3.26* 10.05**
Subbasin 54 1.56** 3.51** 3.8** 1.24** 3.13** 4.93** 5.21** 10.48**
Subbasin 55 1.76** 2.25** 3.64** 1.35** 2.09** 3.42** 4.62** 10.33**
Subbasin 56 1.04** 2.51** 3.52** 1.01** 1.95** 3.69** 4.2** 9** 
Subbasin 57 1.41** 3.39** 3.26** 1.27** 1.69** 3.26** 3.27** 8.97** 
Subbasin 58 0.72** 2.15** 3** 1.22** 2.46** 3.95** 4.5** 8.84** 
Subbasin 59 2.1** 3.58** 5.12** 2.35** 3.62** 4.73** 5.86** 11.36**
Subbasin 60 1.83** 3.38** 3.74** 1.14** 2.55** 4.06** 3.93** 9.17** 
Subbasin 61 5.35** 4.41** 7.32** 1.51* 5.57** 4.88** 8.22** 12.74**
Subbasin 62 1.56** 3.04** 3.88** 1.92** 3.58** 4.54** 5.73** 10.99**
Subbasin 63 1.01** 2.68** 2.87** 1.57** 2.2** 3.5** 4.61** 10.14**
Subbasin 64 4.39** 4.8** 7.14** 0.47* 4.48** 5.34** 7.76** 15.15**
Subbasin 65 4.43** 4.5** 6.47** 1.63* 5.62** 5.2** 6.48** 12.01**
Subbasin 66 1.46** 2.92** 3.32** 2.32** 2.65** 4.19** 4.48** 8.08** 
Subbasin 67 4.64** 4.32** 8.56** 3.18** 6.89** 5.68** 9.43** 11.72**
Subbasin 68 0.38* 2.3** 2.48** 1.27** 2.28** 3.78** 4.2** 9.94** 
Subbasin 69 0.93* 2.07** 2.52** 1.34** 2.27** 3.09** 3.78** 9** 
Subbasin 70 3.7** 5.6** 7.18** 0.59** 4.61** 6.51** 7.92** 13.74**
Subbasin 71 2.81** 2.5* 4.37** -0.78* 3.33** 2.85** 6.37** 9.28** 
Subbasin 72 1.72** 2.6** 3.35** 1.87** 3.8** 4.54** 5.15** 11.68**
Subbasin 73 5.47** 5** 8.09** 2.83** 5.7** 6.2** 8.49** 11.93**
Subbasin 74 1.85** 4.2** 5.19** 0.51* 4.72** 5.51** 5.82** 11.04**
Subbasin 75 3.98** 6.19** 8.48** 0.4* 4.8** 7.33** 8.94** 15.43**
Subbasin 76 5** 7.19** 8.79** 2.59** 6.09** 7.33** 8.25** 14.9** 
Subbasin 77 -0.07* 0.24* -0.81* 0.58* -0.61* 1.37* 0.3* -0.81* 
Subbasin 78 1.87** 3.49** 4.73** 1.57** 3.44** 5.03** 6.32** 10.99**
Subbasin 79 3.66** 5.23** 6.51** 3.32** 5.31** 6.82** 8.71** 15.47**
Subbasin 80 4.63** 8.03** 8.49** 1.35* 5.87** 8.45** 9.68** 14.91**
Subbasin 81 2.49** 3.41** 4.82** 2.03** 4.52** 5.07** 6.94** 13.88**
Subbasin 82 3.75** 7.33** 8.48** 1.88* 5.36** 8.03** 9.83** 13** 
Subbasin 83 4.91** 9.05** 9.22** 0.86* 6.8** 8.45** 9.95** 14.17**
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Subbasin 84 0.3* 0.18* -0.47* 0.46* 0.53* -0.47* 0.66* -1.16* 
Subbasin 85 -0.85* -1.09* -1.49* -1.57* 0.05* -0.73* -1.05* -1.65* 
Subbasin 86 0.18* 2.72** 2.64** 0.15* 0.78** 2.83** 2.96** 9.35** 
Subbasin 87 -2.15* -1.12* -0.41* 0.74* 1.02* 4.44* 3.39* 7.68** 
Subbasin 88 -0.13* 1.77** 1.96** 0.53* 0.55* 2.24** 2.47** 3.88** 
Subbasin 89 0.18* 2.36** 2.38** 0.92** 1.31** 3.09** 3.36** 6.12** 
Subbasin 90 -0.27* 1.63** 1.64** 0.71** 0.83** 2.28** 2.42** 4.67** 
Subbasin 91 0.03* 2.09** 1.74** 1.11** 0.73** 2.42** 3.02** 6.74** 
Subbasin 92 0.34* 2.02** 2.52** 1.96** 2.08** 3.38** 3.61** 8.5** 
Subbasin 93 -0.61* 1.72** 1.71** 0.46* 0.61** 2.25** 2.63** 5.54** 
Subbasin 94 0.33** 2.6** 2.45** 0.83** 1.36** 3.44** 3.4** 6.16** 
Subbasin 95 3.51** 4.55** 5.99** 0.76** 4.42** 5.28** 6.93** 12.93**
Subbasin 96 3.16** 3.82** 5.4** 0.47* 3.36** 4.56** 5.56** 11.55**
Subbasin 97 3.57** 5.13** 6.13** 0.9** 4.25** 5.43** 6.78** 13.07**
Subbasin 98 4.44** 6.55** 8.06** 1.15** 5.78** 7.4** 9.5** 15.89**
Subbasin 99 4.6** 5.93** 8.15** 0.64** 4.88** 6.49** 8.28** 14.69**
Subbasin 100 0.21* 2.82** 2.68** 1.06** 1.49** 3.4** 3.32** 9.6** 
Subbasin 101 2.39** 4.34** 4.97** 1.75** 4.21** 5.54** 6.58** 11.59**
Subbasin 102 1.47** 2.55** 3.35** 1.55** 2.79** 3.68** 4.57** 9.3** 
Subbasin 103 1** 2.44** 3.15** 1.44** 2.47** 3.99** 4.44** 8.94** 
Subbasin 104 0.93** 1.55** 2.05** 1.39** 2.51** 2.85** 3.36** 7.71** 
Subbasin 105 1.48** 2.23** 3.92** 1.32** 3.29** 4.11** 4.71** 10.9** 
Subbasin 106 4.44** 5.85** 7.68** 2.46** 5** 6.47** 8.23** 12.89**
Subbasin 107 13.37* 13.67* 11.3* 1.13* 9.59* 14.85** 10.42* 17.65**
Subbasin 108 7.03* 28.68* 10.24* 7.58* 23.26* 8.77* 26.58* 18.34* 
Subbasin 109 3.26** 4.01** 5.63** 1.34** 5.03** 5.62** 7.37** 14.52**
Subbasin 110 0.14* -0.03* 0.2* 0.13* 0.33* -0.06* 0.06* 0.08* 
Subbasin 111 -0.01* 0.92* -0.42* 0.59* -0.27* 0.06* -0.29* -1.15* 
Subbasin 112 2.77** 3.71** 5.46** 1.62** 4.34** 4.6** 6.49** 11.94**
Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, 
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Table A-8. Raccoon River Watershed: Subbasin specific point coefficients, phosphorus 
Abatement practices 
Location No till Cover crops 
No till, 
Cover 
Crops 
Red.ferti
lizer 
Red.Fert
, No till 
Red.Fert 
Cover 
Crops 
Red.Fert
.No till, 
CC 
CRP 
Subbasin 1 0.06* 0.04** 0.05* 0 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.14* 
Subbasin 2 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0 0.06* 0.05* 0.07* 0.14* 
Subbasin 3 0.02** 0.02** 0.03* 0 0.02** 0.03** 0.03* 0.11* 
Subbasin 4 0.03* 0.02** 0.03* 0.01 0.02** 0.03* 0.03* 0.06* 
Subbasin 5 0.04** 0.05** 0.04** 0.03*** 0.06* 0.03** 0.04** 0.1* 
Subbasin 6 0.03*** 0.01 0.05** -0.01 0.02 0.02*** 0.03** 0.1* 
Subbasin 7 0.08* 0.06** 0.06** 0.02 0.05** 0.05** 0.08* 0.15* 
Subbasin 8 0.05** 0.04** 0.06** 0.01 0.05** 0.06* 0.05** 0.12* 
Subbasin 9 0 0.02*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05* 
Subbasin 10 0.02 0.02 0.03** -0.02 0.01 0 0.03** 0.06* 
Subbasin 11 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* -0.01 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.12* 
Subbasin 12 0.08* 0.1* 0.13* 0.01 0.07* 0.09* 0.11* 0.17* 
Subbasin 13 0.02** 0.02** 0.03* 0 0.02** 0.02** 0.04* 0.06* 
Subbasin 14 0 -0.02 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 
Subbasin 15 0.07* 0.06** 0.07** 0 0.08* 0.03*** 0.09* 0.16* 
Subbasin 16 0.05* 0.03* 0.05* 0 0.05* 0.04* 0.06* 0.14* 
Subbasin 17 0.05* 0.03** 0.06* -0.01 0.05* 0.04** 0.06* 0.15* 
Subbasin 18 0.04** 0.03** 0.04** 0 0.05** 0.05* 0.06* 0.15* 
Subbasin 19 0.03*** 0.05** 0.06* 0 0.03*** 0.03** 0.06* 0.15* 
Subbasin 20 0.04** 0.05* 0.07* 0.02 0.05** 0.05* 0.04** 0.12* 
Subbasin 21 0.01 0.02*** 0.03** 0 0.01 0.03** 0.02*** 0.07* 
Subbasin 22 0.06* 0.05* 0.08* 0 0.07* 0.05* 0.08* 0.17* 
Subbasin 23 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.01 0.05* 0.04** 0.07* 0.15* 
Subbasin 24 0.06* 0.03 0.07* -0.01 0.05** 0.02 0.04** 0.13* 
Subbasin 25 0.04* 0.03* 0.05* 0 0.04* 0.03* 0.05* 0.1* 
Subbasin 26 0.03** 0.02 0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.07* 
Subbasin 27 0.12* 0.06*** 0.1** 0.04 0.06** 0.07** 0.16* 0.16* 
Subbasin 28 0.12* 0.09* 0.16* 0 0.12* 0.1* 0.15* 0.27* 
Subbasin 29 0.08* 0.03*** 0.11* 0 0.05** 0.04** 0.09* 0.2* 
Subbasin 30 0.05* 0.06* 0.07* 0.01 0.07* 0.06* 0.06* 0.1* 
Subbasin 31 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0 0.06* 0.05* 0.08* 0.12* 
Subbasin 32 0.12* 0.08* 0.13* 0 0.11* 0.07* 0.13* 0.26* 
Subbasin 33 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0 0.07* 0.06* 0.1* 0.15* 
Subbasin 34 0.04* 0.05* 0.05* -0.02 0.04* 0.05* 0.07* 0.12* 
Subbasin 35 0.08** 0.11* 0.1* 0.01 0.09* 0.1* 0.13* 0.2* 
Subbasin 36 0.07* 0.03* 0.07* 0 0.07* 0.03* 0.06* 0.12* 
Subbasin 37 0.06* 0.01 0.03*** -0.01 0.06** 0.02 0.06* 0.12* 
Subbasin 38 0.07* 0.1* 0.11* -0.01 0.06* 0.09* 0.1* 0.17* 
Subbasin 40 0.1* 0.13* 0.16* -0.01 0.1* 0.13* 0.18* 0.24* 
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Subbasin 41 0.1* 0.1* 0.14* -0.01 0.1* 0.1* 0.13* 0.22* 
Subbasin 42 0.1* 0.11* 0.14* 0 0.1* 0.11* 0.13* 0.19* 
Subbasin 43 0.09* 0.07* 0.1* 0 0.08* 0.08* 0.11* 0.17* 
Subbasin 44 0.06** 0.09* 0.1* 0.03 0.11* 0.08* 0.09* 0.15* 
Subbasin 45 0.34* 0.39* 0.5* 0.01 0.35* 0.41* 0.49* 0.63* 
Subbasin 46 0.08* 0.1* 0.12* 0 0.07* 0.1* 0.11* 0.18* 
Subbasin 47 0.11* 0.08* 0.15* 0 0.14* 0.09* 0.15* 0.22* 
Subbasin 48 0.09* 0.07* 0.1* 0.02*** 0.09* 0.07* 0.1* 0.17* 
Subbasin 49 0.09* 0.06* 0.1* 0 0.1* 0.07* 0.09* 0.16* 
Subbasin 50 0.12* 0.07* 0.13* 0.01 0.12* 0.08* 0.14* 0.2* 
Subbasin 51 0.1* 0.07* 0.1* -0.02 0.1* 0.06** 0.1* 0.2* 
Subbasin 52 0.31* 0.2* 0.38* 0.04*** 0.28* 0.24* 0.33* 0.52* 
Subbasin 53 0.28** 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.18*** 0.16 0.2*** 0.45* 
Subbasin 54 0.15* 0.12* 0.15* 0.02 0.16* 0.09* 0.15* 0.25* 
Subbasin 55 0.15* 0.1* 0.16* 0.01 0.14* 0.08* 0.18* 0.3* 
Subbasin 56 0.13* 0.08* 0.15* 0 0.12* 0.09* 0.14* 0.22* 
Subbasin 57 0.13* 0.16* 0.18* -0.01 0.12* 0.16* 0.17* 0.2* 
Subbasin 58 0.14* 0.09* 0.17* 0 0.15* 0.09* 0.17* 0.24* 
Subbasin 59 0.19* 0.11* 0.23* 0.01 0.19* 0.11* 0.21* 0.31* 
Subbasin 60 0.16* 0.16* 0.22* 0.01 0.17* 0.15* 0.19* 0.3* 
Subbasin 61 0.62* 0.46* 0.71* 0.04 0.62* 0.49* 0.76* 1.05* 
Subbasin 62 0.17* 0.12* 0.21* 0 0.18* 0.11* 0.21* 0.28* 
Subbasin 63 0.14* 0.09* 0.14* 0 0.13* 0.07* 0.16* 0.22* 
Subbasin 64 0.45* 0.4* 0.6* 0 0.45* 0.42* 0.61* 0.85* 
Subbasin 65 0.37* 0.31* 0.44* 0.05 0.34* 0.32* 0.42* 0.57* 
Subbasin 66 0.11* 0.09* 0.16* 0.01 0.12* 0.12* 0.18* 0.21* 
Subbasin 67 0.4* 0.35* 0.64* 0.12** 0.44* 0.38* 0.59* 0.81* 
Subbasin 68 0.11* 0.08* 0.13* -0.01 0.12* 0.08* 0.15* 0.22* 
Subbasin 69 0.11* 0.07* 0.15* 0 0.13* 0.07* 0.14* 0.18* 
Subbasin 70 0.45* 0.47* 0.63* 0.01 0.46* 0.5* 0.64* 0.85* 
Subbasin 71 0.33* 0.17** 0.39* 0.04 0.34* 0.16** 0.38* 0.53* 
Subbasin 72 0.16* 0.12* 0.19* 0 0.17* 0.12* 0.2* 0.28* 
Subbasin 73 0.53* 0.48* 0.66* 0.08** 0.46* 0.49* 0.66* 0.91* 
Subbasin 74 0.34* 0.39* 0.51* -0.02 0.4* 0.35* 0.46* 0.62* 
Subbasin 75 0.57* 0.54* 0.74* 0.01 0.57* 0.54* 0.76* 0.97* 
Subbasin 76 0.44* 0.49* 0.67* 0.05 0.4* 0.47* 0.64* 0.82* 
Subbasin 77 -0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Subbasin 78 0.26* 0.22* 0.39* 0.01 0.27* 0.25* 0.35* 0.53* 
Subbasin 79 0.42* 0.33* 0.5* 0.04 0.42* 0.29* 0.61* 0.77* 
Subbasin 80 0.56* 0.71* 0.82* 0.03 0.55* 0.72* 0.81* 1.02* 
Subbasin 81 0.33* 0.21* 0.4* 0.01 0.34* 0.21* 0.42* 0.58* 
Subbasin 82 0.49* 0.61* 0.78* 0.01 0.55* 0.62* 0.73* 0.9* 
Subbasin 83 0.59* 0.76* 0.9* 0.02 0.62* 0.74* 0.92* 1.1* 
Subbasin 84 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0 -0.02 0.05*** -0.01 
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Subbasin 85 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 0 
Subbasin 86 0.05* 0.05* 0.07* -0.01 0.06* 0.04* 0.07* 0.14* 
Subbasin 87 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.1 -0.1 -0.02 -0.02 0.1 
Subbasin 88 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** -0.01 0.02*** 0.02 0.04** 0.05* 
Subbasin 89 0.03** 0.04** 0.05* -0.01 0.03** 0.04* 0.05* 0.07* 
Subbasin 90 0.03** 0.02** 0.03** -0.02** 0.03** 0.02*** 0.03** 0.06* 
Subbasin 91 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.03** 0.06* 0.03** 0.08* 0.13* 
Subbasin 92 0.02 0.03*** 0.06** -0.01 0.05** 0.03** 0.04** 0.11* 
Subbasin 93 0.05* 0.05* 0.07* -0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.11* 
Subbasin 94 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* -0.01 0.06* 0.07* 0.09* 0.14* 
Subbasin 95 0.37* 0.41* 0.51* 0.01 0.35* 0.41* 0.51* 0.66* 
Subbasin 96 0.32* 0.3* 0.42* -0.01 0.32* 0.32* 0.61 0.58* 
Subbasin 97 0.4* 0.47* 0.56* 0.02*** 0.38* 0.46* 0.56* 0.73* 
Subbasin 98 0.5* 0.56* 0.71* 0 0.49* 0.55* 0.72* 0.94* 
Subbasin 99 0.49* 0.53* 0.69* 0.01 0.48* 0.55* 0.69* 0.9* 
Subbasin 100 0.09* 0.12* 0.14* 0.01 0.09* 0.13* 0.13* 0.2* 
Subbasin 101 0.26* 0.26* 0.37* 0.01 0.27* 0.26* 0.35* 0.47 
Subbasin 102 0.13* 0.08* 0.15* 0.01 0.13* 0.08* 0.16* 0.23* 
Subbasin 103 0.11* 0.07* 0.12* -0.01 0.1* 0.07* 0.14* 0.21* 
Subbasin 104 0.07* 0.02** 0.07* 0 0.07* 0.02** 0.07* 0.11* 
Subbasin 105 0.16* 0.09* 0.22* 0.01 0.17* 0.11* 0.18* 0.28* 
Subbasin 106 0.38* 0.36* 0.48* -0.05 0.37* 0.36* 0.49* 0.67* 
Subbasin 107 0.86** 0.75** 0.93* -0.07 0.89** 1.19* 1.06* 1.27* 
Subbasin 108 1.18*** 0.29 0.54 -0.58 0.94 -0.58 0.59 0.89 
Subbasin 109 0.41* 0.28* 0.51* -0.01 0.42* 0.29* 0.52* 0.67* 
Subbasin 110 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 -0.01 -0.01 0 
Subbasin 111 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
Subbasin 112 0.22* 0.13* 0.25* 0 0.21* 0.13* 0.24* 0.37* 
Note: Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, 
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Table A-9. Boone River Watershed: Delivery coefficients by subbasin 
 Nitrogen Phosphorus 
Location Field Subbasin Watershed Field Subbasin Watershed 
Sub basin 1 1.11 1.15 0.81 0.52 0.49 0.87 
Sub basin 2 1.12 1.15 0.81 0.61 0.62 0.72 
Sub basin 3 0.96 1.06 1.00 0.49 0.56 0.86 
Sub basin 4 1.07 1.11 1.16 0.76 0.95 0.62 
Sub basin 5 0.91 1.02 1.13 0.56 0.66 1.15 
Sub basin 6 0.99 1.08 1.03 0.59 0.59 0.93 
Sub basin 7 1.76 1.76 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.64 
Sub basin 8 1.23 1.30 0.87 0.50 0.51 0.92 
Sub basin 9 0.68 0.85 2.06 0.18 0.26 3.72 
Sub basin 10 0.91 1.00 1.23 0.55 0.66 1.18 
Sub basin 11 0.94 1.00 1.24 0.34 0.26 1.68 
Sub basin 12 1.12 1.12 0.98 0.48 0.46 1.00 
Sub basin 13 1.00 1.04 1.24 0.43 0.38 1.46 
Sub basin 14 1.24 1.21 1.25 0.56 0.70 1.44 
Sub basin 15 0.94 1.09 1.34 0.42 0.46 1.70 
Sub basin 16 0.75 0.91 1.87 0.25 0.34 2.96 
Sub basin 17 0.96 1.16 1.35 0.48 0.63 1.52 
Sub basin 18 1.07 1.21 0.93 0.63 0.70 0.86 
Sub basin 19 0.95 1.00 1.07 0.62 0.64 0.79 
Sub basin 20 1.08 1.16 1.10 0.51 0.50 1.34 
Sub basin 21 1.02 1.10 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.59 
Sub basin 22 0.98 1.05 0.90 0.51 0.50 1.04 
Sub basin 23 1.14 1.19 0.92 0.82 0.85 0.59 
Sub basin 24 0.95 1.01 0.99 0.64 0.67 0.80 
Sub basin 25 0.76 0.74 1.37 0.49 0.60 0.93 
Sub basin 26 1.03 1.15 0.60 0.72 0.77 0.50 
Sub basin 27 2.17 2.02 0.53 1.49 1.47 0.48 
Sub basin 28 0.94 1.03 1.28 0.51 0.59 1.14 
Sub basin 29 1.10 1.25 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.62 
Sub basin 30 1.16 1.16 0.87 1.03 1.03 0.45 
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Table A-10. Raccoon River Watershed: Delivery coefficients by subbasin,  
  Nitrogen   Phosphorus   Nitrogen Phosphorus 
Location  Field Subbasin Watershed Field Subbasin Watershed  Field Subbasin Watershed Field Subbasin Watershed 
Subbasin1  0.40 0.36 1.92 0.26 0.27 2.58 Subbasin29 0.71 0.71 1.20 0.33 0.34 1.61 
Subbasin2  0.87 0.79 1.05 0.35 0.34 2.23 Subbasin30 0.92 0.91 1.12 0.54 0.54 2.10 
Subbasin3  0.52 0.52 1.79 0.19 0.19 5.19 Subbasin31 0.87 0.87 1.21 0.46 0.46 2.27 
Subbasin4  0.79 0.79 1.32 0.30 0.31 5.19 Subbasin32 0.62 0.64 1.17 0.36 0.38 1.17 
Subbasin5  0.40 0.42 2.88 0.52 0.50 2.62 Subbasin33 0.78 0.77 1.30 0.40 0.40 2.03 
Subbasin6  0.66 0.58 1.34 0.16 0.16 4.95 Subbasin34 0.71 0.68 1.45 0.35 0.29 2.59 
Subbasin7  0.53 0.57 1.42 0.41 0.41 2.14 Subbasin35 0.55 0.67 1.07 0.35 0.35 1.28 
Subbasin8  0.73 0.71 1.34 0.35 0.35 2.57 Subbasin36 0.79 0.80 1.06 0.46 0.47 2.20 
Subbasin9  0.61 0.59 1.75 0.00 0.15 7.56 Subbasin37 0.64 0.64 1.32 0.46 0.31 2.15 
Subbasin10  0.62 0.62 1.83 0.00 0.18 6.33 Subbasin38 0.50 0.50 1.28 0.40 0.37 1.55 
Subbasin11  0.66 0.67 1.33 0.28 0.28 2.61 Subbasin39 0.71 0.71 1.18 0.39 0.37 1.34 
Subbasin12  0.67 0.67 1.04 0.37 0.37 1.43 Subbasin40 0.62 0.68 1.13 0.47 0.47 1.01 
Subbasin13  0.78 0.74 1.25 0.23 0.31 5.13 Subbasin41 0.77 0.77 1.00 0.48 0.45 1.24 
Subbasin14  0.54 0.52 1.79 0.00 0.09 6.86 Subbasin42 0.66 0.66 1.20 0.45 0.45 1.28 
Subbasin15  0.57 0.64 1.13 0.26 0.27 1.99 Subbasin43 0.74 0.72 1.14 0.43 0.41 1.53 
Subbasin16  0.66 0.65 1.60 0.30 0.29 2.95 Subbasin44 0.76 0.75 0.92 0.44 0.44 1.51 
Subbasin17  0.52 0.52 1.82 0.32 0.31 2.77 Subbasin45 0.73 0.70 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.39 
Subbasin18  0.75 0.75 1.52 0.35 0.35 2.60 Subbasin46 0.64 0.63 1.27 0.43 0.43 1.47 
Subbasin19  0.62 0.55 1.81 0.36 0.36 2.89 Subbasin47 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.57 0.56 1.15 
Subbasin20  0.70 0.72 1.53 0.37 0.46 2.36 Subbasin48 0.71 0.69 1.10 0.60 0.56 1.55 
Subbasin21  0.49 0.48 1.98 0.23 0.16 5.32 Subbasin49 0.88 0.87 0.95 0.53 0.51 1.62 
Subbasin22  0.68 0.69 1.18 0.32 0.33 2.05 Subbasin50 0.79 0.77 0.93 0.48 0.49 1.26 
Subbasin23  0.64 0.65 1.45 0.35 0.35 2.46 Subbasin51 0.70 0.69 0.93 0.39 0.38 1.40 
Subbasin24  0.58 0.58 1.52 0.29 0.27 2.31 Subbasin52 0.87 0.86 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.50 
Subbasin25  0.60 0.61 1.56 0.31 0.31 3.24 Subbasin53 0.00 0.34 1.05 0.49 0.78 0.76 
Subbasin26  0.35 0.34 2.30 0.24 0.26 3.88 Subbasin54 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.55 0.55 1.05 
Subbasin27  0.67 0.74 1.20 0.39 0.40 1.62 Subbasin55 0.81 0.80 0.88 0.59 0.54 0.98 
Subbasin28  0.65 0.67 0.96 0.36 0.37 1.08 Subbasin56 0.77 0.77 0.96 0.52 0.52 1.19 
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Location Field Subbasin Watershed Field Subbasin Watershed Field Subbasin Watershed Field Subbasin Watershed
Subbasin57 0.80 0.79 0.97 0.55 0.56 1.01 Subbasin85 0.00 0.00 -2.18 0.00 0.01 1.01 
Subbasin58 0.72 0.67 0.91 0.57 0.58 1.02 Subbasin86 0.66 0.67 1.24 0.31 0.31 2.27 
Subbasin59 0.96 0.94 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.83 Subbasin87 0.00 0.21 0.79 0.00 0.00 -2.55
Subbasin60 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.64 0.64 0.81 Subbasin88 0.59 0.58 1.65 0.28 0.28 4.98 
Subbasin61 0.72 0.70 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.24 Subbasin89 0.78 0.78 1.21 0.34 0.29 3.29 
Subbasin62 1.00 0.98 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.85 Subbasin90 0.60 0.56 1.68 0.23 0.23 4.67 
Subbasin63 0.93 0.83 0.94 0.66 0.66 1.10 Subbasin91 0.64 0.63 1.35 0.43 0.38 2.16 
Subbasin64 0.61 0.60 0.53 0.43 0.43 0.30 Subbasin92 0.69 0.69 1.04 0.25 0.25 3.12 
Subbasin65 0.70 0.63 0.57 0.40 0.40 0.39 Subbasin93 0.61 0.60 1.57 0.46 0.46 2.39 
Subbasin66 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.59 0.62 1.10 Subbasin94 0.75 0.76 1.20 0.51 0.47 2.03 
Subbasin67 0.79 0.65 0.38 0.47 0.47 0.32 Subbasin95 0.66 0.64 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.34 
Subbasin68 0.76 0.73 0.93 0.59 0.60 1.16 Subbasin96 0.65 0.65 0.72 0.50 0.49 0.42 
Subbasin69 0.74 0.71 1.08 0.52 0.52 1.19 Subbasin97 0.72 0.71 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.31 
Subbasin70 0.80 0.74 0.49 0.60 0.59 0.29 Subbasin98 0.76 0.73 0.42 0.57 0.55 0.24 
Subbasin71 0.49 0.48 0.64 0.39 0.38 0.46 Subbasin99 0.77 0.75 0.46 0.58 0.56 0.27 
Subbasin72 0.90 0.82 0.74 0.56 0.56 0.92 Subbasin100 0.79 0.79 1.03 0.56 0.56 1.28 
Subbasin73 0.78 0.75 0.40 0.61 0.60 0.26 Subbasin101 0.77 0.79 0.62 0.55 0.58 0.49 
Subbasin74 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.56 0.35 Subbasin102 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.55 0.56 1.11 
Subbasin75 0.77 0.76 0.44 0.71 0.71 0.23 Subbasin103 0.81 0.80 0.92 0.52 0.51 1.26 
Subbasin76 0.98 0.95 0.37 0.74 0.72 0.27 Subbasin104 0.70 0.70 1.21 0.42 0.42 2.35 
Subbasin77 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.62 Subbasin105 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.71 0.92 
Subbasin78 0.85 0.81 0.65 0.76 0.77 0.50 Subbasin106 0.85 0.83 0.42 0.61 0.59 0.35 
Subbasin79 0.96 0.94 0.47 0.75 0.77 0.33 Subbasin107 1.02 0.98 0.24 0.84 0.78 0.16 
Subbasin80 0.93 0.89 0.38 0.84 0.82 0.21 Subbasin108 0.00 2.08 0.15 0.00 0.97 0.29 
Subbasin81 0.93 0.88 0.59 0.82 0.81 0.43 Subbasin109 0.80 0.76 0.58 0.70 0.70 0.34 
Subbasin82 1.03 0.99 0.38 0.95 0.93 0.24 Subbasin110 0.00 0.01 6.91 0.00 0.01 1.01 
Subbasin83 0.87 0.84 0.35 0.88 0.85 0.19 Subbasin111 0.00 0.00 -7.48 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Subbasin84 0.00 0.08 2.02 0.00 0.00 0.23 Subbasin112 0.87 0.86 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.72 
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Figure A-1 Boone River Watershed: Distribution of point coefficients across watershed, nitrogen. 
183 
184 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-2. Boone River Watershed: Distribution of point coefficients across watershed, phosphorus. 
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Figure A-3 Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of Point coefficients across watershed, nitrogen. 
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Figure A-4 Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of point coefficients across watershed, phosphorus.  
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 Tables and Figures for Chapter 4 
Table B-1. Evolutionary Algorithm Parameters 
Parameter description Value 
Size of temporary population 16 
Crossover probability 1 
Mutation Probability  0.003 
Total Number of Generations 300 
 
 
Figure B-1. Boone River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, N 20% goal. 
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Figure B-2. Boone River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, N 40% goal. 
 
 
Table B-2. Boone River Watershed: Spatial distribution of abatement actions (% of total area), 
optimizing policies, phosphorus 
   Abatement goal 20%  Abatement goal 30% Abatement goal 40% 
Abatement  Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
No Action 55.42 56.8 74.6 19.97 22.3 55.0 0.13 2.2 4.4 
No till (NT) 43.67 41.8 18.8 79.40 76.3 35.9 66.66 83.0 75.6 
Cover Crop (CC) 0.33 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.20 0.2 0.1 
NT,CC 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.13 0.0 0.0 0.18 0.0 1.6 
Red.Fert. 0.04 0.3 2.4 0.06 0.0 1.9 0.24 0.3 0.1 
Red.Fert., NT 0.24 1.0 4.1 0.02 1.3 7.1 28.05 10.2 15.5 
Red.Fert.,CC 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.39 0.0 0.0 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 0.21 0.0 0.0 0.33 0.0 0.0 0.16 0.0 0.4 
LandRetirement 0.05 0.1 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.0 3.98 4.0 2.3 
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Table B-3. Boone River Watershed: Spatial distribution of abatement actions (% of total area), 
satisficing policies, phosphorus 
   Abatement goal 20% Abatement goal 30%Abatement goal 40%
Abatement     Action 
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading
No Action 17.97 30.01 76.84 9.93 16.62 57.10 18.62 20.85 19.04 
No till (NT) 2.89 48.33 16.77 15.90 56.88 33.94 5.31 36.75 66.57 
Cover Crop (CC) 7.76 5.35 0.04 4.35 4.61 0.03 3.03 1.72 0.01 
NT,CC 10.44 3.59 0.00 19.00 5.70 0.01 0.70 0.97 0.05 
Red.Fert. 18.72 1.27 2.50 10.03 0.75 1.91 2.81 0.69 0.20 
Red.Fert., NT 14.73 7.53 3.78 12.61 6.08 6.95 25.15 8.78 14.07 
Red.Fert.,CC 11.95 0.69 0.02 17.03 1.19 0.00 2.19 0.24 0.00 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 15.55 3.23 0.03 4.08 1.10 0.03 14.26 2.07 0.03 
LandRetirement 0.00 0.00 0.02 7.07 7.07 0.02 27.93 27.93 0.03 
 
 
 
Table B-4. Boone River Watershed: Change in the CAC abatement actions distribution (% of total 
area ) 
     Nitrogen Phosphorus 
Approach  Target PS  Trading PS Trading 
Satisificing 
 20% 33.94 81.94 65.46 85.90 
 30% 34.00 93.79 55.78 87.00 
 40% 23.89 93.75 37.66 91.32 
Optimizing 
 20% 4.14 56.45 3.51 39.32 
 30% 6.74 47.08 3.85 59.47 
 40% 15.47 68.49 22.12 38.93 
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Table B-5. Boone River Watershed: The change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, optimizing, phosphorus 
 Optimizing Approach 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 
<=10% 26 27 17 6 0 6 
(10%- 20%] 4 3 2 4 1 8 
(20%- 30%] 0 0 1 2 2 1 
(30%- 40%] 0 0 0 3 3 3 
(40%- 50%] 0 0 2 0 7 0 
(50%- 60%] 0 0 3 3 5 1 
(60%- 70%] 0 0 3 6 2 1 
(70%- 80%] 0 0 1 5 7 2 
(80%- 90%] 0 0 1 1 2 2 
(90%- 
100%] 0 0 0 0 1 6 
 30 30 30 30 30 30 
 
Table B-6. Counts of HRU hotspots 
    Boone River Watershed Raccoon River Watershed
 Point level 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 
N satisficing 
Field 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subbasin 30 61 51 1 3 0 
Watershed 43 63 10 6 5 0 
N  optimizing 
Field 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subbasin 29 59 51 1 3 0 
Watershed 38 63 12 6 5 0 
P satisficing 
Field 17 12 8 0 0 0 
Subbasin 86 89 81 6 10 13 
Wateshed 86 108 57 0 0 0 
P optimizing 
Field 16 12 2 0 0 0 
Subbasin 88 89 80 6 10 13 
Watershed 80 108 59 0 0 0 
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Performance standard Optimizing  
Trading Optimizing 
 
Performance Standard Satisficing 
 
Trading Satisficing 
Figure B-3. Boone River Watershed: Spatial representation of change in distribution, 30% P 
abatement goal. 
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Figure B-4. Boone River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, 20% P abatement goal. 
 
 
Figure B-5. Boone River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, 40% P abatement goal. 
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Table B-7. Raccoon River Watershed: The distribution of abatement actions (% of total area), 
satisficing policies, nitrogen, 
   Abatement goal 20%  Abatement goal 30% Abatement goal 40% 
Abatement     
Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
No Action 1.86 5.89 19.56 6.21 9.28 9.27 3.67 6.90 3.83 
No till (NT) 1.49 11.60 9.46 1.99 4.64 7.56 0.23 7.06 3.04 
Cover Crop (CC) 0.33 3.23 1.38 0.28 3.45 7.59 5.10 4.95 11.28 
NT,CC 2.38 1.13 1.69 8.50 9.52 3.03 1.67 0.89 6.48 
Red.Fert. 23.15 22.97 38.68 17.97 16.54 20.83 20.94 19.94 4.22 
Red.Fert., NT 63.40 47.96 20.29 9.93 8.98 14.99 31.26 24.16 6.96 
Red.Fert.,CC 1.58 1.87 5.74 13.07 13.26 25.13 2.14 1.98 34.86 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 2.17 1.91 3.21 36.36 28.72 11.60 0.15 0.08 26.22 
LandRetirement 3.64 3.45 0.00 5.69 5.62 0.00 34.84 34.05 3.10 
 
 
Table B-8. Raccoon River Watershed: The distribution of abatement actions (% of total area), 
optimizing policies, phosphorus  
   Abatement goal 20%  Abatement goal 30% Abatement goal 40% 
Abatement    
Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
No Action 58.60 61.31 76.18 30.77 31.60 58.02 0.00 1.07 27.56 
No till (NT) 35.03 34.69 22.29 68.92 68.29 36.70 88.10 87.88 61.28 
Cover Crop (CC) 0.24 0.02 0.76 0.10 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.03 0.54 
NT,CC 0.03 0.07 0.32 0.01 0.00 4.34 11.02 10.46 9.90 
Red.Fert. 6.00 3.85 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.14 0.22 
Red.Fert., NT 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.12 0.21 
Red.Fert.,CC 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.14 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.14 
LandRetirement 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 
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Table B-9. Raccoon River Watershed:Spatial distribution of abatement actions (% of total area), 
satisficing policies, phosphorus 
   Abatement goal 20%  Abatement goal 30% Abatement goal 40% 
Abatement     
Action  
CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
No Action 17.97 30.01 76.84 9.93 16.62 57.10 18.62 20.85 19.04 
No till (NT) 2.89 48.33 16.77 15.90 56.88 33.94 5.31 36.75 66.57 
Cover Crop (CC) 7.76 5.35 0.04 4.35 4.61 0.03 3.03 1.72 0.01 
NT,CC 10.44 3.59 0.00 19.00 5.70 0.01 0.70 0.97 0.05 
Red.Fert. 18.72 1.27 2.50 10.03 0.75 1.91 2.81 0.69 0.20 
Red.Fert., NT 14.73 7.53 3.78 12.61 6.08 6.95 25.15 8.78 14.07 
Red.Fert.,CC 11.95 0.69 0.02 17.03 1.19 0.00 2.19 0.24 0.00 
Red.Fert.,NT,CC 15.55 3.23 0.03 4.08 1.10 0.03 14.26 2.07 0.03 
LandRetirement 0.00 0.00 0.02 7.07 7.07 0.02 27.93 27.93 0.03 
 
Table B-10.Raccoon River Watershed: Change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, optimizing, nitrogen 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 
<=10% 47 34 41 2 2 4 
(10%- 20%] 20 21 24 6 2 3 
(20%- 30%] 17 19 19 4 8 10 
(30%- 40%] 11 12 7 0 4 7 
(40%- 50%] 4 12 9 6 7 8 
(50%- 60%] 2 2 2 10 10 10 
(60%- 70%] 3 4 4 9 9 10 
(70%- 80%] 3 3 1 12 15 13 
(80%- 90%] 0 0 0 20 12 15 
(90%- 100%] 5 5 5 43 43 32 
Counts of subbasin 112 112 112 112 112 112 
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Table B-11. Raccoon River Watershed: Change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, satisficing, nitrogen 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
<=10% 37 32 48 0 0 0 
(10%- 20%] 32 38 30 0 0 0 
(20%- 30%] 20 23 21 0 0 0 
(30%- 40%] 9 3 4 1 0 0 
(40%- 50%] 5 7 3 6 0 0 
(50%- 60%] 2 3 2 11 4 1 
(60%- 70%] 2 0 0 12 9 2 
(70%- 80%] 0 2 0 20 20 5 
(80%- 90%] 0 0 2 26 26 14 
(90%- 100%] 5 4 2 36 53 90 
Counts of subbasin 112 112 112 112 112 112 
 
Table B-12. Raccoon River Watershed: Change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, optimizing, phosphorus 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
<=10% 70 57 47 56 28 23 
(10%- 20%] 28 48 55 5 7 8 
(20%- 30%] 5 6 8 7 10 7 
(30%- 40%] 3 1 2 7 5 10 
(40%- 50%] 2 0 0 1 17 19 
(50%- 60%] 1 0 0 5 6 10 
(60%- 70%] 2 0 0 1 6 3 
(70%- 80%] 0 0 0 3 5 2 
(80%- 90%] 1 0 0 1 1 7 
(90%- 100%] 0 0 0 26 27 23 
Counts of subbasin 112 112 112 112 112 112 
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Table B-13. Raccoon River Watershed: Change in the relative distribution of the abatement actions 
relative to CAC, satisficing, phosphorus 
% of subbasin Performance Standard Trading 
Area 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
<=10% 7 1 3 0 0 0 
(10%- 20%] 7 4 6 0 0 0 
(20%- 30%] 12 3 19 2 0 0 
(30%- 40%] 28 11 28 7 0 0 
(40%- 50%] 25 20 18 2 0 0 
(50%- 60%] 16 15 16 14 0 0 
(60%- 70%] 10 21 14 8 0 1 
(70%- 80%] 5 17 4 24 0 7 
(80%- 90%] 2 8 4 22 6 12 
(90%- 100%] 0 12 0 33 106 92 
Counts of subbasin 112 112 112 112 112 112 
 
 
Figure B-6. Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, 20%N abatement goal. 
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Figure B-7. Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, 40% N abatement goal. 
 
Figure B-8. Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, 20% P abatement goal 
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Figure B-9. Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to 
trading outcomes, 30% P abatement goal. 
  
Figure B-10. Raccoon River Watershed: Distribution of abatement effort corresponding to trading 
outcomes, 40% P abatement goal. 
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Figure B-11. Raccoon River Watershed: The overall change in the distribution of abatement 
actions under CAC, 20% abatement goal (the height of the bar represents the percent of the total 
area that changes the abatement actions from CAC). 
 
Figure B-12. Raccoon River Watershed: The overall change in the distribution of abatement 
actions under CAC, 40% abatement goal (the height of the bar represents the percent of the total 
area that changes the abatement actions from CAC). 
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Figure B-13. Boone River Watershed: Spatial change in the CAC distribution under the three types 
of points, 30 % P abatement, optimizing. 
 
Figure B-14. Raccoon River Watershed: The overall change in the distribution of abatement 
actions under CAC, 20% abatement goal (the height of the bar represents the percent of the total 
area that changes the abatement actions from CAC). 
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Figure B-15. Raccoon River Watershed: The overall change in the distribution of 
abatement actions under CAC, 40% abatement goal (the height of the bar represents the 
percent of the total area that changes the abatement actions from CAC). 
 
 
 
Table B-14. Boone River Watershed: The five-year moving average 1999-2009 P loadings 
distribution 
 Abatement goal Satisficing Policies Optimizing Policies 
 20% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (mil kg,P) 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Std.dev. ( mil kg,P) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Average N reduction (% P)  20.48 20.33 25.78 20.48 22.76 21.51 
 30% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (mil kg,P) 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 
Std.dev. ( mil kg,P) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Average N reduction (% P)  29.57 30.19 35 31.37 32.52 31.52 
 40% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (mil kg,P) 0.15 0.14 0.17 2.92 2.94 3.11 
Std.dev. ( mil kg,P) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.46 0.46 0.48 
Average N reduction (% P)  38.56 38.62 42.05 21.35 40.26 40.06 
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Table B-15. Raccoon River Watershed: The five-year moving average 1986-2003 P loadings 
distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20% goal Satisficing Policies Optimizing Policies 
  CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (kg,P) 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Std.dev. (kg,P) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Average N reduction (%P)  20.48 20.33 25.78 20.48 22.76 21.51 
 30% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (kg,P) 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.52 
Std.dev. (kg,P) 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Average N reduction (% P)  29.57 30.19 35 31.37 32.52 31.52 
 40% goal CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
Mean (kg,P) 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Std.dev. (kg,P) 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Average N reduction ( % P)  38.56 38.62 42.05 21.35 40.26 40.06 
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Table B-16. Boone River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity and asymmetric information, nitrogen 
Command and Control and Performance Standard  Outcomes,  Trading Outcomes, 20% goal 
    CAC, 
optimizing PS,optimizing CAC, satisficing PS, satisficing Optimizing Points  Satisficing Points 
  Cost, $ N red.  % Cost, $ Cost, $ N red.  % Cost N red.  % Cost, $ Price, $N red.  % Cost, $ Price, $
BRW, Nitrogen 20% goal 
Mean 1,792,679 20.9 1,667,155 7,231,175 25.7 5,760,977 19.6 715,220 1.9 22.1 939,440 2.34 
Std.dev. 38,944 0.0 38,935 200,556 0.1 187,421 0.1 21,631 0.1 0.1 25,934 0.10 
BRW, Nitrogen 40% goal 
Mean 9,010,815 40.4 8,906,493 29,573,330 43.1 28,510,856 39.3 5,054,855 8.6 41.4 6,020,182 9.7 
Std.dev. 162,446 0.1 163,253 900,772 0.0 896,056.5 0.1 119,496 0.3 0.1 142,750 0.3 
 
Table B-17. Boone River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity and asymmetric information, phosphorus 
Command and Control and Performance Standard  Outcomes, Trading Outcomes, 20% goal 
CAC, optimizing PS,optimizing CAC, satisficing PS, satisficing Optimizing Points Satisficing Points 
 Cost, $ P red.  % Cost, $ Cost, $ P red.  % Cost P red.  % Cost, $ Price, $P red.  % Cost, $ Price, $
BRW, Phosphorus, 20% goal 
Mean 1,238,579 21.7 1,070,494 9,448,262 26.7 3,705,462 21.8 399,318 19.8 20.3 337,180 18.05
Std.dev. 35,329 0.0 33,030 168,954 0.0 95,389 0.1 15,302 0.6 0.8 14,159 0.60 
BRW, Phosphorus, 40% goal 
Mean 8,141,578 40.1 7,277,636 35,555,008 41.8 32,401,774 40.5 3,572,479 346.6 37.0 1,953,064 117.7
Std.dev. 301,178 1.9 300,986 1,100,507 0.0 1,091,362.6 0.1 124,408 27.9 0.1 38,755 4.3 
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Table B-18. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity and asymmetric information, nitrogen 
    CAC, optimizing PS,optimizing 
CAC, 
satisficing  PS, satisficing Optimizing Points  Satisficing Points 
  Cost, $ N red.  % Cost, $ Cost, $ N red.  % Cost N red.  % Cost, $ 
Price, 
$ 
N red.  
% Cost, $ Price, $
RRW, Nitrogen 20% goal 
Mean 23,750,320 20.5 21,571,788 36,086,082 20.5 33,251,571 20.4 11,266,110 6.0 20.9 11,882,764 6.27 
StdDev 427,516 0.0 413,365 1,091,005 0.2 1,071,269 0.1 265,843 0.2 0.2 282,784 0.21 
RRW, Nitrogen 40% goal 
Mean 75,161,975 40.4 70,818,633 130,796,757 40.4 126,862,504 39.1 44,119,054 14.8 39.4 45,015,774 15.0 
StdDev 1,559,094 0.0 1,547,155 3,193,068 0.1 3,177,111.1 0.1 1,151,808 0.4 0.1 1,174,301 0.4 
 
Table B-14. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity and asymmetric information, phosphorus 
    CAC, optimizing PS,optimizing 
CAC, 
satisficing  PS, satisficing Optimizing Points  Satisficing Points 
  Cost, $ 
P 
red.  
% 
Cost, $ Cost, $ 
P 
red.  
% 
Cost 
P 
red.  
% 
Cost, $ Price, $ 
P red.  
% Cost, $ Price, $ 
RRW, Phosphorus 20% goal 
Mean 7,688,685 21.9 7,520,398 36,562,597 22.3 33,242,238 21.6 3,655,285 52.4 18.7 2,759,776 41.69 
StdDe
v 209,004 0.1 207,509 992,526 2.5 1,071,177 0.0 130,025 2.0 0.1 110,773 1.49 
RRW, Phosphorus 40% goal 
Mean 28,102,180 40.0 28,034,179 102,146,184 42.4 92,881,025 40.1 18,025,760 226.6 37.6 14,677,121 186.0 
StdDe
v 550,132 0.0 550,373 2,521,243 0.1 2,512,351 0.0 456,049 6.7 0.0 386,730 5.6 
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Figure B-16. Boone River Watershed: Simulated outcomes under cost heterogeneity, N abatement 
goals. 
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Figure B-17. Boone River Watershed: Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, P 
abatement goals. 
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Figure B-18. Raccoon River Watershed Simulated program outcomes under cost 
heterogeneity, N abatement goals. 
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Figure B-19. Raccoon River Watershed: Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity, 
phosphorus abatement goals. 
Raccoon River Watershed:Simulated program outcomes under cost heterogeneity:Phosphorus
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Table B-20. Raccoon River Watershed: Multiple Pollutant Policies Approach 
Abatement Target/CAC  Performance Standard Point‐Based	Trading 
 N P Total Cost  N P Total Cost  N P Total Cost 
20% 20% 34,798,819 20.5 30.5 31,497,076 19.1 28.7 13,083,876 
30% 30% 45,878,021 29.4 38.7 42,414,634 28.5 38.0 29,972,066 
40% 40% 133,378,501 39.2 46.5 127,983,306 38.9 46.3 56,411,315 
 
Table B-21. Raccoon River Watershed: Single Pollutant Point‐Based Trading 
Abatement Nitrogen only Point‐Based Trading Phosphorus only Point‐Based
Trading 
 N/P N  P Total Cost N P Total Costs 
20% 19.1 28.7 13,083,876 5.9 18.7 3,185,214 
30% 28.5 38.0 29,972,066 9.3 28.2 7,905,358 
40% 38.9 46.3 56,411,315 12.9 38.0 17,250,914 
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Table B-22. Boone River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of nitrogen loadings, satisficing 
policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
 Abatement goal 20% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 6,127,114 4,789,830 4,859,812 4,557,974 21.83 20.68 25.61 
1991–1995 6,169,094 4,817,656 4,877,292 4,570,282 21.91 20.94 25.92 
1992–1996 4,897,034 3,772,430 3,813,088 3,605,312 22.97 22.13 26.38 
1993–1997 4,751,094 3,621,582 3,692,788 3,481,006 23.77 22.27 26.73 
1994–1998 3,990,314 3,148,892 3,166,504 2,991,100 21.09 20.65 25.04 
1995–1999 4,592,024 3,706,796 3,737,448 3,484,086 19.28 18.61 24.13 
1996–2000 4,207,464 3,361,406 3,397,586 3,168,310 20.11 19.25 24.70 
1997–2001 4,795,664 3,786,320 3,846,404 3,564,974 21.05 19.79 25.66 
1998–2002 4,695,550 3,703,142 3,757,870 3,481,396 21.14 19.97 25.86 
1999–2003 4,129,190 3,273,026 3,315,480 3,065,136 20.73 19.71 25.77 
2000–2004 4,336,090 3,397,726 3,462,660 3,195,806 21.64 20.14 26.30 
2001–2005 4,702,210 3,684,604 3,744,528 3,440,588 21.64 20.37 26.83 
2002–2006 3,907,158 3,105,060 3,130,632 2,887,734 20.53 19.87 26.09 
2003–2007 4,893,212 3,873,232 3,917,558 3,624,202 20.84 19.94 25.93 
2004–2008 6,163,132 4,847,158 4,921,012 4,565,968 21.35 20.15 25.91 
2005–2009 5,448,292 4,301,074 4,349,266 4,060,960 21.06 20.17 25.46 
 Abatement goal 30% Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 6,127,114 4,351,228 4,255,128 3,995,086 28.98 30.55 34.80 
1991–1995 6,169,094 4,373,346 4,271,720 4,011,852 29.11 30.76 34.97 
1992–1996 4,897,034 3,499,172 3,330,636 3,183,968 28.55 31.99 34.98 
1993–1997 4,751,094 3,375,132 3,210,366 3,070,394 28.96 32.43 35.38 
1994–1998 3,990,314 2,835,610 2,790,908 2,614,768 28.94 30.06 34.47 
1995–1999 4,592,024 3,216,136 3,326,134 3,020,930 29.96 27.57 34.21 
1996–2000 4,207,464 2,924,096 3,011,556 2,735,186 30.50 28.42 34.99 
1997–2001 4,795,664 3,316,182 3,380,982 3,085,434 30.85 29.50 35.66 
1998–2002 4,695,550 3,238,834 3,300,300 3,004,002 31.02 29.71 36.02 
1999–2003 4,129,190 2,848,230 2,921,210 2,650,526 31.02 29.25 35.81 
2000–2004 4,336,090 3,045,304 3,019,632 2,801,086 29.77 30.36 35.40 
2001–2005 4,702,210 3,293,698 3,258,116 3,030,406 29.95 30.71 35.55 
2002–2006 3,907,158 2,753,932 2,739,746 2,543,292 29.52 29.88 34.91 
2003–2007 4,893,212 3,459,562 3,416,934 3,199,554 29.30 30.17 34.61 
2004–2008 6,163,132 4,388,648 4,281,888 4,038,490 28.79 30.52 34.47 
2005–2009 5,448,292 3,878,852 3,803,942 3,586,424 28.81 30.18 34.17 
 Abatement goal 40% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 6,127,114 3,830,846 3,804,134 3,601,614 37.48 37.91 41.22 
1991–1995 6,169,094 3,840,244 3,824,694 3,610,076 37.75 38.00 41.48 
1992–1996 4,897,034 3,075,842 3,001,530 2,868,304 37.19 38.71 41.43 
1993–1997 4,751,094 2,959,510 2,874,264 2,764,274 37.71 39.50 41.82 
1994–1998 3,990,314 2,490,050 2,461,086 2,348,906 37.60 38.32 41.13 
1995–1999 4,592,024 2,810,490 2,898,008 2,694,724 38.80 36.89 41.32 
1996–2000 4,207,464 2,543,956 2,614,896 2,434,454 39.54 37.85 42.14 
1997–2001 4,795,664 2,880,882 2,937,342 2,747,890 39.93 38.75 42.70 
1998–2002 4,695,550 2,807,214 2,857,508 2,670,162 40.22 39.14 43.13 
1999–2003 4,129,190 2,462,804 2,533,542 2,349,856 40.36 38.64 43.09 
2000–2004 4,336,090 2,638,188 2,621,130 2,475,712 39.16 39.55 42.90 
2001–2005 4,702,210 2,854,296 2,832,146 2,676,284 39.30 39.77 43.08 
2002–2006 3,907,158 2,387,586 2,368,434 2,237,808 38.89 39.38 42.73 
2003–2007 4,893,212 3,019,582 2,984,614 2,833,736 38.29 39.01 42.09 
2004–2008 6,163,132 3,816,804 3,770,646 3,575,940 38.07 38.82 41.98 
2005–2009 5,448,292 3,388,088 3,375,646 3,196,228 37.81 38.04 41.34 
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Table B-23. Boone River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of nitrogen loadings, optimizing 
policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
 Abatement goal 20% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 6,127,114 4,789,830 4,713,598 4,779,994 21.83 23.07 21.99 
1991–1995 6,169,094 4,817,656 4,877,292 4,808,708 21.91 20.94 22.05 
1992–1996 4,897,034 3,772,430 3,813,088 3,765,384 22.97 22.13 23.11 
1993–1997 4,751,094 3,621,582 3,692,788 3,614,932 23.77 22.27 23.91 
1994–1998 3,990,314 3,148,892 3,166,504 3,142,944 21.09 20.65 21.24 
1995–1999 4,592,024 3,706,796 3,737,448 3,699,844 19.28 18.61 19.43 
1996–2000 4,207,464 3,361,406 3,397,586 3,354,952 20.11 19.25 20.26 
1997–2001 4,795,664 3,786,320 3,846,404 3,779,526 21.05 19.79 21.19 
1998–2002 4,695,550 3,703,142 3,757,870 3,695,998 21.14 19.97 21.29 
1999–2003 4,129,190 3,273,026 3,315,480 3,266,724 20.73 19.71 20.89 
2000–2004 4,336,090 3,397,726 3,462,660 3,390,282 21.64 20.14 21.81 
2001–2005 4,702,210 3,684,604 3,744,528 3,677,472 21.64 20.37 21.79 
2002–2006 3,907,158 3,105,060 3,130,632 3,098,294 20.53 19.87 20.70 
2003–2007 4,893,212 3,873,232 3,917,558 3,864,518 20.84 19.94 21.02 
2004–2008 6,163,132 4,847,158 4,921,012 4,837,596 21.35 20.15 21.51 
2005–2009 5,448,292 4,301,074 4,349,266 4,293,428 21.06 20.17 21.20 
 Abatement goal 30% Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 6,127,114 4,789,830 4,713,598 4,779,994 21.83 23.07 21.99 
1991–1995 6,169,094 4,817,656 4,877,292 4,808,708 21.91 20.94 22.05 
1992–1996 4,897,034 3,772,430 3,813,088 3,765,384 22.97 22.13 23.11 
1993–1997 4,751,094 3,621,582 3,692,788 3,614,932 23.77 22.27 23.91 
1994–1998 3,990,314 3,148,892 3,166,504 3,142,944 21.09 20.65 21.24 
1995–1999 4,592,024 3,706,796 3,737,448 3,699,844 19.28 18.61 19.43 
1996–2000 4,207,464 3,361,406 3,397,586 3,354,952 20.11 19.25 20.26 
1997–2001 4,795,664 3,786,320 3,846,404 3,779,526 21.05 19.79 21.19 
1998–2002 4,695,550 3,703,142 3,757,870 3,695,998 21.14 19.97 21.29 
1999–2003 4,129,190 3,273,026 3,315,480 3,266,724 20.73 19.71 20.89 
2000–2004 4,336,090 3,397,726 3,462,660 3,390,282 21.64 20.14 21.81 
2001–2005 4,702,210 3,684,604 3,744,528 3,677,472 21.64 20.37 21.79 
2002–2006 3,907,158 3,105,060 3,130,632 3,098,294 20.53 19.87 20.70 
2003–2007 4,893,212 3,873,232 3,917,558 3,864,518 20.84 19.94 21.02 
2004–2008 6,163,132 4,847,158 4,921,012 4,837,596 21.35 20.15 21.51 
2005–2009 5,448,292 4,301,074 4,349,266 4,293,428 21.06 20.17 21.20 
 Abatement goal 40% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 6,127,114 3,712,472 3,715,339 3,700,865 39.41 39.36 39.60 
1991–1995 6,169,094 3,741,080 3,737,280 3,730,302 39.36 39.42 39.53 
1992–1996 4,897,034 2,936,242 2,941,900 2,927,510 40.04 39.92 40.22 
1993–1997 4,751,094 2,814,376 2,813,612 2,806,920 40.76 40.78 40.92 
1994–1998 3,990,314 2,410,366 2,399,370 2,404,024 39.59 39.87 39.75 
1995–1999 4,592,024 2,821,724 2,809,066 2,815,552 38.55 38.83 38.69 
1996–2000 4,207,464 2,547,911 2,532,842 2,542,055 39.44 39.80 39.58 
1997–2001 4,795,664 2,872,227 2,845,110 2,865,533 40.11 40.67 40.25 
1998–2002 4,695,550 2,792,261 2,765,408 2,785,065 40.53 41.11 40.69 
1999–2003 4,129,190 2,478,187 2,453,456 2,472,313 39.98 40.58 40.13 
2000–2004 4,336,090 2,567,917 2,544,812 2,560,457 40.78 41.31 40.95 
2001–2005 4,702,210 2,784,520 2,749,876 2,776,538 40.78 41.52 40.95 
2002–2006 3,907,158 2,329,822 2,297,662 2,322,936 40.37 41.19 40.55 
2003–2007 4,893,212 2,923,328 2,903,100 2,914,786 40.26 40.67 40.43 
2004–2008 6,163,132 3,707,904 3,675,404 3,696,602 39.84 40.36 40.02 
2005–2009 5,448,292 3,324,382 3,295,412 3,315,372 38.98 39.51 39.15 
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Table B-24. Boone River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of phosphorus loadings, 
satisficing policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
 Abatement goal 20% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 281,336 230,078 206,926 221,654 18.22 26.45 21.21 
1991–1995 288,470 237,302 214,312 228,752 17.74 25.71 20.70 
1992–1996 246,506 207,258 188,036 197,516 15.92 23.72 19.87 
1993–1997 249,838 209,594 191,234 199,684 16.11 23.46 20.07 
1994–1998 197,998 166,674 154,238 159,218 15.82 22.10 19.59 
1995–1999 210,966 173,746 162,956 169,748 17.64 22.76 19.54 
1996–2000 198,948 164,118 154,464 160,422 17.51 22.36 19.36 
1997–2001 235,192 193,282 180,960 189,398 17.82 23.06 19.47 
1998–2002 229,538 191,892 178,020 185,224 16.40 22.44 19.31 
1999–2003 209,122 175,314 162,588 169,700 16.17 22.25 18.85 
2000–2004 225,102 192,280 176,014 183,580 14.58 21.81 18.45 
2001–2005 244,472 208,554 190,766 199,760 14.69 21.97 18.29 
2002–2006 198,988 172,922 157,958 163,734 13.10 20.62 17.72 
2003–2007 241,300 206,000 188,894 196,582 14.63 21.72 18.53 
2004–2008 306,696 260,098 236,902 248,412 15.19 22.76 19.00 
2005–2009 276,976 234,032 214,788 224,188 15.50 22.45 19.06 
 Abatement goal 30% Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 281,336 200,700 181,960 196,276 28.66 35.32 30.23 
1991–1995 288,470 207,384 188,942 202,932 28.11 34.50 29.65 
1992–1996 246,506 182,720 167,304 177,100 25.88 32.13 28.16 
1993–1997 249,838 185,120 170,632 179,828 25.90 31.70 28.02 
1994–1998 197,998 148,376 138,836 144,874 25.06 29.88 26.83 
1995–1999 210,966 154,142 146,282 153,632 26.94 30.66 27.18 
1996–2000 198,948 146,058 138,976 145,926 26.58 30.14 26.65 
1997–2001 235,192 171,182 162,040 171,338 27.22 31.10 27.15 
1998–2002 229,538 170,504 159,808 168,102 25.72 30.38 26.77 
1999–2003 209,122 156,010 146,268 153,898 25.40 30.06 26.41 
2000–2004 225,102 172,050 158,612 166,880 23.57 29.54 25.86 
2001–2005 244,472 185,842 171,320 180,748 23.98 29.92 26.07 
2002–2006 198,988 155,202 142,676 149,234 22.00 28.30 25.00 
2003–2007 241,300 183,040 169,302 178,228 24.14 29.84 26.14 
2004–2008 306,696 229,618 211,218 224,126 25.13 31.13 26.92 
2005–2009 276,976 206,104 191,690 202,550 25.59 30.79 26.87 
 Abatement goal 40% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 281,336 166,764 160,206 173,276 40.72 43.06 38.41 
1991–1995 288,470 172,196 165,508 180,248 40.31 42.63 37.52 
1992–1996 246,506 151,870 146,340 160,168 38.39 40.63 35.02 
1993–1997 249,838 153,640 148,488 163,358 38.50 40.57 34.61 
1994–1998 197,998 125,744 122,236 134,202 36.49 38.26 32.22 
1995–1999 210,966 131,412 128,654 141,494 37.71 39.02 32.93 
1996–2000 198,948 124,864 122,548 135,126 37.24 38.40 32.08 
1997–2001 235,192 145,248 142,142 157,154 38.24 39.56 33.18 
1998–2002 229,538 143,734 139,980 155,070 37.38 39.02 32.44 
1999–2003 209,122 131,996 128,410 141,664 36.88 38.60 32.26 
2000–2004 225,102 143,054 138,378 153,244 36.45 38.53 31.92 
2001–2005 244,472 154,518 149,070 165,330 36.80 39.02 32.37 
2002–2006 198,988 129,570 124,840 137,976 34.89 37.26 30.66 
2003–2007 241,300 153,004 147,668 163,416 36.59 38.80 32.28 
2004–2008 306,696 190,618 183,610 204,078 37.85 40.13 33.46 
2005–2009 276,976 172,926 167,008 185,676 37.57 39.70 32.96 
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Table B-25. Boone River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of phosphorus loadings, 
optimizing policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
Abatement goal 20% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 281,336 216,618 216,374 217,566 23.00 23.09 22.67 
1991–1995 288,470 225,636 225,382 224,556 21.78 21.87 22.16 
1992–1996 246,506 196,072 195,864 194,188 20.46 20.54 21.22 
1993–1997 249,838 196,870 196,666 196,480 21.20 21.28 21.36 
1994–1998 197,998 157,824 157,662 156,784 20.29 20.37 20.82 
1995–1999 210,966 168,734 168,594 167,150 20.02 20.08 20.77 
1996–2000 198,948 159,314 159,178 158,040 19.92 19.99 20.56 
1997–2001 235,192 188,738 188,556 186,468 19.75 19.83 20.72 
1998–2002 229,538 185,114 184,902 182,424 19.35 19.45 20.53 
1999–2003 209,122 170,492 170,294 167,124 18.47 18.57 20.08 
2000–2004 225,102 183,870 183,652 180,946 18.32 18.41 19.62 
2001–2005 244,472 201,384 201,140 196,806 17.62 17.72 19.50 
2002–2006 198,988 165,026 164,830 161,458 17.07 17.17 18.86 
2003–2007 241,300 197,356 197,110 193,656 18.21 18.31 19.74 
2004–2008 306,696 248,064 247,742 244,612 19.12 19.22 20.24 
2005–2009 276,976 225,110 224,814 220,710 18.73 18.83 20.31 
Abatement goal 30% Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 281,336 192,726 192,588 194,414 31.50 31.55 30.90 
1991–1995 288,470 200,450 200,304 201,084 30.51 30.56 30.29 
1992–1996 246,506 176,304 176,184 175,696 28.48 28.53 28.73 
1993–1997 249,838 178,826 178,718 178,470 28.42 28.47 28.57 
1994–1998 197,998 145,798 145,726 143,952 26.36 26.40 27.30 
1995–1999 210,966 154,750 154,682 152,600 26.65 26.68 27.67 
1996–2000 198,948 147,332 147,282 144,988 25.94 25.97 27.12 
1997–2001 235,192 173,018 172,962 170,154 26.44 26.46 27.65 
1998–2002 229,538 170,624 170,544 167,006 25.67 25.70 27.24 
1999–2003 209,122 156,726 156,646 152,872 25.06 25.09 26.90 
2000–2004 225,102 168,320 168,206 165,756 25.23 25.28 26.36 
2001–2005 244,472 181,702 181,552 179,472 25.68 25.74 26.59 
2002–2006 198,988 149,736 149,592 148,252 24.75 24.82 25.50 
2003–2007 241,300 178,394 178,238 176,922 26.07 26.13 26.68 
2004–2008 306,696 224,440 224,248 222,414 26.82 26.88 27.48 
2005–2009 276,976 204,992 204,836 201,054 25.99 26.05 27.41 
Abatement goal 40% Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1990–1994 281,336 164,206 163,800 165,028 41.63 41.78 41.34 
1991–1995 288,470 171,448 170,996 172,092 40.57 40.72 40.34 
1992–1996 246,506 152,778 152,438 153,724 38.02 38.16 37.64 
1993–1997 249,838 155,334 155,062 156,716 37.83 37.93 37.27 
1994–1998 197,998 128,328 128,200 129,488 35.19 35.25 34.60 
1995–1999 210,966 134,882 134,770 136,300 36.06 36.12 35.39 
1996–2000 198,948 128,992 128,942 130,142 35.16 35.19 34.58 
1997–2001 235,192 149,996 149,880 151,082 36.22 36.27 35.76 
1998–2002 229,538 148,278 148,096 149,274 35.40 35.48 34.97 
1999–2003 209,122 136,238 136,006 136,464 34.85 34.96 34.74 
2000–2004 225,102 146,668 146,378 147,076 34.84 34.97 34.66 
2001–2005 244,472 157,962 157,598 158,536 35.39 35.54 35.15 
2002–2006 198,988 131,992 131,678 132,484 33.67 33.83 33.42 
2003–2007 241,300 155,914 155,614 156,606 35.39 35.51 35.10 
2004–2008 306,696 194,348 194,012 194,928 36.63 36.74 36.44 
2005–2009 276,976 177,826 177,570 178,084 35.80 35.89 35.70 
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Table B-26. Raccoon River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of nitrogen loadings, 
satisficing policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
   
  Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 17,244,174 13,849,844 12,334,732 13,777,676 19.68 28.47 20.10 
1987–1991 17,795,874 14,596,664 12,603,988 14,475,556 17.98 29.17 18.66 
1988–1992 18,028,676 14,911,240 12,736,352 14,704,710 17.29 29.36 18.44 
1989–1993 24,457,146 19,874,124 17,497,898 19,893,040 18.74 28.45 18.66 
1990–1994 24,611,696 20,010,434 17,576,928 20,073,484 18.70 28.58 18.44 
1991–1995 20,968,048 16,967,726 14,555,486 17,101,808 19.08 30.58 18.44 
1992–1996 20,019,328 16,340,018 14,212,436 16,303,548 18.38 29.01 18.56 
1993–1997 19,696,322 16,201,910 13,887,264 16,125,052 17.74 29.49 18.13 
1994–1998 17,703,074 14,971,026 12,186,198 14,628,482 15.43 31.16 17.37 
1995–1999 22,339,262 18,969,342 15,333,068 18,536,892 15.09 31.36 17.02 
1996–2000 18,902,572 16,055,141 13,200,789 15,699,483 15.06 30.16 16.95 
1997–2001 19,498,832 16,497,943 13,532,381 16,174,935 15.39 30.60 17.05 
1998–2002 19,738,886 17,079,815 13,824,499 16,633,115 13.47 29.96 15.73 
1999–2003 18,692,534 15,946,429 13,076,435 15,607,009 14.69 30.04 16.51 
1999–2003 19,710,314 16,736,269 14,003,181 16,422,907 15.09 28.96 16.68 
 Abatement goal 20% 
  Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 17,244,174 12,357,120 12,334,732 12,458,452 28.34 28.47 27.75 
1987–1991 17,795,874 12,629,362 12,603,988 12,844,970 29.03 29.17 27.82 
1988–1992 18,028,676 12,759,152 12,736,352 12,960,410 29.23 29.36 28.11 
1989–1993 24,457,146 17,546,220 17,497,898 17,918,348 28.26 28.45 26.74 
1990–1994 24,611,696 17,630,360 17,576,928 18,032,214 28.37 28.58 26.73 
1991–1995 20,968,048 14,581,136 14,555,486 15,145,768 30.46 30.58 27.77 
1992–1996 20,019,328 14,261,614 14,212,436 14,611,614 28.76 29.01 27.01 
1993–1997 19,696,322 13,930,360 13,887,264 14,328,280 29.27 29.49 27.25 
1994–1998 17,703,074 12,247,080 12,186,198 12,577,466 30.82 31.16 28.95 
1995–1999 22,339,262 15,393,508 15,333,068 15,902,044 31.09 31.36 28.82 
1996–2000 18,902,572 13,259,823 13,200,789 13,586,105 29.85 30.16 28.13 
1997–2001 19,498,832 13,572,661 13,532,381 13,989,765 30.39 30.60 28.25 
1998–2002 19,738,886 13,873,489 13,824,499 14,347,193 29.71 29.96 27.32 
1999–2003 18,692,534 13,087,113 13,076,435 13,499,435 29.99 30.04 27.78 
1999–2003 19,710,314 14,044,295 14,003,181 14,360,257 28.75 28.96 27.14 
 Abatement goal 40% 
  Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 17,244,174 10,623,488 10,919,790 10,871,738 38.39 36.68 36.95 
1987–1991 17,795,874 10,993,204 11,131,086 11,090,088 38.23 37.45 37.68 
1988–1992 18,028,676 11,247,356 11,163,668 11,127,010 37.61 38.08 38.28 
1989–1993 24,457,146 14,865,246 15,651,546 15,583,958 39.22 36.00 36.28 
1990–1994 24,611,696 14,965,832 15,699,474 15,635,096 39.19 36.21 36.47 
1991–1995 20,968,048 12,809,666 12,948,212 12,895,086 38.91 38.25 38.50 
1992–1996 20,019,328 12,222,590 12,653,326 12,596,672 38.95 36.79 37.08 
1993–1997 19,696,322 11,958,660 12,300,768 12,241,008 39.28 37.55 37.85 
1994–1998 17,703,074 10,939,178 10,534,222 10,492,188 38.21 40.49 40.73 
1995–1999 22,339,262 13,712,928 13,220,346 13,171,682 38.62 40.82 41.04 
1996–2000 18,902,572 11,700,009 11,458,669 11,418,432 38.10 39.38 39.59 
1997–2001 19,498,832 12,160,595 11,746,289 11,709,484 37.63 39.76 39.95 
1998–2002 19,738,886 12,497,439 11,999,501 11,962,564 36.69 39.21 39.40 
1999–2003 18,692,534 11,733,771 11,333,823 11,297,276 37.23 39.37 39.56 
1999–2003 19,710,314 12,279,533 12,219,611 12,174,106 37.70 38.00 38.23 
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Table B-27.  Raccoon River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of nitrogen loadings, 
optimizing policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
  Abatement goal 20% 
  Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 17,244,174 14,116,902 14,017,700 13,861,980 18.14 18.71 19.61 
1987–1991 17,795,874 14,510,322 14,478,648 14,561,100 18.46 18.64 18.18 
1988–1992 18,028,676 14,636,940 14,631,580 14,793,512 18.81 18.84 17.94 
1989–1993 24,457,146 19,954,844 19,887,876 20,007,850 18.41 18.68 18.19 
1990–1994 24,611,696 20,103,308 20,031,982 20,190,922 18.32 18.61 17.96 
1991–1995 20,968,048 17,064,310 17,016,948 17,210,078 18.62 18.84 17.92 
1992–1996 20,019,328 16,433,888 16,355,516 16,396,188 17.91 18.30 18.10 
1993–1997 19,696,322 16,175,290 16,112,194 16,213,512 17.88 18.20 17.68 
1994–1998 17,703,074 14,453,718 14,435,746 14,704,696 18.35 18.46 16.94 
1995–1999 22,339,262 18,178,998 18,183,438 18,628,542 18.62 18.60 16.61 
1996–2000 18,902,572 15,454,422 15,442,989 15,776,623 18.24 18.30 16.54 
1997–2001 19,498,832 15,866,104 15,891,393 16,255,965 18.63 18.50 16.63 
1998–2002 19,738,886 16,301,496 16,323,957 16,705,099 17.41 17.30 15.37 
1999–2003 18,692,534 15,448,476 15,463,313 15,689,963 17.35 17.28 16.06 
1999–2003 19,710,314 16,431,252 16,410,113 16,514,389 16.64 16.74 16.21 
 Abatement goal 30% 
  Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 17,244,174 13,153,446 13,040,808 12,489,308 23.72 24.38 27.57 
1987–1991 17,795,874 12,937,454 12,942,392 12,879,816 27.30 27.27 27.62 
1988–1992 18,028,676 12,789,324 12,849,622 12,997,656 29.06 28.73 27.91 
1989–1993 24,457,146 18,251,726 18,225,930 17,957,028 25.37 25.48 26.58 
1990–1994 24,611,696 18,298,526 18,287,016 18,073,616 25.65 25.70 26.56 
1991–1995 20,968,048 14,963,538 15,009,420 15,191,024 28.64 28.42 27.55 
1992–1996 20,019,328 14,684,682 14,678,860 14,651,832 26.65 26.68 26.81 
1993–1997 19,696,322 14,191,274 14,202,180 14,372,420 27.95 27.89 27.03 
1994–1998 17,703,074 11,771,980 11,870,920 12,628,106 33.50 32.94 28.67 
1995–1999 22,339,262 14,738,396 14,877,078 15,963,172 34.02 33.40 28.54 
1996–2000 18,902,572 12,801,729 12,881,545 13,630,562 32.28 31.85 27.89 
1997–2001 19,498,832 13,051,717 13,187,693 14,035,438 33.06 32.37 28.02 
1998–2002 19,738,886 13,403,367 13,547,591 14,390,082 32.10 31.37 27.10 
1999–2003 18,692,534 12,836,977 12,952,065 13,537,376 31.33 30.71 27.58 
1999–2003 19,710,314 14,099,093 14,145,015 14,393,114 28.47 28.24 26.98 
 Abatement goal 40% 
  Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 17,244,174 11,248,238 11,171,568 10,919,790 34.77 35.22 36.68 
1987–1991 17,795,874 11,238,692 11,222,944 11,131,086 36.85 36.94 37.45 
1988–1992 18,028,676 11,222,552 11,231,380 11,163,668 37.75 37.70 38.08 
1989–1993 24,457,146 15,830,840 15,782,404 15,651,546 35.27 35.47 36.00 
1990–1994 24,611,696 15,814,590 15,776,818 15,699,474 35.74 35.90 36.21 
1991–1995 20,968,048 12,843,692 12,866,058 12,948,212 38.75 38.64 38.25 
1992–1996 20,019,328 12,655,824 12,642,726 12,653,326 36.78 36.85 36.79 
1993–1997 19,696,322 12,163,306 12,173,888 12,300,768 38.25 38.19 37.55 
1994–1998 17,703,074 10,103,164 10,167,608 10,534,222 42.93 42.57 40.49 
1995–1999 22,339,262 12,508,072 12,596,162 13,220,346 44.01 43.61 40.82 
1996–2000 18,902,572 10,949,788 10,996,029 11,458,669 42.07 41.83 39.38 
1997–2001 19,498,832 11,152,630 11,230,935 11,746,289 42.80 42.40 39.76 
1998–2002 19,738,886 11,389,622 11,472,381 11,999,501 42.30 41.88 39.21 
1999–2003 18,692,534 10,732,466 10,819,707 11,333,823 42.58 42.12 39.37 
1999–2003 19,710,314 11,710,010 11,755,429 12,219,611 40.59 40.36 38.00 
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Table B-28. Raccoon River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of phosphorus loadings, 
satisficing policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
  Abatement goal 20% 
  Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 720,320 612,204 562,160 562,160 15.01 21.96 21.96 
1987–1991 725,760 600,664 587,420 587,420 17.24 19.06 19.06 
1988–1992 741,640 603,624 602,960 602,960 18.61 18.70 18.70 
1989–1993 1,018,780 842,444 824,240 824,240 17.31 19.10 19.10 
1990–1994 1,029,920 848,230 842,300 842,300 17.64 18.22 18.22 
1991–1995 979,440 795,390 812,460 812,460 18.79 17.05 17.05 
1992–1996 906,560 744,790 748,480 748,480 17.84 17.44 17.44 
1993–1997 872,080 713,710 722,120 722,120 18.16 17.20 17.20 
1994–1998 685,140 547,770 581,020 581,020 20.05 15.20 15.20 
1995–1999 794,900 632,660 660,480 660,480 20.41 16.91 16.91 
1996–2000 680,570 545,896 566,602 566,602 19.79 16.75 16.75 
1997–2001 772,830 616,616 625,782 625,782 20.21 19.03 19.03 
1998–2002 742,370 599,796 603,142 603,142 19.21 18.75 18.75 
1999–2003 784,310 634,636 625,442 625,442 19.08 20.26 20.26 
1999–2003 828,070 681,396 668,282 668,282 17.71 19.30 19.30 
 Abatement goal 30% 
  Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 720,320 515,866 508,068 500,598 28.38 29.47 30.50 
1987–1991 725,760 528,446 524,028 523,538 27.19 27.80 27.86 
1988–1992 741,640 542,326 538,948 536,438 26.87 27.33 27.67 
1989–1993 1,018,780 735,680 728,036 729,766 27.79 28.54 28.37 
1990–1994 1,029,920 746,384 739,040 745,934 27.53 28.24 27.57 
1991–1995 979,440 707,324 702,740 717,194 27.78 28.25 26.78 
1992–1996 906,560 662,364 656,460 661,574 26.94 27.59 27.02 
1993–1997 872,080 636,324 631,180 635,794 27.03 27.62 27.09 
1994–1998 685,140 513,084 510,200 514,294 25.11 25.53 24.94 
1995–1999 794,900 584,680 580,460 578,760 26.45 26.98 27.19 
1996–2000 680,570 506,806 501,866 498,680 25.53 26.26 26.73 
1997–2001 772,830 565,826 560,966 548,760 26.79 27.41 28.99 
1998–2002 742,370 551,526 545,346 533,420 25.71 26.54 28.15 
1999–2003 784,310 574,266 567,206 551,000 26.78 27.68 29.75 
1999–2003 828,070 614,386 609,266 593,600 25.81 26.42 28.32 
 Abatement goal 40% 
  Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 720,320 488,134 455,870 463,836 32.23 36.71 35.61 
1987–1991 725,760 466,094 452,870 479,776 35.78 37.60 33.89 
1988–1992 741,640 466,294 460,990 489,116 37.13 37.84 34.05 
1989–1993 1,018,780 652,354 627,184 667,198 35.97 38.44 34.51 
1990–1994 1,029,920 656,148 633,722 680,706 36.29 38.47 33.91 
1991–1995 979,440 606,548 594,762 649,526 38.07 39.28 33.68 
1992–1996 906,560 573,068 557,542 602,526 36.79 38.50 33.54 
1993–1997 872,080 541,928 530,182 577,426 37.86 39.20 33.79 
1994–1998 685,140 409,688 414,902 462,166 40.20 39.44 32.54 
1995–1999 794,900 470,800 471,640 518,620 40.77 40.67 34.76 
1996–2000 680,570 409,054 408,564 447,656 39.90 39.97 34.22 
1997–2001 772,830 459,714 462,064 493,316 40.52 40.21 36.17 
1998–2002 742,370 455,274 454,842 483,016 38.67 38.73 34.94 
1999–2003 784,310 483,294 479,162 500,916 38.38 38.91 36.13 
1999–2003 828,070 527,094 518,082 544,156 36.35 37.43 34.29 
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Table B-29. Raccoon River Watershed: Per period annual average distribution of phosphorus loadings, 
optimizing policies 
 Average Annual N loadings (kg) Annual Realized Reductions (%) 
 Abatement goal 20% 
 Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 720,320 549,722 549,380 543,732 23.68 23.73 24.52 
1987–1991 725,760 575,902 575,500 569,612 20.65 20.70 21.52 
1988–1992 741,640 591,502 591,340 584,712 20.24 20.27 21.16 
1989–1993 1,018,780 803,262 802,780 798,492 21.15 21.20 21.62 
1990–1994 1,029,920 818,980 818,540 816,080 20.48 20.52 20.76 
1991–1995 979,440 788,040 787,560 786,960 19.54 19.59 19.65 
1992–1996 906,560 727,680 727,320 724,440 19.73 19.77 20.09 
1993–1997 872,080 703,000 702,580 697,480 19.39 19.44 20.02 
1994–1998 685,140 567,560 567,460 562,160 17.16 17.18 17.95 
1995–1999 794,900 643,340 643,100 637,420 19.07 19.10 19.81 
1996–2000 680,570 552,558 552,338 548,006 18.81 18.84 19.48 
1997–2001 772,830 613,218 612,798 604,826 20.65 20.71 21.74 
1998–2002 742,370 590,818 590,338 584,726 20.41 20.48 21.24 
1999–2003 784,310 610,358 609,738 606,546 22.18 22.26 22.67 
1999–2003 828,070 652,398 651,758 650,686 21.21 21.29 21.42 
 Abatement goal 30% 
 Optimizing CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 720,320 489,834 489,618 495,912 32.00 32.03 31.15 
1987–1991 725,760 515,614 515,538 516,272 28.96 28.97 28.86 
1988–1992 741,640 531,914 531,838 528,452 28.28 28.29 28.75 
1989–1993 1,018,780 711,530 711,312 718,584 30.16 30.18 29.47 
1990–1994 1,029,920 725,184 724,994 734,514 29.59 29.61 28.68 
1991–1995 979,440 698,604 698,514 704,534 28.67 28.68 28.07 
1992–1996 906,560 651,204 651,094 650,974 28.17 28.18 28.19 
1993–1997 872,080 629,844 629,774 624,694 27.78 27.78 28.37 
1994–1998 685,140 519,884 519,894 505,354 24.12 24.12 26.24 
1995–1999 794,900 585,940 585,920 567,780 26.29 26.29 28.57 
1996–2000 680,570 503,924 503,884 489,430 25.96 25.96 28.09 
1997–2001 772,830 562,204 562,184 537,930 27.25 27.26 30.39 
1998–2002 742,370 542,884 542,784 524,050 26.87 26.88 29.41 
1999–2003 784,310 558,524 558,444 540,910 28.79 28.80 31.03 
1999–2003 828,070 599,464 599,384 584,850 27.61 27.62 29.37 
 Abatement goal 40% 
 Baseline CAC PS Trading CAC PS Trading 
1986–1990 720,320 435,630 435,634 450,678 39.52 39.52 37.43 
1987–1991 725,760 456,970 456,974 465,198 37.04 37.04 35.90 
1988–1992 741,640 471,790 471,794 473,558 36.39 36.39 36.15 
1989–1993 1,018,780 635,282 635,284 646,676 37.64 37.64 36.52 
1990–1994 1,029,920 646,576 646,576 659,070 37.22 37.22 36.01 
1991–1995 979,440 620,476 620,476 627,930 36.65 36.65 35.89 
1992–1996 906,560 581,676 581,696 583,910 35.84 35.83 35.59 
1993–1997 872,080 559,156 559,176 559,750 35.88 35.88 35.81 
1994–1998 685,140 454,216 454,236 446,150 33.70 33.70 34.88 
1995–1999 794,900 509,480 509,500 500,420 35.91 35.90 37.05 
1996–2000 680,570 442,968 442,988 432,494 34.91 34.91 36.45 
1997–2001 772,830 487,788 487,808 477,514 36.88 36.88 38.21 
1998–2002 742,370 475,418 475,438 468,242 35.96 35.96 36.93 
1999–2003 784,310 493,378 493,398 487,282 37.09 37.09 37.87 
1999–2003 828,070 530,078 530,098 529,922 35.99 35.98 36.01 
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 Tables and Figures for Chapter 5 
 
Table C-1. Point permit price in the presence of a carbon market, nitrogen 
 Nitrogen 
  $0 $5 $15 
Targe
t ܴ݁ݍܲ௉஻், $ ܴ݁ݍܲ௉஻்஼, $ Δܴ݁ݍܲ஼,% ܴ݁ݍܲ௉஻்஼, $ Δܴ݁ݍܲ஼,% ܴ݁ݍܲ௉஻்஼, $ Δܴ݁ݍܲ஼,%
20% 2.3 1.7 25.6 0.6 73.2 0 100.0 
30% 5.1 4.2 16.6 2.5 50.5 1 83.9 
40% 9.7 9.0 7.1 7.7 21.1 6 34.8 
 
Table C-2. Point permit price in the presence of a carbon market, phosphorus 
 Phosphorus 
 $0 $5 $15 $25 
Targe
t ReqP୔୆୘, $ ReqP୔୆୘େ, $ ΔReqPେ,% ReqP୔୆୘େ, $ ΔReqPେ,% ReqP୔୆୘େ, $ ΔReqPେ,%
20% 18.1 12.6 30.1 3.6 79.9 0.0 100.0 
30% 35.9 26.5 26.2 11.4 68.3 1.2 96.7 
40% 117.7 94.7 19.5 52.2 55.7 21.6 81.6 
 
Table C-3. Hotspots in the presence of a carbon market  
Price  $0 $5  $15  $25  
N abatement 
20% 0 15 7 6 
30% 0 6 4 6 
40% 0 4 4 4 
P abatement 
20% 9 102 159 160 
30% 8 79 158 160 
40% 8 74 153 158 
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Figure C-1. The distribution of the abatement actions 30% P abatement goal. 
 
 
 
 
Figure C-2. The overall trading activity, phosphorus abatement 
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Figure C-3. The spatial distribution of abatement actions, 30% nitrogen. 
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Figure C-4. The distribution of soil carbon sequestration, MtCO2e/acre. 
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